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Abstract:   
This dissertation draws on original data, including a survey of 1000 citizens, to 
demonstrate the effect of different types of education on political knowledge and political 
participation in a nascent, African democracy.  I find that any level of education, even informal 
and Islamic education, is positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of political 
knowledge as compared to having attend no school at all.  I find that formal education, 
particularly at the secondary and university level, is significantly correlated with higher levels of 
political participation in difficult activities: campaigning, willingness to run for office, and 
contacting a government official.  I argue that education contributes to political knowledge and 
participation by building citizens‟ sense of internal efficacy, and that the highest levels of 
education can endow citizens with French literacy – a key component of full political 
empowerment.  Additionally, I identify a positive, significant correlation between parents who 
enroll(ed) their children in public school, and certain forms of electoral participation, as 
compared to other Malian citizens.  I find a negative, significant correlation between madrassa 
consumers and voting as compared to any other citizens.  I argue that state schooling, as a social 
service, can foster voting among parents of students through policy feedback mechanisms; 
however, any form of Francophone schooling contributes to a family‟s ability to participate in 
politics by endowing them with a linguistic broker. 
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Chapter 1 
Democratic Transitions and Educational Expansion: Schooling and Regime-building in the 
21
st
 Century? 
1.1 Introduction 
The last two decades have ushered in substantial changes across sub-Saharan Africa as 
dramatic growth in primary school enrollment has accompanied sweeping transitions to 
democracy.   Heightened donor funding for basic education as well as the growth and 
accreditation of private schools, including for-profit and religious schools, have greatly expanded 
access to education for millions of African citizens.  Aid to education on the continent doubled 
between 2000 and 2004: rising from 1.8 to 3.4 billion USD in the context of the Education for 
All Campaign and Millennium Development Goals (EFA Monitoring Report 2007: 2).  
Governments have chosen to allocate scarce resources to expand access to public education, 
while simultaneously partnering with non-state school to reach enrollment targets.   Meanwhile, 
private secular and religious providers have blossomed in response to liberalization and 
overwhelming demand for education (Boyle 1999; Rose 2006).  As a result, primary school 
enrollment in sub-Saharan Africa increased by 36% between 1999 and 2005 (Education for All 
Monitoring Report 2008:5).  Despite these sweeping societal changes, political scientists have 
not yet explored their implication for democratic deepening.  This study aims to fill that 
analytical void: What effect do these increases in enrollment have on the democratization 
process? 
There are many reasons to believe that these changes could have an effect on citizens‟ 
knowledge of and participation in democracy.  Historically, the European state used its 
monopoly over education as a tool for deepening democracy by teaching citizens how to locate 
and express their political preferences through democratic channels, fostering loyalty, spurring 
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participation in formal political channels, and by strengthening the capacity of civil society.  
However, the current reality in many resource-poor nascent democracies looks very different: in 
liberalized education sectors, governments have partnered with non-state providers, some of 
which might use a non-official language of instruction.  Greater enrollment in non-state schools, 
including Islamic providers, as well as the public‟s perception of a decline in the quality of 
public education could potentially threaten democratic deepening. 
Most African countries or international donors did not articulate educational expansion as 
a strategy to improve democracy, but rather as a way to improve human development. However, 
the rich theoretical literature on education and democratization suggests that there may be 
reasons to expect unintended positive externalities on democracy and citizenship as a result of 
this dramatic policy change.
1
  My dissertation asks three important questions about the impact of 
education on citizenship in a resource-poor, nascent democracy.  What is the effect of different 
levels and types of education on citizen‟s political knowledge and participation in the context of 
declining quality of the public education? What are the effects of non-state education providers 
on citizens‟ political knowledge and political participation?  Particularly, what are the effects of 
Islamic schooling, on citizens‟ political knowledge and participation? 
 I conduct my study in Mali, a Muslim majority democracy where increases in enrollment 
are dramatic and schooling providers are diverse.  Since the democratic transition in 1991, 
Malian primary school gross enrollment rates have jumped from 26% to over to 82%.
2
   As a 
strategy to increase enrollment, the Malian government opened up its educational market to for-
profit providers, NGO-run community schools, Christian schools as well as madrassas – modern, 
                                                          
1
 In the case of Mali, government documents talked about the importance of education for citizenship, it 
but never implemented civic education or an equivalent course. 
2
  Numbers reflect the 2008-2009 school year.  Malian Ministry of Education Annual Report 2007 and 
Thunnissen 2009: 6.  
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Arabic language religious providers. During the 2006-2007 school year approximately 38% of 
Malian primary students attended non-public schools.
3
 The recent increase in enrollment as well 
as the variation in citizens‟ educational experiences provides fertile ground to test the effects of 
education on citizenship in nascent African democracies with liberalized education sectors. 
Over the course of this educational expansion, Mali successfully held four peaceful 
presidential elections, which resulted in two executive alternations of power.  This procedural 
progress has earned Mali one of the highest democracy scores on the continent, but we know 
little about the substantive trajectory of democracy that lies behind these institutional gains.   
Like all semi-democracies in Africa, a central question among political scientists and policy 
makers is whether democratic institutions in Mali are deepening or if they will remain trapped in 
“low intensity” equilibriums.4  I join those scholars who argue that the quality of democracy 
depends largely the degree to which democratic institutions are made responsive and accountable 
to their populations (Bunce 2005, O‟Donnell 2010, Ippolito-O‟Donnell 2006).  These questions 
are equally pressing for the policy community. In June 2010, Assistant Secretary for Africa 
Johnny Carson named the “consolidation of democratic gains” the first of five priority areas for 
US engagement with Africa. Despite its critical importance to democratic deepening, the 
relationship between citizens and government institutions remains largely unknown in Africa.
5
   
Existing comparative literature suggests that education can spur political enlightenment 
and engagement, thus improving the responsiveness and accountability of democratic regimes to 
their citizens (Bunce and Wolchik 2007; Almond and Verba 1963).  Despite the rich theoretical 
heritage of the study of education and citizenship and the educational expansion that has 
                                                          
3
 Malian Ministry of Education Annual Report 2007 
4
 I use “low intensity democracy” to describe countries that have formal electoral rules, but lack 
genuinely effective liberal democracy.  See Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Bunce 2000, and Tilly 2007;   
5
 Prominent studies of citizens democratic attitudes and behavior include in Africa include Bratton, 
Gyimah-Boadi, and Mattes 2005, Moehler 2008; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; McLean 2010;  
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accompanied democratic transitions, the direct relationships between education and citizenship 
has not been thoroughly explored in nascent African democracies.   
Documenting the relationship between educational experience and political citizenship is 
a complex and difficult task.  I draw on original research I conducted in Mali in 2007 and 2009 
to analyze the effects of greater access to education on citizenship and forecast the implications 
for the future of Malian democracy.  My study yields substantive and surprising findings.  I find 
that all educational experiences are correlated with increases in citizens’ political knowledge.  
While higher levels of education are correlated with the strongest increases in political 
knowledge, I find that even alumni of informal institutions, including Koranic schools and 
literacy programs, are more informed about politics than their peers with no schooling at all.  
Contrary to theoretical expectations, I find that there is no significant difference in knowledge 
between those students who attend secular or Islamic schools at the primary or informal levels.  I 
find that respondents with the highest levels of education, secondary or tertiary, are able to 
leverage their educational background to participate in the most difficult political actions.  I 
argue that French language literacy continues to pose an obstacle to citizens‟ sense of internal 
efficacy. 
 I find a second unintended “democratic benefit” of expanded public provision: greater 
parental participation in elections. I find that the average survey respondent whose child 
attend/attended public school reports voting and campaigning more often than other survey 
respondents.  As such, social service provision, and education provision in particular, has an 
added side benefit of pulling parents, as education consumers, into multiparty democracy.  In 
contrast, parents who send their children to Islamic schools are less likely to say they voted than 
other survey respondents.  While social service provision offers an opportunity for states to 
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connect with citizens, it is not the panacea for democratic development. This distinction, between 
public school parents and other citizens, only holds in the electoral realm; I do not find 
significant differences between public schooling and Islamic schooling consumers in other forms 
of political behavior or in their likelihood of having government identification.    
This study leverages original qualitative and quantitative data to demonstrate the micro-
dynamics of citizenship in a nascent, Muslim democracy.   It is one of the first attempts to 
forecast the impact of rapid increases in enrollment and liberalized provision on democratic 
deepening in Africa.
6
  It is the first study that to compare the impact of secular and religious 
instruction on citizenship in the developing-nation context. My findings point to the under-
studied role that education policy can play in deepening democracies by creating more capable 
democratic consumers and by contributing to citizens‟ practical ability to converse with state 
institutions in the former colonial language.  It highlights the important role that religious and 
indigenous language education can play in heightening citizens‟ cognitive skills, but also warns 
of the constraint colonial language acquisition poses to the development of full citizenship in 
low-literacy environments.  By stressing the ingredients for empowered citizenship, this 
dissertation challenges the ability to discuss democratic institutions or democratic deepening – 
without first questioning and addressing the citizens‟ level of information and empowerment. 
1.2 Education, Voice, and Loyalty: Strengthening Citizenship and Democracy 
To conceptualize the broader impact of individuals‟ education on the quality of 
democratic institutions, we must understand the micro-level base of citizenship and its larger 
relationship to institution-building. Albert Hirschman‟s logic from Exit, Voice, and Loyalty is 
helpful in demonstrating the role of citizens in legitimizing and improving democratic 
                                                          
6The other study is Lauren MacLean „s analysis of Afrobarometer, which argues that the deteriorating 
quality of public health and education provision induces those who utilize public services to participate 
more often than those with who do not use state services (2011). 
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institutions (1970).  Hirschman argues citizens‟ use of “voice” is necessary to keep institutions 
from falling into cycles of slack.
7
 In his seminal study of African political economies, van de 
Walle concludes that weak African governments are allowed to “slack” precisely because of the 
lack of pressure from citizens and civil society on these institutions (2001).   Citizens participate 
in politics to express their voice and provide feedback to government institutions, so that those 
institutions are pressured to improve their performance and become more responsive.  
Voice is a straight-forward analogy for political participation, but the concepts of loyalty 
and exit need further clarification in the contemporary African context.  I conceptualize loyalty 
as a belief in the validity of democratic institutions. Bratton et al have shown that most Africans 
support the abstract concept of “democracy,” but how this support translates to the local context 
and induces them to participate is complicated (2005). It is important to emphasize loyalty as a 
trust in institutions rather than specific politicians or regimes.  In their sub-regional study of 
Mexico and Argentina, Cleary and Stokes found that citizens in less democratic systems exhibit 
higher levels of interpersonal trust and trust in politicians (2006).  This type of trust might be an 
artifact of clientalism – a willingness to appeal to politicians‟ resources or work with community 
members to solve problems that the government fails to address.   Instead, we might 
conceptualize loyalty as diffuse trust in democratic institutions and “exit” as non-participation or 
non-engagement with the secular state.
8
  The loyalty Hirschman describes, like external efficacy, 
is a belief that one‟s feedback will improve the functioning of an institution. 
“Exit” as conceptualized by Hirschman is difficult in current African states.  As Pierre 
Englebert convincingly argues, weak states are deceptively permanent; abetted by rigid 
sovereignty norms and thus endowed with monopoly over the rule of law, citizens have few 
                                                          
7
 Exit Voice and Loyalty (1970). 
8
 I adopt David Easton‟s specification of “diffuse” trust in a general regime/institution to distinguish it 
from specific trust of a leader or party (1975).  
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options other than participate in the perverse system that perpetuates weak state authority (2009).  
Unlike Hirschman‟s consumer choosing between two brands, it is increasingly difficult for 
African citizens to exit away from state authority through rebellion or migration.
9
  Without 
loyalty to secular democratic institutions, citizens might withdraw to the protection of local 
barons, religious authorities, or extended family networks without making further demands on 
the state.  In the current context, with fixed boundaries of authority, passive exit may be induced 
by a persuasive local patron or created through alienation.    This is problematic for democratic 
institutions because citizens‟ retreat releases the government from the constructive pressure of 
their demands.   An extreme example of these dynamics is a 2002 protest in Nigeria where 3,000  
women demanded that Chevron Shell provide the communities where they were drilling with 
clean water, electricity, health care, and free education.
10
  The women appealed to Chevron 
directly without soliciting the mediation of their government.   
In his depiction of minority communities in the US, Amyarta Sen warns that exit can lead 
to lack of representation.  Describing the plight of African Americans, he argues,  
Democracy has to be seen as creating a set of opportunities, and the use of these 
opportunities calls for the analysis of a different kind, dealing with the practice of 
democratic and political rights.  In this respect, the low percentage of voting in American 
elections, especially by African Americans, and other signs of apathy and alienation, 
cannot be ignored.  Democracy does not serve as an automatic remedy of aliments as 
quinine works to remedy malaria.  The opportunity it opens up has to be positively 
grabbed in order to achieve the desired effect (1999: 155).  
 
The comparative and Western precedent suggests that Mali‟s strategy of liberalization 
and educational expansion bodes well for its democratic future.  The vast theoretical literature on 
political participation and existing empirical evidence highlight a positive relationship between 
education and democracy in three main ways.  1) Education creates more knowledgeable and 
                                                          
9
 See Lee Seymour‟s dissertation on the high failure rates of secessionist movements “Pathways to 
Secession: Mapping the Institutional Effect of Secessionist Violence” (2008). 
10
 http://www.ndwj.kabissa.org/Escarvos_Protest/escarvos_protest.html 
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competent democratic consumers; 2) as a social service it improves the governments‟ credibility 
and improves citizens‟ engagement with the democratic regime, which in turn fosters voice; 3) 
finally, it can spur participation through both formal institutional channels as well as informal 
venues of contestation. 
First, education is thought to teach citizens what their preferences are and how to express 
them autonomously.  Educated citizens are empowered citizens and less vulnerable to threats and 
incentives offered by political entrepreneurs.   In the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century debates over universal 
suffrage, opponents centered their arguments on the potential political exploitation of the less 
educated.
11
  How could those individuals who were less educated and less powerful be capable 
of identifying their own preferences and be trusted to articulate those preferences in formal 
political channels?  Twentieth century theorists of American democracy understand school to be 
a critical tool for socializing future citizens and teaching them how to participate in democracy. 
In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba provide an extensive list of practical reasons that more 
educated citizens are better democratic consumers. More educated citizens consume and 
disseminate political education to/from a broader range of sources, they are more aware of 
politics, have greater internal and external efficacy, are more likely to be a member of an 
organization, and are more confident in their social environment (1963: 317-318).   
However, education also plays a constitutive role in transforming “subjects into critical citizens” 
through the process of democratic enlightenment (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik 1996; Norris 1999).  
Amyarta Sen offers an eloquent description of this empowerment: “Social and economic factors 
such as basic education, elementary health care and secure employment are important not only 
on their own, but also for the role they can play in giving people the opportunity to approach the 
world with courage and freedom (1999: 63).” Nie et al argue that enhanced verbal cognitive 
                                                          
11
 I thank David Stasavage for highlighting this parallel 
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proficiency is at the root of this empowerment (1996).  Dalton argues that education decreases 
citizens‟ dependence on political parties by expanding their cognitive capacity (2006).  These 
skills aid citizens in obtaining objective information from multiple sources and expressing 
preferences.
12
 These skills improve citizens‟ own sense of internal efficacy. 
Second, education plays a pivotal role in creating loyalty and credibility for the 
government, which bonds citizens to formal channels of political expression.  While established 
democracies like the present-day US, the governing regime does not compete with alternative 
hierarchies of power for loyalty, hybrid democracies are still charged with the task of state-
building. Education provision played a vital role in the early years of state-building in Europe by 
establishing legitimacy and citizen support, and fostering civic virtue and nationalism 
(Hobbsbawm 1990, Gellner 1983; B. Anderson 1983; Laitin 1977; Laitin 1998; Weber 1976). 
Eric Hobbsbawm writes in Nations and Nationalism Since 1780:  
Naturally states would use the increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with 
their inhabitants, above all the primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of 
„nation‟ and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to country and flag, often 
„inventing traditions‟ or even nations for this purpose (92). 
 
Public education spreads a sense of national unity for learners, but also enables 
governments to consolidate their role as the exclusive symbol of authority to parents of pupils.  
Education also gives the government credibility and increased control.  In his discussion of the 
development of the welfare state in Europe and the US, Abram de Swan explains how 
government used primary education to “extend the reach of the state apparatus directly into the 
population at large (116).”   James Scott makes a similar argument around “legible” public 
                                                          
12
 It is also important to mention the socio-economic gains associated with education.  Citizens are 
attracted to education because of the promise of higher wages, prestige, and greater opportunities.  
Education endows citizens with connections and resources to invest in politics as well as the credentials 
“to be heard.”  
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education facilitating standardization and monitoring for the state and increasing its abilities to 
collect tax revenue (1998: 219).  
Government efforts to expand access to education can also be analyzed as potentially 
fostering political participation through policy feedback mechanisms, which provide resources 
and incentives for participation, activate citizenship identities, and influence perceived political 
efficacy (Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993).  In the American context, studies have shown 
that social service programs have the ability to shape political behavior (Mettler 2005; Campbell 
2003; Soss 2002).  For instance, Mettler and Stonecash find that experience with universal social 
programs has a positive relationship with the likelihood of voting, while participation in income 
limited programs was negatively related to the likelihood of voting (2008). 
There is also evidence from the developing nation context that governments can use 
public service provision to build credibility and connect with citizens.  Fox chronicles Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas‟ use of decentralized service provision in order to re-establish 
credibility and build direct support for the central government instead of local party bosses 
(1994).  More recent work in Brazil and Mexico has highlights how conditional cash transfer 
programs have raised voter turnout and support of the incumbent (Zucco 2011; De La O 2011). 
Third, it is almost undisputed that education fosters political participation in the Western 
context.  Scholars of American democracy demonstrate that higher levels of education are 
consistently associated with higher levels of political participation (Converse 1972; Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) find 
that education, even when controlling for income levels, increases the probability of all forms of 
political participation.  Nie et al argue that by inserting citizens in politically relevant centralized 
networks, education facilitates greater participation in more “difficult” political activities such as 
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contacting representatives, campaigning, and participating in community organization (1996).  
Greater citizen action is also a result of lower informational costs associated with political action 
as well as empowerment (Dalton 2006).  Sen argues that education empowers people to become 
agents that engage with their social, political and economic environment; he defines agents as “ 
someone who acts and brings about change, and those achievements can be judged in terms of 
her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria 
as well (1999: 19).
13
  Education is such a powerful tool, that some governments have feared that 
it would entice their citizens to make demands that they cannot satisfy.  Napoleon allowed public 
schools to atrophy as part of his strategy to “keep the masses ignorant (de Swann1988, 95).”  
Many early European states saw the education of the poor as building a revolutionary base.   
In addition to conventional forms of political participation, education also builds a richer 
civil society.  These civil society organizations can apply pressure to make the state more 
accountable through formal channels such as lobbying or through informal repertoires of 
contentious politics.
14
  Contentious mobilization relies largely on the identification of new 
opportunities for political engagement; education can empower an actor to see openings of 
political opportunity structures for mobilization.
 15
 Dalton argues that as educated citizens 
                                                          
13
 Sen continues, “This has a bearing on a great many public policy issues, varying from such strategic 
matters as the widespread temptation of policy bosses to use fine-tuned targeting (for ideal delivery to a 
supposedly inert population), to such fundamental subjects as attempts to disassociate the running of 
governments from the process of democratic scrutiny and rejection (and the participatory exercise of 
political and civil rights (19).” 
14
 Tilly and Tarrow define contentious politics as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on 
someone else‟s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in 
which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties (2007:4).”  
15
 Tarrow and Tilly have identified the opening of political opportunity structures relating to changes in: 
1). the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime; 2). its openness to new actors; 3). 
the instability of current political alignments; 4). the availability of influential allies or supporters for 
challengers; and 5). the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making (189).
15
   
 
 
12 
 
transition to “engaged” citizenship from partisan, “duty-based citizenship”, they are more likely 
to take part in these direct, contentious forms of participation (2008).   
In low-literacy environments, education can play a crucial role in fostering citizenship 
and democratic participation. Encapsulated in the larger theoretical project of creating “imagined 
communities” is the practical tool of language, which enables citizens to interact with the newly 
formed government bureaucracies.  In Peasants into Frenchmen, Eugene Weber highlights the 
pivotal role of village schools in making “French people French” by socializing them into 
“civilized” French culture, introducing them to the French government, and spreading the French 
language in the period preceding World War I (1976: 303).  Education de-mystifies new forms of 
authority and gives citizens the skills to understand and participate in this new arena of power.  
Citizens‟ familiarity and loyalty to the state facilitate the use of their political “voice.” In the 
American context, scholars have demonstrated the important role that the children of immigrants 
can play as linguistic brokers.  The children‟s language skills enable them to mediate interactions 
and engagements between their parents and the state (Bloemraad and Trost 2007; Weisskirch and 
Alva 2002; Vasquez, Pease-Alvarez, and Shannon 1994). 
In addition, expanded literacy and knowledge of technology can connect members of 
civil society to a greater multiplicity of power centers (Nie et al. 1996).  We can imagine that as 
groups of working-class or rural citizens become adept in the language of politicians and the 
international community, they can increase their links to people in positions of power and 
attempt to leverage these connections on behalf of their interests.
16
  Bunce and Wolchik argue 
that one of the reason post-Soviet states have had more complete democratic transitions is that 
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 Keck and Sikkink describe local social movements‟ use of international allies to pressure governments 
as the “boomerang effect” (1998). 
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their literacy rates at democratization were near 100% as opposed to much lower literacy rates in 
Africa (2007). 
1.3 Education, Voice, and Loyalty in Africa 
Participation is needed to improve institutional performance.  However, before moving 
forward, it is important to distinguish between blind allegiance to a regime and constructive 
participation for democratic institutions.  While the magnitude of imperfections in African 
elections is debated, most researchers acknowledge the widespread role of short term incentives 
on election-day (Collier 2009; Banegas 1998, Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005; Bratton 2008). 
Skepticism among citizens is rampant.  Afrobarometer data has shown that on the whole, most 
African citizens feel ignored by the democratic process.   Existing studies of education and 
political participation in Africa fail to acknowledge the complexity of motivations for political 
action as well as the varying capabilities of citizens partaking in the same behavior.  As a result, 
studies of education and political participation have not been able to identify a strong 
relationship.  However, this is likely due to the varying quality of electoral institutions and 
strength of educational systems in pooled Afrobarometer data as well as the various motivations 
for the seemingly identical behavior (Robert Mattes and Dangalira Mughogho 2009; Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2005, Ishamaya and Fox 2006). 
Given the preponderance of coerced participation as well as under-performing 
institutions, it is important to problematize the assumption that all political participation or 
loyalty to the regime is in of itself good.  In a context of imperfect democratic institutions, it is 
critical to ask what an ideal citizen would look like and how she should act.  In many societies 
that remain largely hierarchical and dependent on patron-brokers to reach voting blocs (Koter 
2009), institutions could benefit from citizens who are informed and willing to act independently.  
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I borrow Amyarta Sen‟s terminology to refer to these citizens as democratic agents.  Therefore, 
before turning to the question of participation, we must evaluate education‟s role in transitioning 
citizens from being “subjects” to democratic agents. Even though their behavior might look 
identical, citizens with knowledge of the political terrain and knowledge of their own political 
preferences who vote or campaign represent something qualitatively different than those citizens 
who vote because their political broker told them to.   The exclusive reliance on quantitative 
survey data fails to capture these substantial differences. 
Unfortunately, few studies have explored the holistic role education plays in helping 
citizens transform into democratic agents.  The empirical comparative evidence that exists 
suggests that education could empower citizens by giving them the linguistic skills to access a 
full range of information, helping them to adjudicate between clientalist appeals and 
performance-based retrospective voting, and increasing their civic skills. In her study of slum 
dwellers in Senegal, Resnick found that attending school was positive and significantly 
correlated to respondent‟s ability to describe the opposition‟s development plan Assises 
Nationales (2010: Chapter 4 Page 64). In a related vein, experimental data shows that access to 
information about incumbent candidate performance influenced citizens‟ retrospective voting 
and can help citizens to overcome clientalist pressures to bloc-vote.
17
 In a recent Afrobarometer 
paper Robert Mattes and Dangalira Mughogho argue that more educated citizens as well as those 
that use news media more frequently are more likely to offer political opinions.
18
  Using original 
data from Senegal, Michelle Kuenzi demonstrates that experience with non-formal education, 
                                                          
17
 See Pande (2011) for a review of experimental work on access to information in developing 
democracies. See Gine and Mansuri (2010) for the information campaigns on Muslim women‟s 
participation; Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) suggest that information asymmetries fuel clientalism.  
18
 Political opinions included the ability to provide evaluations of performance of political regime, 
opinions on democracy as compared to other regime types, and define democracy in their own terms.   
The authors used political knowledge as a separate independent variable on participation, rather than 
testing if education had a direct effect on political knowledge. 
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literacy and numeracy classes, has a strong positive impact on political participation and 
community participation by increasing participants‟ self –esteem, civic skills, and community 
solidarity (2006: 5). 
Returning to productive participation, we must ask: how might education help citizens to 
participate in an empowered fashion in an environment of low external efficacy?  While 
educated citizens might be more supportive of the theoretical idea of democracy (Rose and 
Evans 2007), it is not evident that they would provide more “specific support” to poorly 
functioning institutions.
19
 It would be naïve to assume that educated citizens would reward 
under-performing institutions with loyalty or unqualified support.  In fact, uneducated citizens 
might be more likely to succumb to vote-buying and/or more likely to be coerced into support for 
the ruling regime.   In his study of elections in Kenya, Kramon finds more educated citizens to be 
less susceptible to vote-buying by political entrepreneurs (2010).   Recent analysis of 
Afrobarometer data reveals that educated citizens are more willing to offer critical opinions of 
the president and other political actors (McCauley and E. Gyimah-Boadi 2009).  Devra Moehler 
notes that citizens who participated in Uganda‟s reform tended to be more critical of the 
performance of local government (2008).  Rather than generating trust in government, greater 
knowledge could generate greater disillusionment that stymies participation (2008).   
We do not expect education to generate specific trust for individual leaders, but education 
can aid citizens in making informed decisions about competing candidates or parties and it can 
also help them to participate in “more difficult” activities, which require greater cognitive and 
linguistic skills (Nie et al 1996).  While not all states, like Nigeria, have educational 
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 I borrow David Easton‟s concept of specific trust to refer to support or trust for the current democratic 
actors.  
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requirements to run for office, it is a known fact that a successful politician will have to 
demonstrate dexterity in the former colonial language.  In Africa, education has an accelerated 
effect on verbal cognitive proficiency because it helps to eliminate the paradox that plagues most 
citizens: the government speaks a language that is not your own.  Literacy in the colonial 
language enables citizens to listen to the nightly news broadcast or televised debates, but also 
helps them to craft a formal written request to state authorities or respond to a government letter 
without the fear of exploitation.    Language acquisition plays a vital role in helping citizens 
develop their full participatory potential – allowing them to participate in politics without limits 
and without fear of exploitation.  Unfortunately, there is very little literature on these connections 
on the micro-level.  In his study of Nigeria in the 1960s, Abernethy argues that opening 
educational opportunities, spreading literacy, and the creation of a common language shaped a 
more powerful and political organized civil society, which was able to levy demands on the 
newly independent government (1968).  In her analysis of Afrobarometer data, Lauren Maclean 
demonstrates that those people with higher levels of education are most likely to contact an 
elected official and higher frequency of collective participation (2012). 
On the other hand, education might actually disrupt patterns of political mobilization.   
Education might fashion skeptical and disillusioned consumers who chose not to participate or it 
might awaken political expectations that nascent budgets and economies cannot meet.  Almond 
and Verba (1963) and Hirschman (1970) warn readers about the consequences of too much 
“voice;” governments need adequate space to make policy decisions without being suffocated by 
citizens‟ demands.    Huntington cautions that education and subsequent social mobilization 
could overwhelm a nascent democratic government (1968). In poorly performing democracies 
greater knowledge might breed greater expectations and higher criticism of the government that 
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ultimately leads to rebellion or regime change.  While van de Walle‟s analysis points to the 
dearth of citizens‟ voice in African politics, it is important to recognize that education might 
reshape citizens‟ expectations about their own economic opportunities as well as the state of 
democracy (2001).  In a worst case scenario, education could be disruptive for democratic 
society as citizens could take up arms – as was the case of the Shining Path in Peru or anti-
colonial liberation movements led by student leaders in Mozambique.
20
  Educated citizens‟ 
discontent with the governing regime has led to Islamic revivalist movements like the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt (Rofesky-Wickam 2002) and more recently the Arab Spring in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Yemen.  While these movements flourished against authoritarian 
regime, one might imagine similar revolts against a non-performing democracy or hybrid regime.   
However, there is an additional threat that education might disrupt productive, traditional 
channels of political mobilization.   Education, particularly western education, might awaken an 
individualist spirit in pupils that conflicts with the communitarian organization of larger society.  
Victor Uchendu argues that education offers opportunities for a few non-elites, but in doing so, 
extricates them from the struggle of their less-educated peers. 
Education is one of the most important mechanisms of control in all societies.  In the first 
place, education is central because of its relationship to social mobility.  Furthermore by 
offering a personal escape route to those with low status, it tends to weaken interest in 
collective efforts by those who remain (1978: 29).
21
    
With sights on their own personal mobility, students might be less invested in associational or 
group membership, and therefore, less willing to participate in traditional channels of 
mobilization for group grievances.  
                                                          
20
 I thank Ken Roberts for highlighting the de-stabilizing potential of education.  
21
  As Abram de Swan writes, “Educating the lower ranks of society would not profit them or benefit 
society; rather the opposite: it might turn workers and peasants away from their appointed course in life, 
inspire discontent and awaken higher aspirations (1988: 54).” 
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 1.4 Competing for Allegiance: Education in the Third Wave 
Two other aspects of the current educational market alter the way that education may 
affect participation: the declining perceived quality of public education and liberalized education 
– including partnerships with Islamic schools.  We do not yet understand the role and impact of 
non-state providers on democratic participation – especially in the context of relatively weak 
democratic institutions.  In a worst case scenario, non-state schools could divide citizens, foster 
parochial attitudes, undermine state legitimacy, and remove one of, if not the only, sources of 
citizen contact with the state, thus decreasing political knowledge and participation.  A middle 
class exit out of state schools and a perceived decline in the quality of public education might 
reduce the perceived importance of political voice and/or make the state seem like a less credible 
form of authority. 
Non-state provision, through either a secular or religious provider, could pull people away 
from public sphere by making performance of the state less relevant to their lives. Scholars have 
documented a middle class exodus from public schools in Africa due to a perceived decline in 
public school quality (MacLean 2011; Boyle 1999). In his three country study of Kenya, Congo, 
and Cameroon, Patrick Boyle highlights the exodus of wealthy citizens to private schools in what 
he calls the era of “sauve qui peut (1999).”  These schools cater to wealthy clientele, who can 
buy their way out of the poor quality government provider, while public schools are left to 
atrophy.  Boyle argues that this provision scheme is creating a separation of classes that shapes 
the character of civil society formation in the region. Lauren MacLean highlights broader class 
stratification through service provision in Ghana and Cote d‟Ivoire (2007).  She finds that the 
many middle class citizens are mirroring the elite movement away from public schools and 
paying their way into low cost private providers.  Middle class citizens hope to make a future 
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investment for their children with the scarce resources they have, while the poorest citizens are 
unable to access the capital to pay private school fees.  There has been significant growth of low-
cost for-profit providers, primarily in urban and semi-urban, areas in response to the middle class 
demand for education.  The exit away from public institutions makes these institutions less 
relevant for middle class citizens, thus perhaps, decreasing their incentives to provide political 
feedback to the government.   
Due to the liberalized nature of education provision in weak, nascent democracies, non-state 
social service provision might compete with or undermine allegiance to the state.  Political 
science research provides evidence that citizens make comparative judgments (Rose, Shin and 
Munro: 1999).  If a non-state provider, even an apolitical organization, is offering better services 
than the state can provides, citizens could form harsher judgments about their state, which impact 
the state‟s perceived credibility and legitimacy.   Historically, non-state entities, particularly have 
used service provision to build support.  During the colonial period, Christian missionaries in 
Africa built schools as entry points to communities where they wanted to build churches 
(Abernethy 1968).  The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have used social service provision as 
the foundation for their successful political movements (Rofesky-Wickham: 2002). Political 
parties in India and Lebanon have used social service provision to recruit voters outside of their 
traditional base of support (Thachil 2009; Camnet and Issar 2010).    Rebel groups have also 
used educational indoctrination and service provision to build legitimacy for the movement 
(Weinstein 2007).  By liberalizing the education sector, African governments may be forfeiting 
the allegiance-building mechanisms reaped from public goods provision and passing them on to 
other entities. 
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New empirical evidence suggests that state service provision can induce citizens to vote.  
Based on her fieldwork in Ghana and Cote d‟Ivoire Lauren MacLean demonstrates that in the 
shadow of structural adjustment reforms those citizens who have contact with either public 
schools or public health clinics are more likely to vote, contact political leaders, attend 
community meetings, join with others to make their voices heard, and protest, more frequently 
over the past year than those than other citizens who did not have this contact (2012).  Those 
citizens who had no experience with public schools or clinics used non-state political channels 
more frequently (2012: 25). MacLean‟s contribution is ground-breaking as she is the first to link 
policy feedback literature to the developing nation context.
22
  However, her measure of “non-
users” is murky as it could include private service users as well as the most marginalized citizens 
with access to no service and users of religious or NGO services; it needs to be disaggregated 
further in order to understand the specific benefits of public provision.  The behavior of those 
citizens without access to any service might be very different from those with access to private 
services; similarly, different private service providers might trigger different patterns of political 
participation. Similarly, she cannot disaggregate between people who attended public schools 
and those who sent their children to these schools.   
The proposition of “allegiance-building,” seems particularly important since the 
provision of primary school education funding, along with other tangible government outputs 
such as health services and infrastructure, represent a way for governments to connect with 
voters in rural areas.  If citizens are without tangible evidence of their governments, it is more 
difficult for them to recognize the government‟s capabilities. The need to connect with citizens is 
particularly pressing in weak states, where citizens have little contact with or evidence of a 
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 By comparing use of schools and hospitals, MacLean is able to respond to criticism that the effects are 
caused by education itself rather than the receipt of services.   
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central government.  Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan‟s depiction of rural Central African 
Republic offers a hyperbole of this struggle (1997).  With little physical evidence of the state, 
government officials work tirelessly to demonstrate the state‟s existence and authority. 
Finally, the educational content offered at non-state schools could differ from the state 
education that we associate with citizen-making.  Non-state providers, particularly ideologically-
charged Islamic schools, could pose a challenge to the logic that education breeds support for 
democracy. Dahl argues that American education emphasizes liberal-democratic value, and thus:  
“The greater ones formal education, the more likely he is to endorse the key propositions in the 
prevailing ideology (1967:  335).”  Post 9-11, there is an active policy debate about the role of 
madrassas in Muslim societies (Hefner and Zaman 2007).  Islamic providers could have an 
ideational impact that restricts political knowledge and state-oriented political behavior.  
Furthermore, education in Arabic or indigenous languages does not provide students with the 
same linguistic currency needed to interact with state bureaucracy.   
In the Sahel, Madrassas and Koranic schools are tied to a specific history of contestation 
with the secular state.  While the Catholic Church and colonial authorities were aligned, Islamic 
education faced either isolation from the state, in the case of the British, or elimination and 
resistance, as was the case for French colonial authorities.
23
  When the Europeans arrived in 
West Africa, Koranic schools were already widespread (Sanankoua 1985).  For instance, in 
Guinea in 1907 there were almost 3,000 Islamic schools and 18,000 students (Johnson 1979: 
221).
24
  The French colonial authorities were astounded that leaders from the Fouta Diallo region 
of Guinea, who had a weak command of the French language, could speak fluent Arabic (Ibid: 
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 This is reflected in the British policy of indirect rule in Northern Nigerian, but also in Sudan, where 
British colonial officials forbade missionaries to evangelize among Muslims.  See Sanderson (1975) and 
Abernethy (1968). 
24
 Johnson (1975) 
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221).  In Northern Nigeria there was also a relatively strong system of Islamic education.  In 
1931, approximately 30, 0000 Islamic schools enrolled between 200,000 - 360,000 students 
(Ibid: 153).  The French government, struggling to establish rule in many territories with 
predominantly Muslim populations, and sought to co-opt or eliminate Koranic education.  They 
feared “Islamic fanaticism” and saw it as a significant challenge to their own “mission 
civilisatrice.
25”  They closed many schools and led campaigns against Muslim leaders.    In some 
of the French held colonial territory, the campaign against Islam, as well as the colonialists‟ 
aggressive forced labor recruitment practices, reduced the numbers of students in Koranic 
schools.
26
  Johnson‟s study of Guinea highlights the French attack on Koranic education.   In 
Labe, in 1910 there were 1945 Koranic schools with 5538 pupils.  By 1940, there were only 192 
Koranic schools with 1823 pupils in addition to six French schools with 704 pupils (1979: 224).  
This tension plagued independence transitions as many post-colonial states continued to exclude 
Islamic schools from government aid or accreditation. 
Given the tumultuous relationship between the government and Islamic education, fear 
and distrust might linger despite recent pacts and partnerships (Gandolfi 2003).  It is unclear that 
madrassas and Koranic schools will instill the liberal-democratic ethos and support for the ruling 
regime that Dahl esteemed crucial for democratic citizenship (1967).  It is possible that by 
attending a madrassa a student or parent could become integrated into an alternative community 
that values concentration on one‟s personal moral improvement and relationship with God.  
These communities might encourage civic engagement exclusively through actions mediated by 
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 Mission civilisatrice refers to the French civilizing mission that sought to turn educated African into 
French subjects through an assimilation process. 
26
 The French government routinely captured young men from schools and other public places to 
complete infrastructure projects through forced labor. 
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their mosque or religious leader and distrust and opposition to the state and its formal channels of 
participation. 
Alternatively, Afrobarometer finds more religious respondents to be more supportive of 
the president, more trusting of their compatriots, and to have greater interest in public affairs 
(McCauley and Gymiah-Boadi 2009: 16).  If religious students are somehow more approving of 
status quo and less willing to be critical, these values could impede their transition from subjects 
to citizens. Amaney Jamal argues that civic associations need to be contextualized and 
challenges the assumption that all organizations are breeding grounds for both interpersonal trust 
and civic participation.  She identifies Palestinian associations‟ link to political power as the 
crucial factor determining how politically engaged members of each association are and 
conversely how much interpersonal trust they exhibit (2007: 13).  Through a similar logic, the 
need to conceptualize and disaggregate forms of non-state education and their relationship to 
government power in the Malian context seems just as pressing. 
1.5 Research Design 
What is the impact of education on citizenship in Africa in the current democratized, 
liberalized era? The best existing data on citizenship and education is found in the Afrobarometer 
survey.  However, it is limited in its ability to capture complete educational profiles.  It includes 
each respondent‟s level of education, but fails to disaggregate their educational profiles by 
school types. My study‟s focus on education brings greater precision to each respondent‟s 
educational history by including school type as well as the length of schooling experience.  Our 
research team focused on eliciting comprehensive responses about education in all school types. 
For instance, we found that the French or Bambara translations for school “école” or “kalanso” 
carried an association with formal western education.  When asking Malians about their 
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educational history, we found that citizens who had attended Islamic schools or participated in 
informal literacy trainings would often claim that they never went to school.  Only after 
secondary questions that probed into specific types of informal education did respondents reveal 
that they did in fact go to a school.
27
  In addition, my project adds a second dimension by looking 
at school choice and school performance to analyze how the parents‟ relationship with the state 
as a welfare-provider might impact political trust, knowledge, or participation.  The expansion of 
education in Africa represents the largest government push to increase social well-being of 
citizens.   It is critical that we better understand the effects of provision on social service 
consumers. 
My dissertation draws primarily on an original survey of 1000 citizens in ten school 
districts in five regions in Mali to analyze the relationship between education and citizenship for 
students as well as parents. The survey generated education profiles for parents and their 
children, which allows me to analyze  the impact of length of education, type of schooling, and 
participation in school management on respondents‟ political knowledge, trust, and participation.  
The survey data uses closed-ended questions, which allow me to compare attributes of different 
citizens through statistical analysis.  My research innovation was the systematic inclusion of 
qualitative justifications for citizen responses to better understand the mechanisms driving 
correlations between education, knowledge, and participation.
28
  I complement the survey data 
with more than fifty interviews with educators, government officials, and members of civil 
society as well as a survey of 200 university students, data on elected officials education profiles, 
and 450 exit polls during the municipal elections in Bamako.  This data provides for a further test 
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 This difference is apparent if one compares the number of respondents who reported attending informal 
school in my sample (29%) as compared to the Afrobarometer Mali average of 22%.  
28
 While justifications were not elicited for all respondents, research assistants were trained to capture the 
qualitative reasons citizens gave for their responses (if any such justifications were given). 
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of observable implications of the mechanisms driving correlations generated through survey 
work by providing insight into observed voting behavior, detailing educational differences 
between citizens and elected leaders, and allowing us to compare respondents to an “elite” group 
of university students.
29
   In addition, I obtained sub-national data from Ministry of Education 
and the Administration Territorial as well as data from the national archives and national 
assembly.  This descriptive data allows me to better describe the current and historic educational 
and democratic landscape in Mali. 
I chose a sub-national research design for three reasons as outlined by Snyder (2001).  
First, my research design enables me to explore a diversity of educational provision profiles in 
Mali, while controlling for many institutional factors.  As described above, even in those 
countries that have crossed the democratic threshold, the quality of institutions and the 
comparative value of different educational degrees varies greatly across African countries.  
While there is also regional variation in terms of educational and democratic quality – restricting 
the study to citizens in Mali gets us closer to understanding how education might affect 
knowledge and participation holding these other institutional factors constant. Secondly, the 
focus on Mali, allowed me to cultivate and capitalize on specialized area knowledge – thus 
increasing the accuracy of my coding and interpretation of causal inferences.
30
  While colonial 
language knowledge might prove sufficient in countries with higher literacy rates or for a study 
of elites, an analysis of regular citizens‟ opinions and behavior in a population where less than 
30% of people speak French requires that the researcher speak some Bambara.  Language 
knowledge is useful in earning respondents‟ trust, but also in dissecting and translating citizens‟ 
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 Diverse sources of data provide greater potential sources of observable implications.  King, Keohane, 
and Verba advocate collecting data on as many observable implications as possible (1994: 24). 
30
 My first visit to Mali was in 2002; I have made five subsequent trips including my year of fieldwork.  
By living with a Malian host family and through language training with my research assistants, I have 
obtained proficiency in Bambara. 
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understanding of democratic concepts that we often assume to be identical to the Western 
context.
31
  Lastly, by comparing residents in school districts thousands of kilometers apart, I can 
investigate important spatial variation in political phenomena, while again controlling for 
institutional factors.
32
 While it is often more tempting and (academically rewarding) to seek out 
variation across borders, sub-national variation in many countries remains under-explored 
despite very important differences across region: ethnicity, language, political economy, 
proximity to foreign actors, and mobilization patterns.  Mali is one of the largest and most 
diverse countries in Africa. Covering more than 478,767 square miles, Mali contains dense forest 
regions, vast Savannah, and uninhabitable desert. My original strategy was to select two districts 
from a geographically diverse group of five regions: Bamako, Kayes, Sikasso, Timbuktu, and 
Mopti.  Due to insecurity in the North of Mali, we were only able to conduct surveys in one 
school district in Timbuktu.    
Given limited time and resources, I felt that I could generate a better contribution to 
political science with an intensive study of Mali, rather than doing a series of three-month studies 
in Accra, Cotonou, Bamako, and Lagos.  In addition, Mali is understudied by political scientists 
and possesses key attributes that I sought to examine: rapid expansion of primary education in 
the context of high illiteracy rates and a diversity of education providers including Islamic 
schools.  I think of my contribution largely as a theory-building exercise, which I would 
eventually like to test in other poor, Muslim countries with high illiteracy and rapid, liberalized 
educational expansion.   
1.6 Sampling and Survey Implementation in Mali 
                                                          
31
 For instance, during the translation of the survey instrument – I was able to dialogue with my research 
assistants about the different cultural and contextual meanings of various phrasings.   
32
 See for Richard Snyder 2001 for the merits of sub-national research design; Kalyvas' The Logic of 
Violence in Civil War   demonstrates exemplary use of multiple methods and within country-variation. 
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Survey work in Mali is a formidable and expensive task, which I could never have 
accomplished this project without the help of my research team.
33
  The primary members of the 
team participated in a month long training, in which we covered relevant political science 
theories and research methodology.  After much discussion over phrasing, cultural 
appropriateness, and measurement, the survey instrument was translated into French, Bambara, 
and Songhrai.
34
   In eleven months together our team grew close as we faced the obstacles that 
plague any group attempting to do household surveys in five regions in Mali.  This data was 
obtained despite stifling 115 degree heat in Bamako, extensive mechanical problems with my 
1984 Mercedes D- 90, bouts of malaria, snakes that invaded our concrete bedrooms in Sikasso, 
commutes in wooden pinasses during bridge outages, and an Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) kidnapping and travel warning that prevented me from accompanying my team to the 
North of the country 
 The majority of surveys were conducted in a team of two – with one coder and one 
person who posed the questions.  This enabled the coder to capture qualitative justifications for 
closed-ended responses.  In this sense, the surveys often became more like interviews.
35
 The vast 
majority of surveys were conducted without interpretation – enabling respondents to express 
themselves freely in local language. My Bambara language skills enabled me to participate in the 
actual survey process as nearly 80% of the surveys were coded in Bambara.  I was present and 
                                                          
33
 The team included four assistants.  Three research assistants were selected from a group of twenty 
university graduates who interviewed for the position.  One research assistant, who was still enrolled in 
university, began as an intern, but she was later promoted. 
34
 Surveys were also conducted in Arabic, Tamashek, and Peul without formal translation.  The research 
team discussed consistent phrasing of these questions. 
35
 While the use of two researchers is ultimately more costly, it yields far better ability to code qualitative 
justifications for responses than one person would be able to code.   
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personally coded responses for 190 surveys in seven school districts in Bamako, Kayes, and 
Sikasso.
36
  
The survey uses stratified, area probability sampling from within 10 school districts 
(Fowler 2009:29).  I selected school districts using Ministry of Education national data on 
education provision by type of school that I had collected during a pre-dissertation fieldwork 
visit to Mali in 2007.  I chose districts based on three factors: 1) to maximize variation on the key 
independent variable; 2) to facilitate logistics; and 2) to achieve regional variation.  First, in 
order to maximize variation on my independent variable, type of school, I selected school 
districts that had disproportionately high level of enrollment in each school type – public, 
private, madrassas, and community schools to increase the probability that respondents would 
have attended or sent their children to a diverse set of schools.
 37
   In each school district, we 
would draw quadrants onto a map or the school district or in the case of rural areas – create a list 
of “accessible villages.”38  After determining the universe of accessible zones or villages within 
the school district, we would select four to five quadrants (or villages from a list) using an online 
randomizer. In urban areas, each group started in the middle of the quadrant. Then, teams 
proceeded in opposite directions from starting points and surveyed every fifth household.  
Individual respondents in households were selected randomly using playing cards. Surveys were 
conducted on weekdays and weekends at varying times of day in order to ensure that we reached 
                                                          
36
 Due to kidnappings and instability as well as a US government travel ban to Timbuktu, I was unable to 
accompany the team to Timbuktu, Mopti, and Sevare.  I did conduct one monitoring visit to Timbuktu 
where I was able to meet with the additional team members that were trained to help with survey 
implementation. 
37
As advocated by King, Keohane, and Verba, I chose districts to maximize potential variation on the 
independent variable (as well as control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables 
(140). 
38
 Accessibility to rural zones was primarily determined by the proximity to our starting point and 
whether or not roads were accessible and/or if there was alternative transportation (boat, moto taxi, etc). 
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all population types.
39
  In villages, when possible, teams would begin at the dugutigi’s (chief‟s) 
home and then proceed in opposite directions, stopping at intervals of five (or three houses) 
depending on villages sizes.  In certain instances, especially in the rural school districts in 
Sikasso II and Sevare, some chiefs called respondents into their compounds to be interviewed.
40
 
Interviewers recorded GPS coordinates for approximately 40% of all respondents‟ homes as well 
as neighboring schools so that I could analyze spatial patterns of school choice and 
simultaneously to ensure that research teams were operating in the correct zones.   
 Due to budget and time constraints, the project focuses primarily on urban and peri-urban 
zones as travel to the rural zones is costly, difficult, and time-consuming. Only two of ten school 
districts were rural and thus my project has a bias towards a population with a greater choice of 
educational options.  Table One summarizes characteristics of each school district as compared 
to national averages. 
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 Unlike Afrobarometer, I did not alternate the selection of respondents by gender. 
40
 This strategy is not ideal as chiefs can select respondents, respondents might feel restricted speaking in 
chief‟s compound, and/or there is usually an oversample of men.  However, it reflected the cultural and 
logistic constraints posed by conducting surveys in villages. 
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Table 1: Selected School Districts 
School 
District 
Region Gross 
Enrollm
ent Rate 
Public Community Private Madrassa Rural/ 
Urban 
Poverty 
Index 
(2001)
41
 
National N/A 78%  62% 
 
17% 
 
10% 12% NA 68% 
Faladie Bamako 119% 37%  
 
7% 44% 12% U 29% 
Bamako 
Coura 
Bamako 112% 81% 0% 16% 4% U 29% 
Banconi Bamako 126% 38% 
 
11% 31% 20% U 29% 
Kayes 
Rive 
Droite 
Kayes 92% 65% 
 
3% 1% 32% U/R 68% 
Kayes 
Rive 
Gauche 
Kayes 103% 73% 
 
6% 5% 16% U/R 68% 
Sikasso 1 Sikasso 83% 71% 
 
11% 7% 11% U 82% 
Sikasso  Sikasso 48% 59% 
 
29% 2% 10% R 82% 
Mopti Mopti  80% 83% 2% 8% 6% U 79% 
Sevare Mopti 46% 79% 6% 0% 15% R 79% 
Timbuktu Timbuk
-tu 
148% 67% 18% 1% 12% U 54% 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
 Percentage of the regional population calculated to be living in poverty Source: DNSI, 2004, 2007; 
ODHD, 2006. 
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1.7 Dissertation Map: Exploring Education and Citizenship in Mali 
The next chapter of the dissertation provides background information about the political 
culture of citizenship in Mali to situate the analysis of the impact of education on citizenship.  I 
highlight the trends in political participation as well as competing realms of authority, secular 
and traditional/religious, in contemporary Mali. The third chapter examines the supply side of 
education in Mali to introduce the diverse schooling providers as well as enrollment trends over 
time.   The fourth chapter explores the impact of education on students‟ political knowledge and 
political participation.  The fifth chapter examines the relationships between parents who send 
their children to different education providers and the state.  The final chapter assesses the 
relevance of lessons learned from the Malian case to the relationship between education and 
citizenship in other nascent Africa democracies. 
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Chapter 2 
Politiki ni Fanga na Mali (Power and Politics in Mali)
42
 
2.1 Introduction 
  I embarked on my preliminary research in Mali in the summer of 2007, directly in the 
wake of Presidential elections.   Eager to delve into popular political opinions, I would ask 
friends, neighbors, family members, and shop-keepers what they thought about the current state 
of Malian democracy.  To my surprise, I was confronted by citizens‟ reluctance to discuss 
politics.  Malians, even some of the people I admired most, would respond with a standard 
phrase: “politiki man ɲi” – meaning politics are bad.43  I had anticipated criticism of specific 
leaders, parties, or institutions, but the blanket response startled me.  I was frustrated by what I 
initially perceived as Malians disinterest in my topic.   
Determined that the intersection of education, an expanding and diversified sector, and 
politics was a fruitful research area, I continued with my interviews.  Eventually, the repetition of 
politki man ɲi forced me to reflect on what multi-party democracy actually meant to most 
citizens.  This skepticism contrasts Mali‟s heralded position as a democratic star relative to other 
African countries.  Since its democratic transition in 1991, Mali has held four presidential 
elections and undergone two executive turnovers of power.  Despite having characteristic 
thought to hinder democracy, such as high poverty rates and a predominantly Muslim 
population, Mali boasts one of the highest democracy and free press scores in Africa.
44
  
                                                          
42
 I thank Brandon County and Kristin Michelitch for helpful comments on this chapter.  While Brandon 
County‟s comments helped to improve the spelling of Bambara words, in some instances I adopt 
phoenetic adaptations that do not use the correct Bambara characters as my Bambara language 
capabilities are entirely oral/verbal. 
43
 “Politiki Man ɲi” is ubiquitous in pop culture.  It is the title of a very popular song by the Malian 
singers Amadou and Mariam; Tiaken Jah Fakoly, a reggae musician, has a song with a similar title. 
44
 Mali is ranked 5
th
 worst by UNDP Human Development Indicators 2009, but boasts a Freedom House 
score of 2 for political rights and 3 for civil liberties (2010). 
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This pervasive pessimism stirring under Mali‟s democratic facade merits deeper 
exploration. There have been few recent political science studies that have explored this curious 
disjuncture between Mali‟s exalted democratic position and popular skepticism about politics.  
Sadly, the divergence of citizens‟ experience from Mali‟s democratic record is not unique.  In 
her study of African democracy at the local level, Carolyn Logan finds dramatic variation in 
terms of perceived democratic opportunities within countries with relatively high democracy 
scores (Logan 2010). Seventy percent of Malians feel that their voices are not heard between 
election cycles; sixty-two percent of Africans feel the same way (Logan 2010: 25).
45
   Mass 
skepticism about politicians and politics is far from an African phenomenon.  Americans need 
look no farther than the Tea Party criticisms of greedy, elite politicians whom are out of touch 
with citizens needs.  However, in the US, democratic institutions have consolidated and that 
there is no threat of authoritarian reversal or civil war.  In African countries, this threat is very 
real.   Malians need only turn to its neighbors Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, or Cote d‟Ivoire 
to find contemporary examples of dictatorship, military coups, violent outbreaks, or 
constitutional sabotage.   
This chapter explores the political culture underpinning Mali‟s democratic landscape to 
underscore the potential effects of education on political knowledge and participation.  First, I 
seek to demonstrate the existence of popular skepticism toward politics in Malian political 
culture.  I then try to explain the why citizens are wary of multi-party democracy and symbols of 
the secular state. I highlight obstacles to electoral participation: the French language, the residue 
of consensual governance, weak parties, and the isolation of religious actors from the democratic 
system.  Then I introduce descriptive statistics of the respondents‟ answers to survey questions as 
                                                          
45
 The continental average is not much lower at 62%. 
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well as some comparative Afrobarometer data to paint a picture of the state of Malian political 
knowledge and participation. 
In Chapter 4, I argue that education is crucial for helping citizens gain the skills and 
confidence to engage with this new system of government. Education empowers citizens to leave 
the “safety in numbers” offered by traditional communitarian expression in order to make their 
own personal demands on government.  This direct rapprochement, between citizens and 
government, enables citizens‟ voices to be transmitted to government directly rather than relying 
on more familiar traditional or religious spheres of authority as intermediaries to express their 
concerns.  In Chapter 5, I demonstrate how social service provision connects citizens to the state 
and induces Malians to vote in elections.  I argue that direct contact with government institutions 
helps citizens to overcome the skepticism described in this chapter. 
2.2 Politiki Man ɲi: Popular Skepticism in Malian Democracy 
Mali‟s democratic deficit lies in the disconnect between Malians and the institutions of 
multi-party democracy: elections, political parties, and municipal offices.  State bureaucracy 
operates in the former colonial language - French, which most Malians do not speak in their own 
homes.  The alien-nature of bureaucratic institutions, emblematic of the former colonial power, is 
tangible to anyone who spends time in the Malian world outside of air-conditioned offices of 
donors or government ministries.  During my fieldwork, I became accustomed to speaking 
Bambara except for the rare instance when someone initiated a conversation in French.  I 
purchased vegetables in Bambara, spoke to my laundry ladies in Bambara, squabbled over cab 
fair in Bambara, gossiped with friends and relatives in Bambara, and coached basketball in 
Bambara.  The only instances that required French were my interactions with formal 
government: when I sought entry into government ministries, needed to get a research permit, or 
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had to negotiate with police officers over a “ticket. “ The formal requests that I wrote in French 
seemed foreign in my every-day world of Bamanakan.
46
   
I had the linguistic ability to switch between languages, but this discomfort is magnified 
by uncertainty for the millions of Malians who do not speak French.  For instance, Nana,
47
 a 
woman in her fifties, was fortunate among her peers to attend school as a young girl living in 
Kayes, but was not able to obtain French literacy during her few years in primary school.  She 
feels that this directly impedes her ability to interact with government. “Since I can‟t write (in 
French), I can‟t get much from the government (K39).” 
The majority of Malians view pluralist democracy and its related institutions as a foreign 
system, which does little to provide for their own needs.  This skepticism is heightened by the 
fear of political exploitation, since as Nana describes above, the government operates in a 
language that most citizens cannot speak or write in.  The mistrust breeds a characterization of 
politics as dishonest or un-pure.  The following quotes demonstrate other ways that citizens tried 
to explain “politiki man ɲi.”   
“Everything that is related to politics in Mali is dishonest. It‟s to fill pockets and get out 
(S11).”  - Mamadou, 20 year old respondent from Segou with a high school diploma   
 
“I have no trust in politiki mogo (politics people) (BA7).” -  Salimatou, attended some 
secondary school. She has 3 children and lives in the Banconi neighborhood of Bamako.  
 
“I don't like politics; it's nothing more than pure lies (M 40).” Aminata is a Bella woman 
in her 50s.  She lives in Mopti and received a Koranic education.  
 
“I don‟t discuss politics at all.  To discuss politics is a bad thing. Politiki man ɲi (F81).”  
Ami, 25, left her village home to go seek work in Bamako.  Her child lives with her aunt 
and attends school back in the village. 
 
                                                          
46
 Bamanakan is the Bamana language word for Bambara.  I will use Bamana and Bambara 
interchangeably in this dissertation. 
47
 All names of respondents have been changed to protect their identities.  Their ages are estimated from 
within a ten year period. 
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“The (political) authorities do not do anything, but trick us.  We do not get anything from 
their behalf (SV84).” Amadou, 45, Koranic education, village of Siry in Sevare region. 
 
Gottileb describes Afrobarometer data that corroborates these interviews: 83% of respondents 
say politicians fail to keep campaign promises, 79% rarely (or never) did their best to promote 
development, 80 % of voters said politicians often (or always) engaged in vote-buying,  90 % 
said politicians made promises just to get elected (2009: 10). 
This skepticism manifests itself in Mali‟s low voter turnout. National turnout in the last 
two presidential polls was less than 40% of all voters.  The 2009 municipal elections registered 
45% turnout, but this still far below other countries on the continent.
48
  Figure 1 compares 
turnout in the last two presidential elections for Mali and other “democratic regimes” in Africa.  
Voting rates are much lower in Mali than other top democratic performers and the continent as a 
whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48
 It is important to acknowledge substantial regional variation within Mali.  Voter turnout in the Northern 
region is consistently higher than the rest of the country. For presidential races, the disparities in turnout 
are even greater than at the municipal level. 
 
 
37 
 
Figure 1: Percent of Registered Voters Who Voted in Last Two Presidential Elections
49
 
 
Multiple factors stifle relative turnout in Mali including outdated voter rolls, weak 
political parties, and or lack of ethnic mobilization. 
50
 Two of these reasons, weak party structure 
and lack of ethnic mobilization, can be traced directly related to Mali‟s history of consensual 
governance, which I will discuss below. 
2.3 Politiki Man ɲi: The roots of skepticism 
In order to understand the obstacles to citizens‟ engagement with democracy, it is 
important to interrogate Malians‟ conception of Politiki. The fact that the Bambara language 
borrows the French word, politique, to describe politics in the current system, reveals the Malian 
conception of “politiki” as something alien to their traditional understanding of governance. 
Malians‟ understanding of politiki is directly tied to their understanding of multi-party 
democracy.  The French appropriation is particularly striking when you consider that the 
Bambara language is brimming with a rich vocabulary related to governance from centuries of 
                                                          
49
  Susana Wing 2008, Administration Territoriale Mali. 
50
 The denominator for voter turnout is based on a 1997 census; it will be updated this year.  All citizens 
over 18 are automatically registered to vote. 
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experience with decentralized rule.  Malians have adapted aspects of this vast political 
vocabulary to describe other parts of the current system of governance. 
Table 2: Bambara Political Vocabulary
51
  
 “Fanga” Power or force.  Someone who has power or is in charge would be 
referred to as a “fangatigi” or literally the one with power.  
“Fangaton” – group of people in power. 
“Faso” Homeland, native land 
“Jamana” Collective grouping, country; the president is often referred to as the 
“jamana-tigi” 
Malidenw/Jamandenw Citizens or literally “children of Mali” 
“Nyogon-deme” Civic spirit or willingness to help one-another 
 
Politiki is conceived by citizens as a narrow range of partisan politics and not public policy or 
broader subjects related to politics. For instance, the phrase politiki ton – literally meaning 
politics group – describes political parties rather than civil servants or policy makers.  In the 
minds of most Malians, politics is not a means for voicing their preferences or affecting policy 
change – it is an isolated realm of competition for power.  My conversations with citizens 
revealed the perception of politics‟ narrow scope.  In Kayes, I talked to Ahmed, an artisan who 
left his native village of Sofara in Mopti region, to look for employment in Kayes.  During our 
survey, he was busy making aluminum cooking spoons, but he took time to respond to each of 
our questions thoughtfully.   He spoke eloquently about the problems facing the residents of 
Sofara, but when we asked him if he would ever run for office (and participate in politiki) in the 
future, he replied, “I would run (only) if the development of my commune (Sofara) was linked to 
                                                          
51
 For a discussion of the historical roots and appropriation of Bambara political vocabulary see Skinner 
and County 2008 and Bagayoko 1989. 
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my candidacy; if politics could affect development (KV38).” Ahmed talked about development 
and politics as if the two were fundamentally incompatible.  
Studies of political culture in Senegal find a similar negative characterization of the 
Wolof word: Politig.  Frederic Schaffer traces negative associations with politig back to colonial 
times: 
For Wolofones, then, the “French” meaning of politig carries a range of positive 
connotations; the “Wolof” meaning, in contrast, is strongly pejorative and indicates a 
variety of dishonest or deceitful behaviors. Many Senegalese associate this Wolof 
meaning of politig with the self-serving lies politicians tend to tell in search of votes and 
support (1998: 77). 
 
Schaeffer contrasts politig with the Wolof word Demokaraasi, which has also been borrowed 
from the French language, but describes the tenants of consensual democracy such as mutual 
understanding, equality, consensus, and deliberation (58). Sheldon Gellar explains demokaraasi:  
The concept of demokaraasi is particularly prevalent in villages and local communities 
where people prefer to come to a consensus on the candidate or party of their choice in 
order to reinforce local solidarity….The communitarian values inherent in the Wolof 
notion of demokaraasi also work to promote reconciliation after conflict and the 
likelihood of these conflicts ending in violence (2005: 12). 
 
As the depictions of Senegalese political culture reveal, one problematic aspect of 
politiki, or pluralist democracy, is that its partisan nature contradicts almost a thousand years of 
rule through “consensual democracy” in the West African region. Consensual democracy is 
similar to the idea of deliberative democracy, where citizens are free to express their concerns 
and discuss multiple perspectives until all group members agree on a final solution.  This 
practice dates back to the 13
th
 century when Soundiata Keita, the founder of the Mali Empire, 
ruled indirectly over decentralized kingdoms by consulting regularly with leaders from 
conquered areas.   The tradition of consultation continued with the Kulubali ton fanga in the 17
th
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century and Cheikou Amadou‟s consultative Madjilis in the 19th century (Baudais and Chauzal 
2006, Sears 2007; Gellar 2005).  
In contrast, the concepts of “opposition” and minority vs. majority were not introduced 
until colonial times and most recently during the transition to multiparty democracy. These 
dramatic changes to established systems of power and authority were unsettling to many citizens.  
As a high ranking member of the National Independent Election Commission explained: 
Starting in 1992, the guiding principle – one man, one vote, this was a huge change in the 
way that Malians perceived participation.  At the village level all decision making was 
done in consensus style – discussions might take forever, but everyone needed to be 
convinced. It (elections) introduced this aspect of individualism, the ability to dissent.  
We had to learn about a majority and a minority that opposed it.”52 
 
Jonathan Sears argues that Mali‟s history of consensus democracy impedes a full transition to 
pluralist democracy as citizens are wary of the opposition (Sears 2007: 172).  Data from the 
Afro-barometer support this thesis.  Seventy percent of Malian respondents are in favor 
consensus compared to only 40% of respondents in Namibia, Uganda, Kenya, and Botswana, 
which do not have comparable histories of consensual democracy over such large expanse of 
territory (Logan 2008: 9).   
The reluctance to embrace the concept of opposition is certainly not just a Malian, or 
even African, problem.  Adam Przeworski explains, “The notion that people can freely oppose 
the government elected by a majority emerged only gradually and painfully everywhere, the 
United States included (12).”  He shows that the US founding fathers were extremely hesitant to 
welcome opposition politics, fearing violence and division, and that their initial understanding of 
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 May 18, 2009; An August 25, 2009 interview with a member of a leading democratic think tank also 
stressed the power of the culture of consensus. 
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representation was closer to the deliberation and consensus valued by Malians.  He cites George 
Washington: 
“The spirit of the party serves to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public 
administration.  It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, 
kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasional riots and 
insurrections.  It opens the door to foreign influence and corruptions (2008: 10 citing 
Washington‟s Farewell Address 2002: 48.) 
 
The acceptance of the utility of parties, as representing different constituents‟ interest happened 
over time as leaders saw that consensual governance was not feasible on a large scale. 
Despite the differences between pluralist and consensual systems, Mali‟s political culture 
and political institutions have benefitted from elements of its democratic heritage (Pringle 2005).  
Shortly after deposing dictator Moussa Traore, the transitional governing committee convened a 
National Conference in July 1991with of members of the military, political parties, labor unions, 
human rights association, and other members of civil society in what many regard as the most 
inclusive conference to take place on the continent. The conference shaped the elements that 
would enter the new constitution.  Shortly after the first election, newly elected president, Alpha 
Konaré introduced the Question and Answer Assembly (IED), an annual forum through which 
citizens could present their grievances to a national audience (Wing 2008:125).   
Villages continue to uphold the tradition of consensual democracy.  Aggrieved citizens 
have the right to present their perspectives to a traditional leader in a specified meeting place.  It 
appears that elected officials in the region have internalized the need to receive constituents and 
listen to their concerns.  Compared to nineteen other African countries, Malian officials rank 
second best, behind Burkina Faso, in terms citizens‟ perception that officials listen to their 
grievances – consistent with the tenants of consensual democracy (2010: 25).  Malian officials 
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also fall above the African median in terms of citizens‟ perception of their ability to “handle” 
complaints (25).   
Mali also boasts an active civil society.  Most Malians are members of groups or 
associations called tonw.
53
 These associations exemplify the consensual tradition and provide 
members with the strength in numbers to protect their rights and aggregate their interests. The 
Bambara idiom, “putting our hands together, gives power to everyone” predates the democratic 
era.   Ton is a popular and expansively utilized term.  For instance, in Bambara European Union 
translates to Toubabouw ton or European group and ton fanga refers to the ruling group at the 
center of all political power.    
These organizations provide a range of services including access to credit and social 
support networks, but also provide members with venues to address their grievances. When I 
spoke to Malians about their interaction with elected officials, the vast majority explained the 
contact in terms of group membership.  Daly, a thirty-something respondent in the Lafiabougou 
neighborhood Kayes, never attended school, but serves as president of a women‟s association. 
She and her fellow members had contacted the authorities multiple times in order to address the 
flooding problem in her neighborhood (KV53).  Other respondents in the same neighborhood 
confirmed their activism and noted that there was women‟s association who had gone to speak 
with the mayor‟s office about the flooding issue.   
Another example was Nanette, who is Bobo – a minority ethnic group in the Sikasso 
region.  She is also one of few Christian respondents.  A lifelong Catholic, she attended the 
mission primary school in the colonial era and is now an active member of the Catholic 
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 Tonw is the plural for ton. 
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association in Sikasso.  She often goes with other Catholics to the mayor‟s office to address 
problems (S54).   
Associational life even dictates citizens understanding of what is possible.  When asked if 
he had ever contacted a government official, Modibo from Sikasso, responded in reference to the 
association in which he is a member, which had nothing to do with the phrasings of the 
Afrobarometer question. “We have a fishing association, but we didn't go see the authorities 
(S42).”  For Modibo, and many other respondents, visiting a government official required a 
preliminary condition of associational membership.  I would always pose the question in the 
singular and consistently, respondents would reply in the plural (we) referencing what their ton 
had or hadn‟t done. 
Tonw empower marginalized citizens to use their political voice.  However, rarely does 
the civic spirit embodied by tonw translate into party politics. Tonw are not seen as an element of 
“politiki;” they are a more organic grouping that reflects a shared interest or background.   In 
contrast, parties are perceived as contrived and potentially disruptive. Kadiatou in Kayes 
explained why she isn‟t close to a political party, “We have tried a lot of different paths in vain 
(K55).” When asked if they were close to any political party – other respondents would say: u be 
kele or they (parties) are all the same.
54
 Kissima in Sikasso explained, “They (elected officials) 
know our problems, but nothing is ever developed to help us. They know what is going on - they 
just close their eyes (S1).” Citizens also complained that their relationships with party officials‟ 
relationships are temporal, unlike traditional leaders who lives are entwined with their 
constituencies.  Like many others Djeneba noted the divergence between the behavior of elected 
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 Similar responses from respondents: BA7,  K38, KV18 
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officials before and after the electoral cycle: “Officials only come to visit during elections 
(K52)”.  
President Toure, affectionately known as ATT, has leveraged the public‟s distaste for 
partisanship by running as an independent in the 2002 and 2007 Presidential elections.  ATT 
capitalized on his reputation as a military hero and national unifier by running on a “consensus” 
platform. Once in office, he appointed members of all different parties, and his “a-political 
association” Mouvement Citoyen (Citizen Movement), thus eliminating any significant 
opposition.  In the 2007, Toure was backed by a super alliance of forty-three parties including 
Mali‟s strongest party – the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA).  ATT‟s actions and 
ADEMA‟s willingness to align with the president has neutered the threat of a credible opposition 
in Mali and significantly weakened the party system. ATT‟s strategy has been copied by 
candidates in legislative and municipal elections; since 2002, one observes an increase in 
independent candidates and independent victories in Mali. 
Political parties have been weakened by “consensual collaboration” between elites, but 
their ability to mobilize constituents is also handicapped when compared to other African parties 
because they generally operate without ethnic bases of support.  Mali‟s unique history has 
shaped values of tolerance and conflict mitigation mechanisms including sananku or cousinage.  
Cousinage is a societal conflict resolution mechanism, which links certain last names - jamu- 
from different ethnic groups together in a joking relationship to create cross-cutting cleavages.  
Cousins come from different ethnic groups and depending on their last name, members of the 
same ethnic group can have different joking cousins. Any researcher who has visited Mali can 
testify to the importance of jamu and cousinage.  Upon arrival, she is bestowed with a Malian 
name that enables her to integrate into society.   In Mali, I am Yama Coulibaly, and rarely does 
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anyone ask about my “real” name.  Part of becoming a capable researcher in Mali is learning 
enough history about your jamu to be able to defend yourself from constants critiques and jokes 
from various cousins.  For instance, when someone calls me a “bean-eater,” I defend myself as a 
fierce warrior woman invoking the name of Segou‟s brutal 16th century ruler Biton Coulibaly.  I 
have witnessed minor traffic accidents and disputes where the first question the drivers ask each 
other after they emerge from the car is – “What is your jamu? If the drivers are joking cousins, 
they will often drive off without any further dispute. 
Using a clever experimental design, Dunning and Harrison demonstrated the power of 
cross-cutting cleavages created through cousinage; Malians are more likely to vote for someone 
from a cousinage group than another candidate as they are also more likely to vote for someone 
from their ethnic group (2010).  Partially as a result of this cross-cutting cleavage, Malian 
political institutions are among the least ethnically polarized on the continent (Posner 2004).  
However, Malians are at a disadvantage in the sense that ethnic or regional party affiliation 
offers citizens cognitive shortcuts about which parties will best support their interests (Fridy 
2007). In the absence of consistent party platforms or stereotyped party-membership, prospective 
voters have few clues to distinguish between different parties and candidates.  Most parties 
continue to rely on group mobilization and seek out patrons or leaders who can mobilize 
constituencies of clients, but this happens at a lower level of disaggregation (Koter 2009).   The 
dearth of ethnic mobilization is most likely a factor that contributes to Mali‟s low voter turnout. 
2.4 Alternative Forms of Authority  
The other aspect of the strong political legacy is that Malians have other more reliable 
alternative authorities to turn to.  As in most African countries, elected officials operate in 
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parallel to traditional leaders, religious figures, and economic strongmen.  In Mali, most rural 
zones are governed by hierarchies at the family and village level. There is a head of household in 
the family compound, usually inhabited by multiple families (and generations), called the 
(dutigi).  Most villages have a chief, or dugutigi as well as a counsel of advisors (Bagayoko 
1989).   In addition, marabouts (Sufi religious leaders), hunters, donzon  (also known for their 
mastery of traditional medicine), councils of elders, griots or djeliw (oral historians) and/or 
imams are all figures who can play advisory or mediatory roles related to every-day governance.  
Given widespread poverty in Mali, those members of society with substantial resources can also 
be called upon for advice, material contributions, or brokering relationships with government 
figures/bureaucracy in times of need. 
The existence of “competing” forms of authority in the Malian context complicates voter 
participation in ways that do not affect turnout in consolidated democracies.  While low 
American voter turnout is comparable to Mali‟s polling numbers, disaffected American voters 
cannot turn to paramount chiefs and if they turn to religious authorities, there are only so many 
steps a church or temple can take without having to involve the bureaucratic state.  Faced with a 
problem or wanting to access a service, Malians have a choice to “exit” out of bureaucratic state 
channels and consult with a different authority figure who can find a solution.  This is 
problematic because unless these intermediary authorities apply pressure on state authorities to 
address authentic citizen grievances, the state will be able to fall into a “cycle of slack” 
(Hirschman 1970).  Even when intermediary institutions make contact with the state, there is a 
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risk that the individual voices of less powerful citizens will be lost or misrepresented in the 
aggregate lobby, especially when the mediating institution is hierarchical.
55
 
In Mali, politics is described in juxtaposition to more “legitimate” forms of political 
authority: religious and traditional leaders.  Seventy-six percent of Afrobarometer respondents 
wanted their traditional leaders to have greater influence governing the local community 
(Afrobarometer Mali Summary of Results 2009: 42).  Politics, associated with greed and 
material interest, is described as “dirty” in contrast to religion, which is described as pure and 
clean.   Interviews with survey respondents revealed a mental compartmentalization of the 
political and religious spheres.    Many respondents believed that participation in politiki 
corrupts.  Respondents stressed the importance of the separation between the political and 
religious spheres.  Boubacar, a resident of Timbuktu complained, “Religious authorities can act 
like those in political power – it (religion/religious practice) should be different than politics 
(T39).” Politiki is also perceived as corrupting traditional elites. 56 Afrobarometer Round 4 data 
reveals that 56% of Malian respondents preferred that traditional leaders stay out of politics 
(Summary of Results 2009: 43).
57
  This separation also reflects a legacy of separation between 
the communities of scholars and warriors; the former were distinguished by their religious 
devotion and the latter‟s distance from them (Brenner 2001: 90).     
                                                          
55
 See Seyla Benhabib “The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era” for a discussion 
of the difficulties of authentic groups representing culture. 
56
 Another respondent in Timbuktu gave a zero vote of confidence to traditional authorities and religious 
leaders explaining: “They are ruined now; even them - they take part in politics (T6); same sentiment 
from T39 
57
 Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: Traditional leaders must represent all of their people equally. They should remain non-
partisan, and not affiliate themselves with any political party.  Statement 2: Traditional leaders are 
citizens like everyone else and have the right to decide for themselves whether to support a particular 
party 
 
 
48 
 
Malians rate their confidence in traditional authorities (82% express a lot or great deal of 
confidence) higher than confidence in any other political institution (Little and Logan 2008:13). 
For example the percentage of Malians who trust the courts is only 43%, those who trust local 
council members 59%, and trust for national assembly from 61% of respondents (2008: 13).  
Malians also rated traditional authorities as least corrupt of any other institutions (14).  The gap 
between Malians‟ confidence in traditional authorities and that provided for other types of 
political authorities is wider than in any of the other 17 countries surveyed. As a result most 
Malians, especially in rural areas, are reluctant to contact mayors and prefer to consult with 
traditional or religious leaders (Coulibaly and Diarra 2004:17). 
When asked if they would contact the police in case of a future dispute, fewer than 10% 
of respondents said that they would even possibly contact the authorities.
58
  More than 90% 
replied with an authoritative no.  The reasons for the response seem twofold: one is that 
culturally it is more common for disputes to be settled among families, traditional authorities or 
religious figures. When we posed the question, many respondents countered that they preferred 
to go speak with traditional authorities than involve the law (S69, SR47). As Salah, a Tuareg 
man in his early twenties explained, “We always settle things ourselves, we prefer not to involve 
the authorities (T54).” Contacting the police was treated as a last resort, a less honorable 
alternative to problem-solving from within the community.  Seydou from the village of Madinel 
explained, “Muslims shouldn‟t contact political authorities - it‟s a bad idea.”  Some respondents, 
like Sadio in Kayes, qualified that they only felt the police should be contacted in cases of 
murder (K34).  The population‟s reluctance to contact the police or judiciary hampers these 
institutions ability to grow and improve. 
                                                          
58
 I would like to thank Kelly McMann for allowing me to use this question from her questionnaire. 
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Secondarily, the judiciary and police are generally viewed as corrupt and predatory.  
“Money has ruined everything,” complained Sidiki from Ziguena (SR11).  For those without the 
means, attempts to navigate the justice system will be futile.  Idrissa, a resident of Mopti 
explained his cynical take on the justice system using a Bambara proverb, “Even if it is easy to 
judge a poor person, it is very difficult to judge a rich person (M36).” Even Moussa, a doctor 
from Bamako who sends his children to school in Algeria and represents the kind of “rich 
person” that Idrissa was talking about, complained about the quality of the justice system: “All 
the judges and lawyers are corrupt (BBC 60).”  The exodus out of bureaucratic state channels has 
the simultaneous effect of reducing the relevance of the state to citizens‟ lives and lessening the 
likelihood that they will engage with it in the future.  The separation of many citizens from the 
secular state is exacerbated by religious authorities who willingly court those who are unsatisfied 
or alienated by secular, state authority. 
2.5 Religious Authority: Two Public Spheres? 
In other parts of the Islamic world, religious authorities and associations have assisted 
voters‟ transition into the world of elections or democracy by offering a credible assurance, 
familiarity, or social services.
59
  However, Mali, like other nations in the Muslim Sahel, 
maintains a stark divide between religion and formal electoral politics.  Religious and secular 
authorities live in relative harmony and govern separate spheres of societal relations.  One 
pertains to elections and governance through the mayors‟ office, while the other regulates 
everyday events such as weddings, baptisms, and conflict resolution.  In his dissertation on the 
political culture in Niger, Abdoulrahmane Idrissa describes this divide as “competing 
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 Pepinsky and Wellborne 2010 show how Indonesian voters think Islamic parties to be more “credible” 
than other parties, Carrie Wickam-Crowley 2002 describes voter mobilization behind the Muslim 
Brotherhoods candidates, running as independents, despite Egypt‟s ban on political parties 
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modernities” – one tied the West and the other to the Muslim world (2008). In Niger, the 
struggle for power between political authority between secular and Islamic elites is more 
contentious than in Mali, but the tension and competition between spheres of authority is 
relevant.  He explains: 
…in a context of great material poverty, images of political modernity which liberal 
republicans and Islamists strive to invest in their divergent agendas.   In this process, they 
produce the specific cultures of the “civil society” and of the “clerical society,” which 
lead, the dissertation concludes, to a kind of heterogeneous order irreducible to either the 
liberal republican sovereign or the Islamist sovereign (10). 
 
Like most other nations in Africa, Mali has strict laws banning religious political parties 
(Bogaards 2008).  Most political elites are Western-educated and committed to French 
secularism (Villalón 2010; Bleck and van de Walle 2011, forthcoming). The transition to 
democracy facilitated the vast promulgation of religious associations and public discourse 
surrounding Islamic principles and practices (Soares and Launay 1999; Soares 2005; Villalón 
2010).
60
  Under the Traore dictatorship, there was only one recognized Islamic organization – 
AMPUI (Association Malien pour l‟Unite´ et Progre´s d‟Islam), which was made up of 
predominantly Sufi clerics by the ruling party.  Democratization opened the door for the creation 
of a multitude of diverse religious organizations and Islamic self-help associations.   However, 
these gains have not translated into the formal political sphere as Islamic actors remain outside of 
the formal political sphere.  Idrissa explains an analogous division of the secular state sphere and 
Islamic actors in Niger despite the Muslim-majority population. 
Francophone Muslims with no ideological orientation toward Islam, for their part, tend to 
consider laïcité as a form of practical arrangement which does not need to be questioned 
as such– even though Islam necessarily influences their social and political expectations. 
Laïcité allows them to privatize religion, in a way analogous to how the principle of 
                                                          
60The debate has continued and even heightened with Mali‟s transition to democracy, increased freedom 
of the press, and dissolution of the ruling party‟s ban on religious groups outside of its own AMPUI 
(Association Malienne pour l‟unité et le progrès de l‟Islam).  
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national unity calls for the privatization of ethnicity. Religion and ethnicity are important 
factors in family life and social gatherings, but are considered invalid orientations on the 
national public space (240). 
 
Efforts by Islamic associations, such as the Muslim Cultural Union, to integrate into the 
political sphere were thwarted post-independence and then later under Moussa Traore (Amselle 
1985).  Similarly, during the National Conference held immediately after the transition to 
democracy, Islamic groups attempted to create an Islamic state and to allow the formation or 
Islamic political parties, but both attempts failed (Künkler and Leininger 2009: 1073).  At least 
one Islamic party, Hizbollah, attempted to enter the formal political arena in 1991, but was 
prevented from forming (Soares 2006: 282; Brenner 294).
61
    A more recent attempt by the High 
Council of Islam to back a presidential candidate, who subscribed to their conditions, also failed 
(Sears 2007).
62
   
Islamic groups in Mali are also hindered by their fragmentation.  There are estimated 135 
to 190 Islamic organizations and the lack of centralization weakens their potential for 
mobilization in comparison to the centralized organization to the Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal 
(Künkler and Leininger 2009:1077).  Brenner explains the decline in Sufi power: 
The Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders that dominated the religious and political 
landscape in the 19
th
 century have been effectively marginalized from the political arena 
in Mali. The influence of the Sufi order persists, especially in rural regions, but the 
political economy has changed dramatically from the 19
th
 century when Muslim political 
authority was sanctioned and reinforced through the hegemony of Sufi spiritual authority 
….Still political figures do not intervene in the public political debate based on personal 
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 “Justifications against the religious party ban were twofold: Democracy-minded organizations such as 
the Association Islamique pour le Salut au Mali (AISLAM) viewed religious parties (just as any type of 
party) as part of liberal democracy. Others, the so-called integristes, to which the Hizboullah and 
dissenters of AMUPI belonged, advocated Islamic law as providing a blueprint  for a just social order and 
believed religious parties to be the natural vehicle for an Islamic agenda (Künkler and Leininger2009: 
1073). 
62
 Sears chronicles candidate Ibrahim Boubacar Keita‟s (IBK‟s) failed attempt to run as an “Islamic” 
candidate during the 2002 Presidential Race as well as the High Council of Islam‟s failed attempt to find a 
political party to support their campaign agenda. 
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divine inspiration, although this was precisely the kind of discourse that encouraged and 
legitimated Muslim political expansion in the 19
th
 century (Brenner 2007: 216-217.) 
 
While there is a divide between the historically powerful Sufi hierarchies and the Salafists, 
which represent a small, but economically powerful group, many other Malians choose to blend 
elements of “reformist” and Sufi practices, and identify as part of neither specific group (Soares 
2005).
63
 
Religious organizations have been most successful in demonstrating their organizational 
potential and political weight in the sphere of contentious politics rather than in formal political 
channels.  Religious leaders continue to play a consultative and advisory role – as well as acting 
as societal mediators.  The High Council of Islam plays an official advisory role for the 
government.  They have successfully vetoed legislature for the abolition of the death penalty and 
family law.  A telling example of their informal political weight is the success of the family code 
protests.  
On the first day of Ramadan, August 22, 2009, more than 50,000 citizens packed the 
national soccer stadium, spilling out on the surrounding streets of Yirimadio, in protest of 
recently legislated Family Code.  Weeks earlier the National Assembly had passed the code, 
which contained more than 1,000 resolutions including a minimum age for legal marriage, 
restrictions on religious marriages, and inheritance laws, with a nearly unanimous vote.  Many 
Malian citizens were outraged by the government‟s entrance into personal matters that had been 
largely regulated by religious and traditional authority.
64
  Protestors decried their representatives‟ 
disregard for citizens‟ preferences and Western donors‟ stranglehold over the political agenda.   
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 When asked what their religion was very few respondents cited a particular sect of Islam, but instead 
claimed simply that they were Muslim. 
64
 Interview with Malian Think Tank Director August 2009. The contentious bill divided Malian society.  
Women‟s associations and NGOs had spent years lobbying for the passage of the bill in order to increase 
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Mosques and religious associations played a primary role in organizing the stadium 
protests, as well the marches in Bamako and Kayes the previous weekend, bussing congregations 
to the protest sites.  Religious leaders lashed out against members of the assembly in televised 
commercials and local newspapers. The members of the High Council of Islam issued a direct 
appeal to the Malian President – Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) –to reverse the code.    In a 
televised speech on August 29th, ATT announced that he would send the code back to the 
National Assembly so that they could revisit the most contentious elements.  Islamic actors were 
allowed to provide input on revisions to the code.  At the end of 2010, the code had not yet been 
voted on in the National Assembly. 
2.6 The New Emperor: “Kalanso and Politiki” 
Scholars of Mali have described the colonial authorities‟ introduction of French-language 
bureaucracy and schooling as a violent assault on local traditions of societal organization. A 
small group of individuals that attained French literacy became a “fabricated” new class and this 
social elite was able to dominate the rest of the population with their linguistic skills.
 65
  Etienne 
Gerard describes an interview with an illiterate, Malian farmer, “The peasants, themselves affirm 
in echoes,‟ We are in the hands of the educated.  They have more power and everyone is scared 
of them. If you are illiterate, you can have the power to support someone in their trip around the 
world; but if he is educated, he can colonize you (1999:156).” 
Due to their reluctance to attend colonial schools, the Malian aristocracy inadvertently 
allowed poorer and lower caste citizens to profit from Western education (Meillassoux 1970: 
102).  Shaka Bagayogo compares the post-independence domination of educated elites to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
legal equality between Malian men and women.  See Susana Wing‟s work (2009) for a discussion of the 
history of the family code in Mali and in the rest of the West African region. 
65
 Louis Brenner2001 and Etienne Gerard 1992 
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Malian folk tradition of a dominant leader re-ordering chaos with their simultaneous mastery of 
force, knowledge, and wealth (1987:103). Since the colonial era, fluency in the official language 
of the Malian state, French, has translated into political power.  In the 1960s, post-independence 
graduates of colonial schools became the political elite in Mali and much of West Africa. At 
independence, power transferred hands to a narrow bureaucratic elite, who had managed to 
achieve literacy in French. The illiterate aristocracy and the rich, bourgeoisie were marginalized 
from the post independence political process (Meillassoux: 98). 
 In the democratic context, the Malian political landscape remains dominated by a 
Francophone-educated elite despite its majority Muslim population.  French language has also 
translated into increased job opportunities.  In the first decades of independence rule, a college 
diploma guaranteed a salaried civil service job (Ba 2009). While French language schooling no 
longer assures government employment, it remains a necessary condition for a position in 
government, international institutions, or in an international NGO.   Malian citizens, the vast 
majority of whom speak indigenous languages at home, have learned that French schooling is a 
key to political power and increased economic opportunities.    
Malian political leaders, especially at the national level, represent a highly educated elite, 
contrasting the vastly pre-literate society.  Figure 2 contrasts the educational levels current 
Malian legislators and Malian respondents from Afrobarometer Survey.
66
  While the political 
elite are generally more-educated than the masses that they represent in any country; the gap 
between educational credentials in Mali is substantial. More than fifty-five percent of legislators 
have a university degree as compared to two percent of the Malian population. 
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 Afrobarometer uses a representative sample population. 
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Figure 2: Comparing Assembly Members’ Educational Levels to the Malian Population67 
 
The same is true for Ministry officials.  All but two of Mali‟s thirty ministers have university 
degrees and that the remaining two went to Mali‟s prestigious military academy.  
It is logical that Malians, given the high illiteracy rates and widespread poverty, observe 
the differences between the people that run government and themselves.  However, unlike 
domination by caste, gender, or birthright, educational barriers can be overcome and degrees can 
be earned.  Theoretically, Malians or their children can gain the qualifications to fully engage 
with their system.  This gives parents with the means to pay school fees hop that their children 
might reach the top of this social hierarchy. 
2.7 The State of Political Knowledge 
Malians‟ political skepticism should not be misinterpreted as widespread ignorance or 
apathy. This section describes the political knowledge and political behavior of 1000 respondents 
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 Elected leaders' education levels  from : L ASSEMBLE NATIONALE DU MALI SOUS LA 
TROISIEME REPUBLIQUE, un guide à l'usage des élus, des citoyens et des partenaires extérieurs. 4em 
legislature 2007-2012.  National Education Averages from Afrobarometer 2008.  Primary refers to 
respondents with any primary schooling and high school refers to respondents with any high school or 
secondary schooling. 
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from my survey. In later chapters, I argue that education can play an important role in creating 
political knowledge.  It is first important to explore the population‟s baseline; what do Malians 
know about their own political system?   In my survey, I asked a series of Afrobarometer 
questions to evaluate each respondent‟s political knowledge.68  The questions were asked in the 
form of a political pop quiz: can you name your mayor, can you name the president of the 
National Assembly, and can you name the majority party? Do you know executive term limits? 
Surprisingly, my survey results revealed that most Malians have internalized the new 
rules of the democratic game.  More than 70% of Malians, most of whom are illiterate, were able 
to name executive term limits.
69
  In fact, when asked about presidential term limits, the majority 
of the Malians responded in the same way:  san duuru, siɲe fila (five years, two times).  This 
finding suggests that a comprehensive message about the way democracy works has penetrated 
Malian society.  This knowledge may be due on part to public information campaigns about 
democracy circulating through local radio.
70
  During the second presidential election, a well-
known comedian ran as a publicity stunt and has since continued to raise awareness about the 
importance of voting through comedy skits.  While I was in Bamako during the 2009 elections, 
USAID helped sponsor a commercial that juxtaposed municipal elections in two communes: a 
“bad commune,” where vote-buying was rampant, and as a result was dirty and unorganized 
neighborhood and a “good” commune where people voted along principles and candidates 
responded to their needs.  The survey results suggest that these awareness efforts have been 
successful.  In addition, all Malians have already witnessed a president step down and there was 
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 Questions borrowed from Afrobarometer Round 3 
69
 Thunnissen2009 : 6 and Bleck Survey Data 2009 
70
 Interviews with DJS from private and community radio revealed that donors were transmitting 
messages about how to participate in politics (July 2011). 
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an active debate about ATT‟s obligation to step down especially in light of Tandja and 
Compaore‟s choices in neighboring Niger and Burkina.   
As Figure 3 demonstrates, Malian respondents from my survey outperform peers from 
the 2005 Afrobarometer survey in Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana. The chart suggests 
Mali‟s comparative experience with executive turnover and President Konare‟s willingness to 
respect term limits and step down, informed citizens about presidential term limits.  
Figure 3: Political Knowledge about their Respective Governments
71
 
 
Malians responded to three other political knowledge questions at lower rates.  Malians 
were third, behind the Senegalese and Beninese, in their ability to name their local 
representative.
72
  Almost half of the Malian respondents were able to name their mayor as 
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 The data from Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal is from Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005), while the 
Malian data is from my survey administered in 2009.  My survey has an urban bias as compared to the 
other nationally representative samples.  However, my figures are not dramatically different than 
Afrobarometer Round 3 in Mali.  Local officials varied according to the specific electoral system; Ghana 
and Nigeria poll respondents on knowing the Vice President, while the Francophone countries ask about 
the head of Legislature. 
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 This may be due to the fact that Francophone voters elect municipal officials, while local 
representatives in Ghana and Nigeria are appointed. 
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compared to lower percentages who could name the President of the Assembly or the majority 
party.  This is unsurprising given that municipal elections in Mali are often described as 
“elections of proximity” meaning that citizens mobilize around family members or friends who 
are candidates.   
On the whole, respondents revealed a higher level of familiarity with municipal 
authorities as well as willingness to evaluate local officials.  This familiarity is most pronounced 
in the village setting, where citizens benefit from the greater visibility of candidates in their 
“backyard.”  
Citizens‟ willingness to evaluate local officials also suggests a greater familiarity with 
them.  Unlike the president, who was often referred to with a statement of deference such as 
“God gave him power” or political institutions like the national electoral commission that 
citizens were largely unfamiliar with, respondents spoke about mayors in concrete terms.
73
   This 
critical engagement is also evident in higher electoral turnover at the municipal level.   Voting 
rates in the 2004 and 2009 municipal elections, at 43% and 45% turnout respectively, were 
higher than either the 2002 or 2007 presidential elections. We also observe lower rates of 
incumbency wins at the local level in Mali.  In 2004 municipal elections, more than half of all 
mayors were not re-elected (Magassa and Meyer 2008: 16).  
Fewer respondents were able to name specific information about national-level politics.  
Forty-one percent of respondents were able to name the president of the assembly; this is only a 
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 This kind of deference or respect of president‟s is seen across Africa.  Logan uses Afro-barometer data 
from eighteen countries to show that 66% of respondents assess the president‟s performance positively, as 
compared to 51% support for MPs, 50% support for local counselors and 39% support for the ruling party 
(2008:22) 
73
  Example of rating of mayor: Another respondent in Kayes says, “The only contact I had with the 
community official was during the elections.  The municipal authorities in Kayes do not work; the city is 
dirty and there are major problems with access to water and electricity.  I only have confidence in those 
who work.”  
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little more than half of the percentage Nigerians and Ghanaians who could name their Vice 
President. It probably reflects the weak visibility and power of the position. However, if we 
broaden the comparative context Malians do not perform too poorly.  For instance, the margin of 
difference between the percentage of correct responses provided by Malians and Americans is 
strikingly low given the age of institutions and median education levels in the US.  Only about 
15% more Americans are able to name their Speaker of the House  than their Malian 
counterparts could name the President of their National Assembly (Pew Survey 2007).   Malian 
politics, like politics in many African nations, remains largely personal.  While this does not 
bode well for the strength of democratic institutions, it does mean the Malians tend to be fairly 
well-informed about individual politicians. 
Malians were least able to name the majority party as compared to respondents in 
neighboring countries.
74
  This finding reflects the large number of Malian parties (113) and 
relative party weakness in Mali.  Given the past history of coalitions and the fact that the 
majority party, ADEMA, did not run a presidential candidate in the last elections – it is logical 
that Malians have the most difficulty with this question. 
In Mali, it appears that education could make the greatest impact on citizens‟ knowledge 
of national-level politics, which reside in Bamako: the name of representatives other than the 
president and the name of the majority party.  Since so many citizens, most of whom did not 
complete primary school, already articulate executive term limits precisely, we would anticipate 
a lower likelihood that education has a strong effect on this aspect of political knowledge.  
Education beyond primary school could have a ceiling effect on knowledge of term limits, but be 
more productive in learning about politics on the national stage. 
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 Unfortunately, no data is available for Benin, which also boasts a large number of weak parties and 
would be the best direct point of comparison. 
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2.8 The Participation Problem 
As I have already discussed, voting rates in Mali are much lower than other countries in 
Africa.  Voting only captures one aspect of citizens “voice,” so I wanted to explore baselines for 
different types of reported participation. Figure 4 shows total levels of reported political 
participation for the survey respondents based on six categories of participation: if the 
respondent voted in 2007 presidential elections, if she campaigned in the 2007 presidential 
election, if she feels close to a party, if she has ever run for office, if she would ever consider 
running for office in the future, and whether or not she has contacted a government official in the 
last five years.
75
   
Sixty-seven percent of respondents report voting, which is consistent with the percentage 
of respondents claiming to vote in Afrobarometer data.  A little over fifty percent of respondents 
claimed to identify with a party; this is slightly lower than, but consistent with first round Afro-
barometer findings of 58% party-identification, but much lower than Afrobarometer Round 4 
findings from 2008 of 69% party identification. Lower percentages of people reported partaking 
in more time consuming forms of participation including willingness to run for office (35%), 
past participation in 2007 presidential election campaign (29%), and experience contacting a 
government official to address a problem or express an opinion in the last five years (23%) and 
past experience running for office (3%).
76
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 The questions are taken directly from the Afrobarometer round 3 and 4 
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 After initially including “Ran for office” as a dependent variable for participation, I dropped it from my 
analysis since so there were so few positive responses. 
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Figure 4: Reported Rates of Political Participation
77
  
 
Certain forms of political participation require greater efforts compared to voting.  Nie et al have 
termed these “difficult” forms of participation (1996).   Among the survey questions, I consider 
the difficult forms of participation to be campaigning, running for office, willingness to run, and 
contacted a government official.   If a citizen is going to campaign, she needs to be able to 
convince others to vote for a party and thus have some knowledge about that party and electoral 
race.  If she ran for office or is willing to do so in the future, she needs to be able to imagine 
herself as a competent and capable elected official.  Finally, its takes time and resources to 
contact a government official who might not listen to demands or requests.  This is coupled 
citizens‟ fear of exploitation by a bureaucracy that operates in a colonial language. These factors 
make contacting a government official, especially without the support of an association, much 
more difficult. Consistent with my categorization, responses for more difficult forms of 
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participation are much lower than reported rates of voting and party identification.  Due to the 
scarcity of positive responses, we can anticipate that education might have the greatest effect and 
make the greatest gains in more difficult forms of participation. 
 It is important to acknowledge that these responses are all self-reported and therefore 
there is a potential for conformity bias in the way that Malians report their behavior. The 
percentage of respondents claiming to have voted is more than twenty-five points higher than 
actual national voter turnout for the 2007 Presidential elections.  We can assume that respondents 
are over-reporting voting rates, and perhaps other forms of participation.
78
   
To complement the self-reporting, I wanted to include some additional data on Malian 
participation.  In light of Malians‟ skepticism about the democratic system, I organized an exit 
poll survey of 450 Malians during the March 2009 Municipal Elections in Bamako to better 
understand what motivates citizens to come out to vote.  Exit poll survey teams at three polls in 
three districts of Bamako asked a basic question: why did you come out to vote today? 
79
  
Citizens were not prompted with categorical choices; their open responses were sorted and 
grouped in larger qualitative categories illustrated in Figure 5. We also asked citizens for some 
basic biographical data including their level of education.  I had anticipated that respondents with 
different levels of education would provide different justifications for participation, so I sorted 
responses by respondents‟ levels of education (no schooling to university degree).     However, I 
found that regardless of education, respondents disproportionately claimed to have voted because 
of a sense of patriotism and civic duty. While these sentiments do not preclude the possibility 
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 This is common in any survey data on voting (Holbrook and Krosnick 2009: 
http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty//krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-
%20Final.pdf). 
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 Polling stations were selected from the same neighborhoods where surveys were conducted.  
Enumerators were asked to interview every third person exiting the polls.  Respondents were asked for 
information about their education profile and then asked, unprompted, why they came out to vote. 
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that the voter received a bribe or voted for a boss, it does demonstrate that Malians share a basic 
widespread understanding of the importance of elections as an element of multiparty democracy.  
Short term incentives for voting and the act of voting as an expression of citizenship are not 
mutually exclusive.  These results are further evidence that an understanding of the general rules 
of the game have penetrated Malian society.  Twenty years after the first elections, Bamakoise 
who vote appear to have internalized the “civic spirit.”  I caution against generalizing these 
findings because we do not know if voters and patterns of mobilization are the same in different 
regions of Mali.  In fact, exit polling suggested that voters in Bamako are younger and more 
educated than what is reflected in the survey data.
80
 
Figure 5: Citizens’ Reasons for Voting in 2009 Municipal Elections by Education Level  
 
Given the irregularities and group mobilization for voting in Mali, it is tempting to deride voting 
as artificial or inauthentic in the atmosphere of weak parties and widespread clientalism.  
However, these findings caution against writing off voting as coerced and manipulated and, 
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therefore, less essential to the democratic process.  Those citizens who engaged in the act of 
voting, regardless of how they ended up in the ballot box or what they knew about politics, felt 
as if they were fulfilling their own civic duty to the country. 
2.9 The Obstacles to Deepening Democracy in Mali 
This chapter has explored citizen skepticism about democracy and Francophone 
institutions of government to suggest that gains that education could have on democratic 
citizenship.  The strong legacy of consensual governance as well as the reluctance of religious 
actors to endorse partisan politics obstructs citizens‟ willingness to engage with party politics.  
While, democratic values of tolerance, trust, mutual help, and consensus guide Malians behavior, 
they just do not always translate into participation in formal politics.  Education could help 
citizens to learn more about democratic institutions and potentially to engage with them. 
There are two primary threats to representation in Mali‟s current system of consensual 
democracy.  The first is the undemocratic aspects of associational membership.  As Sears warns, 
just because decisions are made collectively, this does not require them to be made 
democratically (2007: 176).  Mali is still largely stratified by age, gender, wealth, and in some 
instances, caste.
81
  Many Malians participate in vertical associations, which may include 
deliberative procedures and offer them a chance to voice their opinions, but ultimately follow the 
authority of the strongest group member or patron (Benhabib 2002). 
The second is the irrelevance of political parties, which I have just discussed. The 
President, in his tenure as an independent, has contributed to the erosion of a Malian opposition.  
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 Castes are related to Malian last names and integrated into the cousinage system.  They are not limiting 
in the sense of political limits for a particular caste, but some occupations are exclusively occupied by 
certain types of castes (ie griots or mediators); famously Salif Keita, the most famous Malian singer, 
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During his second election campaign, 43 parties, all but two, joined the president‟s coalition.  
ATT had appointed members of all different parties in his administration, thus eliminating any 
viable threat of the opposition (Baudais and Chauzal: 2006).  When respondents claimed, 
“parties are all the same,” they are accurately describing the political terrain.  If citizens continue 
to turn to traditional leaders or to view parties as irrelevant to their daily existence,  that lack of 
engagement will not push parties to be more accountable to the population‟s needs. Even in other 
countries, where strict ethnic or regional mobilization servers as a palliative for skepticism in the 
system, mobilization still draws citizens through the political process.  In the following chapters, 
I suggest that education can empower citizens with tools to engage with the state and take 
advantage of the opportunities for self-expression offered by the new multi-party system. Greater 
engagement by individuals advocating for their own preferences could then stimulate more 
responsive institutions that would become accountable to a larger subset of citizenry.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Chapter 3: 
Mali’s Evolving Educational Landscape 
3.1 Introduction 
Democratization brought a dramatic expansion in primary enrollment due to three factors, 
liberalization, increased government allocation for primary education, and greater donor support 
for basic education through Education for All Campaign, the Millennium Development Goals, 
and the Millennium Challenge Account. Unlike other contexts, where schooling and state-
building were simultaneously reinforcing – rapid expansion in Mali and many other African 
countries focused on increasing access to education to bolster human development indicators.  
Through liberalization, the Malian public gained greater access to schooling supply, but the 
Malian government simultaneously forfeited some of its control over the education sector (Lange 
and Diarra 1999).  These policy changes resulted in dramatic increases in enrollment and a more 
diverse pool of providers.  In 1991, only 26% of school aged population was enrolled in public, 
primary schools,
82
 by 2009 82% of school aged students were enrolled in public, private, 
Francophone schools, madrassas, and community schools.  The growth of these different school 
types and increase in the public investment in education mean that more Malian citizens are 
making it into the classroom than ever before.  By embracing madrassas, the Malian government 
broke a past tension between secular government schooling and marginalized Islamic schooling; 
for the first time Islamic schooling was publicly endorsed by the state.  The rapid pace of 
expansion and the diversity of providers make Mali an ideal place to explore the impact of 
educational changes in the post democratic context.  As a result of these policy changes, many 
interesting questions remain: could expansion have generated unintended benefits for democratic 
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citizenship in Mali? How does government partnership with Islamic schools change the fact of 
Malian democracy? 
This chapter explores Mali‟s educational landscape in order to outline the schooling 
choices facing parents, patterns of enrollment, and potential implications for democratization. As 
described in the previous section, education in Mali has traditionally linked parents and students 
to different centers of power: secular, Francophone elites and a flourishing trade networks linked 
to Arabic – the language of Islamic instruction.83  In present day Mali with the expansion and 
liberalization of the educational sector – these educational tracks, and their respective 
modernities, are colliding and combining more than ever – creating a mosaic of educational 
choices and consumers.  I begin with a discussion of the history of education in Mali and then 
describe recent changes that accompanied the democratic transition. I introduce the various 
schools in Mali and basic patterns of enrollment based on data provided by respondents to the 
survey. 
3.2 Pre-colonial and Colonial Education 
Before 1500, 25,000 students from across Africa, Europe, and the Middle East attended 
three universities in Timbuktu.
84
  When the French arrived in Mali in the late 19
th
 century, little 
of this educational infrastructure remained, but Koranic schooling was pervasive in the North of 
the country.
85
  Originally established by Muslim traders and intellectuals, Koranic schools 
indoctrinated students into the Islamic religion through the memorization and repetition of texts.   
Koranic schools were generally decentralized; students worked under the apprenticeship of their 
teacher, or marabout, and slowly gained access to the more esoteric elements of Islamic 
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knowledge (Soares 2005).   These schools generally did not facilitate tremendous social 
mobility, but reinforced hierarchal lineage structures (Brenner 2001).  
The French government feared “Islamic fanaticism” and saw it as a significant challenge 
to their “mission civilisatrice.”  Ironically, as the French built infrastructure, Islam and Islamic 
education spread rapidly through the rest of the country.
86
  Colonial authorities sought to co-opt 
or eliminate Koranic education.  In some instances, the French campaign against Islam, as well 
as the colonialists‟ aggressive forced labor recruitment practices, reduced the numbers of 
students in Koranic schools.
87
  The French built their own Franco-Arabe schools in an attempt to 
co-opt local populations into their control (Brenner 2001: 41). The birth of French language 
schools in Mali faced resistance and distrust from local populations, especially because a parallel 
Koranic education system was already widespread across much of the country.
88
  Many Malians, 
suspicious of colonial rule, refused to send their children to French schools – preferring instead 
to send their children to Islamic schools.  The French authorities courted the sons and relatives of 
chiefs and notables, but village chiefs would often send children of lower-caste village members 
to the toubabuw ka kalanso or European school while keeping their own children far from 
French control (Gerard 1997: 99).   The population‟s suspicion of French education as well as 
the limited penetration of colonial infrastructure into Malian territory begot one of the lowest 
literacy rates of any African nation.  At independence, only 7% of the Malian population was 
literate in the former colonial language as compared to an African average of 39%.
89
 
3.3 Post-Independence/Pre-Democratization Education 
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Historically, education has proved key to political mobility on the continent.  In the 
Francophone Sahel, the few Africans who managed to obtain secondary Western schooling 
quickly climbed to the highest ranks of political leadership (Ekeh 1975).  The Ponty School in 
Dakar educated the first Presidents of Mali, Benin, Niger, and Côte d‟Ivoire, as well as the Prime 
Minister of Senegal (Sabatier: 266).  Even in the current democratic environment, the majority of 
politicians in Africa reflect this elite, secular training and mastery of the colonial language. Their 
elite, educational profiles are distinct from the illiterate masses that they represent (Bleck and 
van de Walle 2011, forthcoming).   
In many African states, where colonial language is rarely spoken at home, schooling 
gives young students the skills to interact with government.  Louis Brenner and Etienne Gerard 
argue that Western education created a “fabricated,” social elite class, which was able to 
dominate the rest of the population.
90
 The mastery of colonial languages enables citizens to 
better interact and navigate the state bureaucracy.  A 1989 survey conducted by the Ministry of 
Education in Mali reports parents‟ strong attachment to the exclusive use of French as a language 
of instruction despite the pedagogical challenges it poses to most Malian children who speak 
other indigenous languages at home: 
For them, mastering it (French) means having a better grasp of administrative procedures, 
and running less of a risk of being cheated by civil servants.  Parents quote examples 
showing that the mastery of French is not only useful in Mali, but also abroad.  They 
have not had the chance to profit from a mastery of French, but feel that their children 
should benefit from it (Bergman 1996: 594 quoting 1989 Ministry report (44)). 
 
Mali‟s first regime campaigned on a platform to expand quality education to the masses.  
Under the leadership of the first president, Modibo Keita, Mali made substantive progress and 
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increased enrollment rates to 24% in 1964.
91
  Like many of his post-independence 
contemporaries, such as Nyerere in Tanzania or Nkrumah in Ghana, Keita saw the educational 
system as part of a greater ideological revolution.  The 1962 Educational Reform Law 
established nine years of compulsory education. There were five main principles outlined in the 
reform:  A quality education for all; teaching that can facilitate development; teaching that 
respects Malian culture, but that creates diplomas that are equivalent to those in other modern 
states; educational content that respects not only African values and norms, but also universal 
values; teaching that decolonizes the sprit and that rehabilitates Africa and its own valor 
(Système Educatif Malien: 20 and Obichere: 199).  Keita‟s ambitious efforts struggled in part 
due to budgetary limitations, but reflect his consistent, nationalist ideology.   He enlisted students 
to spread the party message and policies and guaranteed state employment for all secondary 
school employment – a practice that was continued until structural adjustment in the 1980s 
(Brenner 2007: 201).   In the post-independence era, even those citizens‟ who managed to obtain 
a 6
th
 grade diploma could qualify for a well-paying position as a civil servant.
92
  Parents, who 
enrolled their children, or at least tolerated their enrollment, began to see the financial returns to 
education. 
Keita‟s Marxist government was strongly secular and nationalized one of the largest 
madrassas in Bamako as well as the French-era madrassas.  The schools were required to teach 
in French and Arabic, but were stripped of their religious curriculum.  Keita planned to do the 
same with other madrassas in Mali before succumbing to a military coup in 1968 led by Moussa 
Traore (Brenner 2007: 214).    Following the 1968 coup, the education system floundered under 
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the Traore dictatorship; a World Bank report estimates that the gross enrollment ratio had 
dropped to 20% in 1973 (Bender et al: 1; Lange and Diarra 1999).   Fifteen years later gross 
enrollment improved a mere six percentage points.  Traore sought tight control over the 
education sector; he stripped civic education from the curriculum in 1972. In the mid 1980s 
Traore made harsh changes to the educational sector as a part of structural adjustment reforms.  
Seeking to reduce recurrent expenditures, including teachers‟ salaries,93 the Traore government 
reduced health and education expenditures from 20 billion FCFA ($40 million USD) in 1987 to 
16  billion FCFA ($32,000 million USD) in 1991.  One of the reforms was the “voluntary 
departure program” through which 1,000, or 12.5 %, of all teachers left the education sector 
(Bender: x).   These changes dissuaded many high school graduates from joining the teaching 
profession.  Five of eight teacher training institutes were closed due the inability to recruit new 
teachers (Bender: 15).
94
 Traore reluctantly integrated madrassas into the national education 
system in the 1980s. He only responded to heightened societal pressure for education and 
legalized private schools in 1990.
95
 Primary school enrollment rates remained dismally low, 
estimated at approximately 26% gross primary school enrollment, leading up to the democratic 
transition in 1991.  
In the backdrop of colonialism and government mismanagement of the primary education 
sector, madrassas emerged as educated West Africans returned from studies abroad in North 
Africa and the Middle East in the mid 20
th
 century.
96
 Schools were opened by Malians with a 
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cosmopolitan vision of a pan-Muslim community; they sought to construct modern, Islamic 
education facilities (Brenner 2001: 54).
97
  The schools offer a modern curriculum, in addition to 
religious studies, and use Arabic as the language of instruction. Initially, many of their founders 
aligned with an emerging “reformist” version of Islam that aimed to align Malian religious 
practice with those throughout the rest of the Muslim world.  They were critical of hierarchical 
Sufi networks that dominated Koranic education and faced conflict form Koranic school 
advocates (Brenner 2007: 202; Brenner 2001:91; Launay and Soares 1999).  For religious 
parents, madrassas offered a “modern,” pedagogy, which also reflected their values (Villaón 
forthcoming). 
Since their inception, there has been considerable tension between the government 
authorities and madrassas (Brenner and Sanankoua 1991; Brenner 2007; Amselle 1985).
98
  Unlike the 
partnerships between the French colonial system and Catholic Church across much of the 
continent, the colonial authorities were fearful of Islamic education. The colonial administration 
restricted the curriculum that these schools could legally offer by classifying them as “Koranic 
schools” and tried to ban them from teaching in Arabic (Brenner 2007: 213).  It was not until 
after independence that madrassas were allowed to teach French (Brenner 2001: 15). The French 
government refused to grant licenses that would qualify these schools for state aid such as that 
received by the Catholic schools. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
these initial schools were tiny, semirural institutions that could barely be distinguished from local 
Qur‟anic schools, except by the pedagogical aims for their founders, which included the introduction of 
formalized and modernized curriculum and the teaching of Arabic as a foreign language.  The third, 
which was eventually authorized to open in Bamako, was a much larger institution that counted its 
students in the hundreds within years of inception (Brenner 2007: 199).” 
97
 This modern Islamic schools are not unlike the Deobandi brand of madrassa in Pakistan and India, 
which have grown substantially since 1900 (Hefner and Zaman 2007). 
98
 The French government associated madrassas with a Salafist school of Islam they found threatening, 
despite the fact that some madrassas had a Sufi orientation.   
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Even without state assistance or recognition, madrassas flourished, especially in the 
1970s with the influx of petrol-dollars from the Middle East.   Brenner estimates that enrollment 
in madrassas outstripped enrollment in public schools in the 1980s.
99
  Madrassas educated 6% of 
primary learners in 1960, but by they represented 25% of all primary enrollment by the 1980s 
(2001: 170, 172).   Traore reluctantly integrated madrassas into the Ministry of Education in the 
1985; however many schools viewed the incorporation as an attempt at “domestication” 
reminiscent of French efforts to control Islamic schooling at the turn of the century (Brenner 
2001:260; Brenner 2007: 215).   
3.4 Education in the Democratic Era 
When Alpha Konare, a PhD and former educator, became Mali‟s first democratically 
elected president, he brought with him high expectations for education reform.  A longtime 
democratic activist, he was elected with a broad base of support from networks of teachers, 
health workers, and students across Mali.  Quickly after being elected, Konare expressed the 
development of education sector as one of the democratic regime‟s priorities (Lange and Diarra 
1999: 166) 
Within a year, he held the National Education Forum where citizens were invited to 
express their opinions on the future of Malian education.   For the first time, supporters of 
Islamic education were allowed to provide input into government education policy.  Members of 
diverse groups of newly flourishing Muslim voluntary associations, including the Union 
Culturelle Musulmane and Shubban al-muslimin, were staunch advocates of the modernization 
of Islamic schooling (Brennner 2007: 201). Proponents of Islamic education were very vocal and 
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demanded more schools and government resources (Brenner 2001: 281). Unlike forced 
integration of the Traore era, this conference represented a victory for Islamic interest-groups in 
a democratic context of new possibilities.  
Konare moved quickly to write new laws to integrate private and community schools as 
well as to formalize the state‟s relationship with madrassas (Lange and Diarra 1999). Madrassas, 
along with for-profit secular schools, and NGO-run community schools, were awarded 
accredited status in as government schools.  As a result, the schools were subject to government 
inspections, followed government sanctioned curriculum, and issued government diplomas.  This 
change was also welcomed by advocates of Islamic education as well as recent, unemployed 
university graduates who opened their own schools to meet the heavy demand in urban centers.  
The number of private schools grew from 54 in 1980 to 711 in 1998 (Bender et al: 21).
 100
 
Enrollment in madrassas also grew – albeit at a weaker rate and the government continued with 
the integration of madrassas into the Ministry of Education.  By 2007, the students could take the 
baccalaureate in Arabic.
101
   The state has gradually developed a system of monitoring and 
standardization. Ministry of Education officials conduct school visits, oversee exam grading, and 
run training seminars for teachers from all different school types.  
Konare‟s 1998 campaign of “a school or literary center in every village” earned Mali 
much needed donor-support for the education sector.  The government‟s quest to increase access 
to education was in line with the Education for All Campaign, which Mali signed in 1990 as well 
as the emerging Millennium Development Goals and Millennium Challenge Account‟s emphasis 
on girls‟ enrollment (Bleck and Guindo 2010).  The government and donors poured support into 
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the creation of teacher training institutes and accelerated teacher training programs to boost the 
number of teachers at school.  The Malian government built hundreds of new schools in order to 
accommodate new learners.  Konare embarked on an explicit partnership with non-state schools 
as a way to boost enrollment  
The government efforts were complemented by donor support for community schools in 
under-served rural areas. USAID, Norway, France, Canada and the World Bank financed 
schools, which used indigenous language instruction and local resources to reach children 
without access to other forms of education.
102
   Designed to complement decentralization, 
schools were managed and funded directly by committees of parents and community members, 
while NGOs took a lead in providing technical support and guidance on school management.   
Community school teachers were often recruited from among the local community members.  
Their salaries were generally paid by the local community with money and/or in kind 
contributions such as land, food, and crops. Eventually, after debt relief, the state began to 
subsidize the salaries at roughly $50 a month (Bierschenk 2007). The community school 
program was able to increase the number of community school teachers from 1,106 in 1996 to 
5,808 in 2003 and increase enrollment in some target regions from 35% to 62% (USAID 
Meeting EFA Targets: 5; Bender et al: 13).  
Figure 6 shows the dramatic increase in primary school enrollment following 
democratization in 1991. With increased aid to education as well as the liberalization of the 
education sector, Malian primary school gross enrollment climbed from less than 30% before the 
democratic transition to 78% in the 2007-2008 school year.   
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Figure 6: Number of Children Enrolled in Malian Primary School 1968 - 2009
103
 
 
This growth was matched by significant government efforts to build more public 
infrastructure, train teachers, and commit a larger percentage of the budget to education. Despite 
these efforts, there is a growing perception that the quality of public schools is declining due in 
part to larger class sizes, shorter hours of schooling, lower requirements for teacher 
qualifications, and frequent strikes (Diakite 2000; Bleck and Guindo 2010). Public opinion of the 
quality of state education has significantly declined.  As a seventy-year old respondent who was 
educated during the colonial system claimed, “My sixth grade French can beat any university 
student‟s French in the current educational system.”(BBC 25– May 2009).  In order to 
accommodate the growing number of students, public schools began offering “double sessions” 
of schooling, where two separate cohorts of students would attend a morning and afternoon 
session separately (Gerard 1999).  Due to the lack of infrastructure in rural areas, some schools 
grouped multiple grades in the same classroom.
104
  In 2006, over 34% of all urban and 14% of all 
rural students in Mali were attending these shortened classroom sessions.
 105
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3.5 Educational Content: Forming Democratic Citizens? 
The 1999 educational law stressed the importance of education for creating “patriotic 
citizens and building a democratic society”, but this discourse was not matched with policy 
changes (Portant Loi d‟Orienter sur l‟éducation 2).   It justified the importance of education for 
democracy by explaining that it helps citizens to learn and practice their obligations as “active 
members of democratic societies, who respect of peace and basic human rights of men and 
citizens” (Portant Loi d‟Orienter sur l‟éducation 2).  However the Malian state did little to revise 
the school curriculum to reflect the democratic discourse.  Civic and moral education, stripped 
from the Malian school curriculum during the Traore dictatorship, was not reinstated until 2009 
after teachers pleaded for its inclusion during a 2008 education conference.
106
  The forward to 
Mali‟s newly issued 2009 Civic and Moral Education textbook laments this loss: 
Moral and civic instruction,” which structured our life as students in the past, have lost 
their force over the course of time; their pedagogical purpose disintegrated.  It is 
fortunate that this new volume embodies the effort to actuate in our children, lost in the 
whirlwind of modernity and globalization, the reflection on what is good and what is bad, 
what they have the right to do and not to do.  Aiming to help them to become citizens 
who are conscious of their duties and their rights in the community, mothers and fathers 
conscious of their familial and social responsibilities is not a frivolous mission.  Civic 
and moral education is an essential task for us as educators (Keita et al: ii). ”107 
 
 The post-transition Malian governments have not capitalized on the “state-building” 
aspects of educational content beyond the proliferation of French as the national language.  
Through liberalization and inattention to civic curriculum, Mali failed to capture the unifying or 
nationalizing benefits of education as extolled by those who study European transitions to state-
hood. Beyond increasing provision to a larger base of citizens, the Malian government did not 
use a systematized approach to transmit messages about democracy or citizenship.  Students are 
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taught about the transition to democracy as well as Malian political history in history class, but 
up until recently, the Malian government did not use a civics or democratic curriculum to teach 
student about how to be better citizens or how to participate in democracy.   
3.6 The Growth of Religious Schooling 
In the democratic era of greater school choice, enrollment in madrassas is growing 
beyond its traditional base within trading communities.
108
  Historically, Malian society has 
critiqued madrassas for limited the employment opportunities of their graduates but they do offer 
a “negotiable social statute, and up to a certain point, a social mobility, which is not available to 
the majority of students of Koranic school.”  (Sanankoua and Brenner: 8). The state‟s recognition 
of madrassas as well as the rising popularity of Arabic as a language of cosmopolitan trade, 
increased trade with the non-Western world, and the spread of Islam has helped dissuade fears 
that graduates of madrassas have few job options.
109
  One of the leading proponents of madrassas 
education, Wahhabis, have created a nouveau riche class in Bamako with a cosmopolitan 
Muslim, rather than Western, orientation and frame of reference (Launay and Soares 1999: 512).  
They represent a concrete material power tied to commerce networks in the Middle East. 
Previous tensions between Wahhabyi and marabouts have largely subsided, as many Malians  
chose to blend and select practices they feel appropriate to their own lives (Soares 2005).
110
   As 
the graph below demonstrates enrollment in madrassas has continued to grow despite the 
increase in the availability of French-language schooling options and it even outpaces enrollment 
in secular Francophone counterparts.   
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 Gerard notes an increase in madrassas in Niger and Burkina as well (1999). 
109
 Interview Madrassa Director July 2007; Interview Ministry of Education Liaison to Arabic language 
schools July 2007; Interview with Arabic teacher Sikasso October 2009. 
110
 The French initially labeled Salafist or reformists as Wahhabis, but eventually many of them came to 
accept this identity (Brenner 2007: 211).  Today, many Malians refer to reformists, usually those who 
wear a full burqa or those men with long beards, as Wahhabis. 
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Figure 7: Primary Enrollment over Time
111 
 
Arabic teachers in Bamako explained that there has been a substantial increase in demand for 
their services in the last few years.  Many of them teach part time at private schools, which 
increasingly offer Arabic classes, in addition to their full-time work at madrassas.
112
     Initially, 
donors attributed the new increases in enrollment to the formal inclusion of madrassas into the 
Ministry records, but the recent statistics reveal that this growth is real– even in an environment 
of expanding Francophone options.   
Maybe a quote from one of the teachers here 
3.7 Schooling Supply in Mali 
 To understand the breadth and diversity of educational increases it is important to 
describe the educational sector in Mali.  Schooling in Mali is comprised of 9 years of basic or 
primary education, followed by four years at formal, lycée or in 2 or 4 year degree at a 
vocational school.  The primary cycle is divided into a first and second cycle.  After students 
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complete six years of school, they must pass an exam to enter the second cycle of primary 
school.  After they complete three additional years, they take an entrance exam, which 
determines if they can place into a lycée.  There are still very high attrition rates in the second 
cycle of primary and in high school. 
Table 3: Malian Schooling System 
Elementary Education 
First Cycle 
CP1 – Year 1  
Secondary 
Lycée 
Year 1 Lycée 
CP2 – Year 2 Year 2 Lycée  
CE1 – Year 3 Year 3 Terminale 
CE2 – Year 4 Vocational Track 1 
Year 1 
CM1 – Year 5 Year 2 (Take CAP Exam) 
CM2- Year 6 (Take CP Exam) Vocational Track 
Vocational Year 1 
Second Cycle 
7
th
 Grade (Start of Second Cycle) 
Vocational Year 2 (Take Exam BT1) 
8
th
 Grade Vocational Year 3 
9
th
 Grade (Take DEF Exam) Vocational Year 4 (Take Exam BT2) 
 
Most Malians, including the respondents in my survey, never make it past the first cycle 
of elementary school.  Many factors, including poor student performance, lack of resources to 
pay school fees, increased need for agricultural or domestic labor, sickness, disability, and early 
marriage for girls, contribute to high attrition rates.  The chart below demonstrates the 
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percentages of the population that have attained the commensurate levels of education. Only 
about 45% of the population has had any kind of formal schooling.  This does not mean that they 
have completed the 9 year cycle, but that they have any experience in primary school.  Less than 
10% of the population has attended any secondary school and less than 2% of Malians report 
attending university. 
Figure 8: Respondents’ Highest Level of Educational Attainment113 
 
3.7.1 Types of Schooling 
The educational expansion has changed perception of schooling options.  For those 
Malians with sufficient means, public school is increasingly viewed as being of inferior quality 
to private schooling. In most rural areas, public schools are the only educational institutions – 
especially at the secondary level. Public schools are managed and funded by the Malian Ministry 
of Education.  Schools fees, which range from $.50 to $10 dollars a year per pupil, are managed 
by the parent-teachers association (APE). Enrollment still outpaces the public school 
infrastructure; the Malian government pays for the majority of its secondary students to attend 
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private high schools because there are insufficient numbers of public secondary schools.  
Competition for secondary placement is fierce and the government institutes age cut-offs, which 
make all graduates over 17 ineligible for government scholarship to high school.  The university 
system, based in Bamako, is public; it is not uncommon for more than 1000 students to crowd 
into a lecture hall.    
Private schools mushroomed in capital cities, and now represent up to 50% of provision 
in some schools districts in Bamako, Sikasso, and Kayes.
114
  In these schools education is 
Francophone and secular; schools typically offer smaller class sizes than public schools.  This is 
made possible through more lenient regulations about teacher qualifications and building codes. 
Christian schools historically received subsidies from the state and many of them continue to 
receive funding in the current context (Lange and Diarra 1999). There is a great diversity 
between types of private schools.   A typical private school charges between 2,000-2,500 CFA 
($4-5) a month, but more elite private schools in Bamako can cost upwards of $2,000 a year.  
Private high schools outnumber public providers at the secondary level. For instance, only four 
of approximately fifty high schools in Bamako‟s Rive Gauche are public. 
Private schools provide jobs for many unemployed graduates.  A private school direct or 
in Bamako explained his motivations for starting his school in Niamakoro in 1992: “I already 
had the idea I wanted to do something for myself – that was my philosophy – I didn‟t really want 
to work for the state; it was very difficult – I was without resources, without anything – I started 
with 16 students, but with time, and good exam results - people talked and more people 
came.”115  The schooling economy in Bamako is growing as many parents, with sufficient 
means, forgo public schools to enroll children in private schools with higher passage rates.  
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 Ministry of Education Annual Report 2006-2007 
115
 Interview February 26, 2009 
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Some public school teachers are wary that private schooling has commoditized education and 
incentivized grade inflation.
116
 Private universities have just been introduced in the past few 
years. 
The Malian state groups Christian schools as a sub-set of private schools.  During the 
colonial and post-independence periods the government worked in exclusive collaboration with 
the Catholic Church as the only accredited private provider.  Catholic schools received subsidies 
from the Malian government despite the fact that Christians make up a small minority of the 
Malian population.  The Catholic Church is still the dominant Christian provider in Mali and has 
primary and as secondary schools in many regional capitals.  Some learners attend mission 
schools at subsidized rates, but others pay more than $300 a year for tuition.  Catholic schools 
are recognized for quality; most survey respondents that reported attending these schools were 
Muslim. 
Decentralized community schools have existed since de-colonization, but flourished in 
the mid-1990s as a result of the USAID-funded community school program.  In 1994, 
community schools were formally acknowledged as “a subcategory of private schools in Mali, 
defined as any not-for-profit education center created and managed by a community or 
association, as opposed to an individual or corporations.”117  NGOs provide community members 
with training on management as well as supplementary literacy courses; the government provides 
monitoring and teacher training.
118
  Many of the teachers are community members themselves.  
Some community schools use French as the language of instruction and others use indigenous 
languages to transition to French instruction.  Most community schools only offer education 
through the first cycle of primary school.   
                                                          
116
 Interviews with public school teachers in Bamako July 2007 and Sikasso October 2009 
117
 http://www.equip123.net/docs/e2-MaliCaseStudy.pdf 
118
 Interview M. Coulibaly, World Education Employee March 2009 
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Related to community schools are community literacy centers, which offer indigenous-
language literacy classes to citizens‟ who did not receive formal education.  These literacy 
centers were part of Konare‟s campaign for” a school or community educational center (CED) in 
each village.”  Classes are designed to help participants learn to read, write, and calculate in 
Bambara (or another relevant indigenous language) – allowing them to better organize 
themselves and their agricultural/market activities (Gerard 1997: 75).   
Madrassas are Arabic-language private schools that offer a modern curriculum in 
addition to religious instruction.  Currently, the largest percentages of learners attending 
madrassas are in districts in Bamako, Sikasso, and Kayes.
119
   Madrassas charge tuition rates 
between $3-5 per month, but like their Christian-peer institutions, many offer subsidized tuition 
to some poorer learners.
120
  Some madrassas receive external funding through remittances from 
the US and Europe.
121
  Foreign donors, notably Kaddafi, have also contributed money into the 
construction of madrassas.
122
  Although more recently some madrassas have begun to offer 
secondary education, the majority of respondents in the sample attended madrassas exclusively 
at the primary level.   Presently, the Malian government monitors and provides technical support 
to madrassas through the Center for the Promotion of the Arabic Language housed in the 
Ministry of Education.  Students hoping to continue their studies set their sights on scholarship 
programs abroad in other Islamic nations including Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia.
123
  Madrassas also represent mobility and the links to the broader Muslim world that are 
a scarce resource in Mali; many of the teachers in madrassas have spent time abroad and are 
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 Ministry of Education Report 2006-2007 
120
 Interview with Madrassa director  in Niamokoro, Bamako (February 2009) 
121
Interview with teachers and school directors in Kayes (July/August 2009) 
122
 During recent UN/NATO attacks on Libya, local radio DJs championed Khaddafi and criticized 
Malians for their lack of support to a man who had paid for so many mosques and madrassas.  There were 
a series of protests in  Bamako during the beginning of the UN occupation 
123
 Soares 2005 and Brenner 2001 
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perceived as having access to resources and personal connections in other countries.  The Malian 
2005-2006 Annual Education Report revealed that there were 81 primary school teachers in 
madrassas with four-year college degrees, more than three times the number of primary school 
teachers in public schools with the same level degrees.
124
 Madrassas use Arabic as their primary 
language of instruction although the law requires them to teach French as a subject. 
Koranic schools are the only school type that has not been integrated into the government 
system.  Koranic teachers were upset at the government decision to omit Koranic education from 
government subsidies or accreditation programs.  They felt that it was unjust for madrassas to 
receive support, while the vulnerable populations they educate, are excluded from government 
aid.  As one Koranic school director told me, “Our students – they too are jamandenw (citizens); 
we house them, we cloth them, and feed them – we should receive help from the government to 
accomplish these tasks.
125
  As discussed earlier, Koranic schools focus on memorization and 
deeper understanding of the Koran. Louis Brenner describes them: 
Virtually all Muslim children in the past attended Qur‟anic schools where most of them 
learned to recite at least some verses of the Qur‟an and where they learned the 
fundamentals of their religion.  A minority of these students might continue their 
schooling until they are able to recite the entire Qur‟an, and a still smaller minority might 
continue their studies in majlis, where they would study selected texts of Muslim 
religious sciences.  Majlis studies began with elementary books, usually in tawhid and 
fiqh, and depending on the student could continue for many years to include major 
Islamic texts.  It was only in the majlis that Arabic was taught systematically (Brenner 
2007: 203). 
 
At the most advanced levels, Koranic schools provided an opportunity of advancement and 
mastery unavailable in madrassas. A minority of Koranic school students have been able to reach 
advanced levels of study in majlis, while most madrassas schooling offered only primary 
degrees.  Informal Koranic education continues to flourish in Mali, often accommodating poorer 
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 Author‟s calculation using 2006 Ministry of Education Report 
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 Interview with Kayes Association of Koranic teachers in Kayes August 2009 
 
 
86 
 
populations who cannot afford to go to formal school and/or providing supplementary religious 
instruction for students who go to state schools (Gandolfi 271).  Students read text from Arabic, 
but most of the instruction is in local language until the highest levels of study.  Education is 
hierarchical and personal; a teacher transfers knowledge to his student.  A Koranic student is 
generally required to beg for alms totaling 100cfa or $.20; in some cases students live with their 
teachers and this money goes toward their food and educational expenses.
126
 Other students 
attend Koranic schools to supplement Francophone education.
127
  
Table 4: Comparative Analysis of School Type in Mali 
School Type Language of 
Instruction 
Accredited by 
State? 
Highest Level of 
Schooling 
Available? 
Primary School 
Fees? 
Public French or 
Bambara to 
French  
Yes University $.50 to $10 per 
year 
Private, Secular French Yes University $4-5 a month for 
most; some in 
Bamako up to 
$20-40 a month 
Christian French Yes High School $10-15 a month 
Madrassa Arabic (Franco-
Arabic schools 
also teach in 
French) 
Yes High School $3-5 a month 
Koranic Local 
Language/Arabic 
No Until mastery of 
Islamic 
Knowledge 
$1 a month 
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 Data from surveys with parents who send their children to Koranic schools 
127
 This group is underreported in the survey as parents who sent children to a school, did not receive a 
second prompt to ask if they sent the same children to another school type; if parents responded that their 
children went to no school, then they received a second prompt question asking specifically about 
Koranic school. 
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Community French or Local 
Language to 
French 
Yes Most only 
through first 
cycle of 
elementary 
school 
Sometimes 
goods in lieu of 
school fees 
Literacy Centers Local Language No Informal only The majority are 
free 
 
3.7.2 Enrollment Patterns 
In the 2006-2007 school year, 65% of primary school children attended public school, 
11% attended madrassas, 17% attended decentralized community schools, and 7% attended 
private secular or Christian schools in Mali.
128
  In my survey sample, 44% of respondents 
attended public school, 31% attended Koranic schools, 10% attended madrassas, 12% attended 
private secular or Christian schools, and three percent attended community schools or literacy 
centers.  Since community school programs are relatively recent, I was not able to sufficiently 
capture students who had attended community school in my survey sample.  I was able to 
include some recipients of government-sponsored literacy training in my sample who are coded 
as having received “informal education.” Like literacy centers, I treat Koranic instruction, 
regardless of length of tutelage, as informal education. 
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 2006-2007 Ministry of Education Annual Report.  The state report does not include Koranic 
enrollment. 
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Figure 9: Highest Level of Education for Survey Respondents 
 
The respondents‟ educational levels are slightly higher than national averages.  In 2006 the 
combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment rates in Mali was 36.7% as 
compared to 53% of all survey respondents who had primary, secondary, or tertiary schooling.
129
    
 
3.8  Girls’ Education 
In Mali, women are about 1.5 times as likely as men to be illiterate (Education for All 
2010: 96). Due to the strong educational disparities between men and women, it is important 
isolate and review women‟s educational profiles. In many ways, the story of educational 
expansion in Mali is a story about unprecedented opportunities for girls. During the colonial 
period, few members of Malian society enrolled their daughters in school. In 1949, only 21% of 
primary school students in the French Soudan were girls (Gerard 1997: 106). In the post 
independence period, little progress was made in terms of women‟s education. However, the 
transition to democracy, and concurrent campaign for Educational for All, has targeted women‟s 
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enrollment.  In Mali, girls‟ net enrollment has increased from 16% before the democratic 
transition to almost 43% in 2004.
130
 
Many challenges to girls‟ education remain.  Parents frequently pull girls out of school 
for early marriage or out of fear that they will become pregnant if allowed to fraternize with boys 
outside the home. Gerard adds that some rural households worry that educated daughter-in-laws 
will become too empowered and refuse arranged marriage and/or be able to seek administrative 
recourse in the case of a conflict with her husband (1999). Girls‟ primary completion rates are 
less than 40%, while boys‟ completion rates are almost 60% (World Bank Education Statistics 
April 2008).The obstacles to girls‟ education are higher in certain ethnic groups. Primary school 
teachers in Kayes region explained that they faced particular problems encouraging Soninke girls 
to stay enrolled past sixth grade despite sensitization campaigns.
131
  It should be noted that 
expected returns for education are different for boys and girls as boys are expected to contribute 
to the household after they are married, while girls join their in-laws family and are not required 
to continue to send money to their own parents.  This makes the productive investment aspect of 
education, less relevant for daughters than sons.  
Despite the many gender inequities in Mali, it should be noted that women who are able 
to achieve the highest levels of education are able to attain the highest positions in government.  
In spring 2011, following the resignation of Prime Minister Modibo Sidibe, President Toure 
appointed Madame Cisse Mariam Sidibe Kaïdama as Mali‟s first female prime minister.  In 
addition, 22% of ministers are female as well as 15 members of the National Assembly.  Women 
have had a more difficult time winning votes at the local level, but this also reflects their lower 
level of educational attainment: women make up fewer than 9% of municipal officials 
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 http://www.indexmundi.com/mali/net-enrolment-ratio-in-primary-education,-girls.html 
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 The teacher noted success of PAM and UNICEF competitions for attendance rates on female student 
retention. 
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3.9 Regional Variation 
Figure 10: Map of Mali
132
 
 
  Mali is 1.24 million square kilometers and each region has vastly different types of 
schooling infrastructure and opportunities.
133
  I selected survey sites in to maximize the variation 
in the citizens‟ educational experiences: the prevalence and popularity of different school types 
in each school district.   My research design created a substantial urban and peri-urban bias as 
rural areas of the country have far fewer schooling opportunities and fewer schooling choices.  I 
did include two rural school districts, in Sikasso and Sevare, to try to capture the specific 
challenges facing rural communities. I take a cue from Lauren MacLean‟s rich depiction of 
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village life in Ghana and Cote d‟Ivoire (2010) and offer a brief description of the ten districts: 
Faladie, Banconi, and Bamako Coura in Bamako, Kayes Rive Droite and Kayes Rive Gauche, 
Sikasso 1 and 2, Mopti, Sevare, and Timbuktu.   
3.9.1 Bamako 
Bamako is a dusty, sprawling city with an estimated 1-3 million inhabitants representing 
most of the country‟s sixty-two ethnic groups.134 Bamako has the largest educational market in 
the country.  Bamako is home to the national university, which attracts learners from all regions 
of the country.  As the national capital, Bamako has always had the most schooling options.  In 
2009, Bamako‟s red dirt roads were still paved only in the most trafficked areas.  Architecture in 
the capital city ranges from large cement three-story houses that hold large extended families to 
more modest mud/cement one-story homes.  Bamako‟s “sky scrapers,” which can be counted on 
two hands, include awkward government ministries, banks, and newly constructed 
Libyan/Chinese hotels.  With few landmarks or street signs, the cities plan eludes all but the most 
seasoned public transport drivers.  Music blares from all angles and seems to intensify Bamako‟s 
frenzied pace.  In the last eight years, donkey carts have given way to privately owned vehicles 
and flashy SUVs.  Cell phones and plastic motorbikes called “jakartas” are fairly commonplace 
in most Bamakoise households.  
Bamako‟s most prominent feature is the Niger River that divides the city in two distinct 
sides: Rive Droite and Rive Gauche.  Two bridges strain to facilitate the steady morning flow of 
cars, motos, and bicycles from the residential neighborhoods in Rive Droite to the commercial 
centers in Rive Gauche.  The oldest neighborhoods in Bamako, as well as the most famous 
markets, are located in Rive Gauche.  Rive Droite, settled in the 1950s when residents could still 
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Despite this diversity, intermarriage is common and most households speak Bambara.   
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purchase land using kola nuts, is home to the Bamako airport. The educational landscape of each 
side of the river reflects their historical legacies.  The older neighborhoods in Rive Gauche have 
greater rates of public school provision per capita, while the recent private school boom is most 
apparent in the Rive Droite.   
Public schools on the newer side of the Niger have been overwhelmed by this 
demographic growth.  School teachers struggle with more than 100 learners in a classroom.  As 
one sixth grade teacher explained, “Technically, we are only supposed to allow a maximum of 
75 learners in the class, but often you face more than 100 pupils in your class.  What are you 
going to do – turn those kids away?”135 Over-enrollment and overcrowding in public schools has 
diverted many learners to private school. A private school director in Bamako explained, “There 
has been a certain demographic growth that makes it difficult to satisfy the demand for 
education.  There are a lot of students who cannot get into public school, so they are forced to go 
to private school.”136  In addition, lower poverty rates and less reliance on agricultural labor in 
Bamako, mean more students are enrolled in school than any other region of the country and that 
on more parents have the disposable income necessary to send their children to private school.  
As a result, some school districts in newer settlement districts in Bamako have private school 
enrollment rates of over 40% - more than four times the national average.  My sample includes 
one district in Rive Droite: Faladie.  Faladie is one of Bamako‟s newest communities and 
stretches from the Northern perimeter of the city towards the airport and includes the peri-urban 
village of Senou, which was not yet electrified at the time of the survey.   
There other two districts are in the more established Rive Gauche – Bamako Coura and 
Banconi.  Bamako Coura, whose name ironically means “new Bamako,” lies at the heart of 
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 Interview with Niamakoro public school teacher (July 2007) 
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 Interview with Private school director, Niamakoura (February 2009) 
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downtown Bamako.  Its faded sidewalks and European style parks are reminiscent of another era.  
Banconi lies further along the railroad line toward Koulikoro.  It is home to one of Mali‟s most 
prolific religious figures – Haidara. His presence is felt, not only through his merchandise sold 
along street corners, but in the high rate of enrollment in madrassas in this school district. 
Bamako has a strong market for Islamic education.  Some of the first madrassas were 
built in Bamako in the 1950s including the Ecole Coranique Supérieure, a madrassa founded by 
university-educated Malians who returned from studies in Egypt and felt deceived and 
disappointed by the lack of opportunities in spite their prestigious diplomas (Brenner 2001: 56). 
As in other regions, madrassas find their base with members of the trading communities – 
particularly Soninke traders and those Malians that subscribe to a “reformist” version of Islam.137 
Some wealthy members of these communities constitute a differentiated market for Islamic 
education and clearly choose to enroll their children in religious schools despite the many school 
types that exist in Bamako.   
3.9.2 Kayes 
Kayes is the final railroad stop in Mali before the Senegalese border.  The culture and 
legacy of the railroad resonates throughout the city.
 138
 Kayes, the former colonial capital, was 
home to the first French schools in Mali.   Kayes is one of the hottest cities in the world, but 
many of the villages in the region are inaccessible during the rainy season. The majority of 
citizens in Kayes are Kassonke, Peul, Malinke, and Soninke. The former French capital, it is one 
of the few places in Mali where you can see remnants of colonial architecture including the 
railroad station. Kayes, like Bamako, is divided by a river – the Senegal; the bus from Bamako 
                                                          
137
 As explained, this is not an exclusive profile, but just the predominant groups that we associate with 
demand for schooling in madrassas.  Gerard also finds that trading communities prefer madrassas in a 
study of education in Burkina Faso (1999: 158). 
138
 See Brandon County‟s dissertation: Cheminots into Citizens: Labor, Migration, and Political 
Imagination along the Dakar/Niger Railroad, 1923-1974 for a history of political activism along the rail 
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first reaches the urban part of Kayes Rive Gauche (Kayes N‟Dyi) – a much larger school district 
encompassing a vast network of villages in the region, before crossing the Senegal to the smaller, 
more compact Kayes Rive Droite. Residents complain that life in Kayes is expensive.  There is 
no public transit in the city; taxi rides in Kayes cost a fixed rate of 1000 CFA ($2), which relative 
to the distance covered would be considered exorbitant in Bamako.  The price reflects the poor 
quality of the roads, which are nearly impenetrable when muddy. Juxtaposed with the dirty 
landscape of city are the extravagant villas, built by Malian expatriates.  
Kayes' education profile also reflects the disjuncture between the French legacy and 
expatriate remittance flows.  The first French schools in Mali were built in Kayes in the late 
1800s.  However, two ethnic groups, the Soninke and Peul, have historically opted to send their 
children to Islamic schools.  In one of the two school districts in Kayes, encompassing many of 
its surrounding villages, more than 30% of all primary learners go to madrassas.  Unfortunately, 
the ministry of education does not capture enrollment in Koranic schools, but Kayes had the 
largest number of parents who send their children exclusively to Koranic schools.  The Soninke, 
a migrant community, have dominated trade that stretched across the Sahel since before the 
Middle Ages.
139
 Like all trading communities, the Soninke have had a contentious relationship 
with government regimes who seek to restrict movement and collect taxes.   Known for their 
religious fervor, Soninke traditionally refused to send their children French “Christian” education 
(Manchuelle 1997: 204).  The tension continues as Soninike emigrants in France chose to build 
new madrassas instead of helping to fund existing public schools in their villages. Teachers and 
doctors working in rural Kayes reported that Soninke expatriates in France and the US send 
remittances to build ostentatious houses and private health centers in villages throughout the 
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 See Francois Manuchelle‟s Willing Migrants for a comprehensive study of Soninke trade and 
migration. 
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region.
140
     I interviewed a public school director who works in a village in the region of Kayes 
with a predominantly Soninke population.  He explained how Soninke expatriates in France sent 
remittances to fund a state-of- the art madrassa in the same small village.  He wrote a letter to the 
men in France and appealed to them to send some funding for his under-financed public school, 
but he was ultimately unsuccessful.
141
   
Soninke emigration from the region is so pronounced, that the absence of Soninke males 
from households is tangible during our survey work; we encountered many female-headed 
households, where young women would respond to our questionnaires clutching state of the art 
camera-phones from France. The Fulani, or Peul, while less affluent, also tend to favor Islamic 
education –particularly Koranic schools.  However, a parallel community of Soninke and Peule 
parents exists, which preferred Islamic education.  Many members of the Peule community in the 
Kayes region prefer Koranic education because it is tied to their religious heritage and 
membership in the Sufi brotherhoods.
142
 Of the 42 parents who enrolled children in Koranic 
schools, twenty-seven claimed to speak Pulaar at home.   
3.9.3 Sikasso 
Sikasso is an agricultural region in Southern Mali bordering Burkina Faso, Cote d‟Ivoire, 
and Guinea.  Sikasso produces the majority of Mali‟s cotton - Mali‟s primary export and weak 
world cotton prices have hurt producers.  Referred to as the Sikasso paradox, the rich agricultural 
region has Mali‟s second highest poverty rates and lowest regional school enrollment averages 
(Delarue et al 2008). As an agricultural region, many families rely on their children‟s labor to 
work the family farms. The city of Sikasso‟s population is predominantly Senoufo, Mianka, and 
Bambara though immigration into the region by a vast number of ethnic groups is common given 
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 Interviews doctor, teachers, school director working in rural Kayes (August 2009) 
141
 Interview with School Director (August 2009) 
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 Most students in the North go to Koranic school in addition to any government instruction. 
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its position on the roads to neighboring countries.  Sikasso, particularly in the city, also has a 
growing market for Islamic education.
143
  In comparison to Kayes, Sikasso‟s shady, tree-lined 
streets lack the same energy or cosmopolitan accoutrements. The Sikasso region was home to 
some of the strongest colonial resistance movements including those of Samory Toure and 
Babemba Traore.  In the sheep market in the center of the city, you can still spot the crumbling 
remains of a wall built by Tieba Traore in the late 1800s, which protected the city from French 
invaders until his ultimate defeat.   
Sikasso has traditionally had the lowest rates of school enrollment in the country, but has 
benefitted greatly from the community school program.  Now close to thirty percent of all 
primary school learners in Sikasso attend community schools. As with the other regions, initially, 
madrassas in Sikasso were populated by the children of the Malian trading community (Amselle 
1985).   Sikasso is also highly dependent on agricultural labor; many parents explained tradeoffs 
between sending their child to school and having enough labor for their farms. 
We conducted surveys in both Sikasso city and villages in Sikasso II, 40-20 miles 
Northwest of Sikasso city. Most community schools are found in the rural villages, such as those 
that make up Sikasso 2.  The villages selected for our study in Sikasso II were predominantly 
Senoufo and most residents worked as farmers on the lush green landscape.  Survey work in 
these zones required preliminary meetings with a village leader (dugutigi) and, in the larger 
villages, mayor.   
3.9.4 Mopti/Sevare 
Mopti and Sevare are twin cities in the middle of Mali, found along the country‟s “best 
road,” which stretches from Bamako to Douentza.  The gateway to the Northern part of Mali, 
Mopti and Sevare school districts reflect a blend of the cultures.  A small, crowded city, Mopti 
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 Interview with school director and Arabic teacher Sikasso (October 2009) 
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exports fish to the other regions of Mali.  Mopti sits along a narrow peninsula straddled by the 
Niger and Bani rivers.  Referred to as the Venice of Africa, Mopti‟s ports welcome large, 
colorful pinasses ferrying people, livestock, and commerce from villages along the river into the 
vibrant market.    Sevare city sits a couple of kilometers inland from Mopti.  Its central location 
on the roads to Douentza, Bamako, Dogon Country, and Koutiala makes it a popular stop for 
tourists and NGOs.  Like other historic cities in the region, including Djenne, Mopti has a long 
history of Islamic education. 
  We conducted surveys within Mote‟s urban school district as well as a second set of 
surveys in the greater Mopti region (Sevare school district).   Our survey work in Sevare school 
district was done in villages in the surrounding region up and down the roads between San and 
Douentza.  The villages are ethnically diverse: Peule, Bozo, Soninke, Songhrai, and Dogon.  
Mopti has high public school enrollment – greater than 80% of all students attend public primary 
school.  Madrassa education is popular in the villages of Sevare region – 15% of all primary 
students in the school district attend madrassas and many others attend Koranic schools 
3.9.5 Timbuktu 
A center of Islamic and scientific thought, Timbuktu was home to some of the oldest 
universities in the world. By the 16
th
 century under the Askia Dynasty, the approximately 25,000 
students attended the famed University of Sankore, which was made up of independent colleges 
and schools run by single professors.
144
 A full degree took approximately ten years and required 
mastering Arabic as well as memorization of the Koran. During this period, Timbuktu had one of 
the highest literacy rates in the world.  Timbuktu also sits on the Niger - a day‟s drive up the dirt 
road from Douentza.  The tree lined entrance to the city is reminiscent of Mopti, but the sandy 
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 http://www.Timbuktufoundation.org/university.html; 
http://www.muslimheritage.com/topics/default.cfm?TaxonomyTypeID=101&TaxonomySubTypeID=19
&TaxonomyThirdLevelID=280&ArticleID=371; http://www.grioo.com/info5511.html 
 
 
98 
 
landscape quickly reminds visitors that they are on the edge of the desert.  The sandy side streets 
are impenetrable to all but 4x4s and Peugeot motorcycles.  The city‟s unique architecture and 
meticulously adorned wooden doors exude its rich heritage.    
Like the other regions in the North of Mali, Kidal and Gao, Timbuktu looks distinct from 
the rest of Mali - as Bambara gives way to Songhrai as the prominent market language.  
Timbuktu‟s diverse population includes Tuaregs, Songhrai, Arabs, Bella, and Peule.  
Respondents to our surveys included those living in permanent houses as well as nomadic 
dwellers in make-shift huts nestled in openings within the city streets.  In recent years, residents 
of Timbuktu have been victims of conflict.  The Tuareg uprising of the 1990s, destroyed many 
schools and disrupted education provision in the region.  Though these disputes were initially 
settled, insecurity has begun to plague Timbuktu and the rest of the North of the country again 
with the introduction of rebel and intra-community fighting in 2008 and 2009.  Tension between 
the central government and the North remains as the Northerners feel marginalized from access 
to fewer job opportunities and state-resources.  Attacks on soldiers and military installations by 
rebel groups have increased in the last few years.  In addition, AQIM kidnapped a record number 
of foreigners in Mali and the surrounding areas in 2009 – drawing international attention to the 
region. 
According to one of my research assistants, who grew up in Timbuktu, all public school 
learners also attend Koranic schools. He explained, “I remember getting up early to do my 
lessons at Koranic school, then we would all go to public school, and then after public school, we 
would return to Koranic school.”  Our surveys in Timbuktu confirmed this pattern of public 
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school parents simultaneously enrolling their children in Koranic school for supplementary 
religious instruction.
145
  
3.10 Conclusion 
The dramatic increases in enrollment and the recent accreditation of non-state schools 
generate interesting questions about the impact of educational policy on democratization.  
Historically, we imagine the state monopoly over education shaping citizens political knowledge, 
experience, and expectations.  What are the effects of a massive educational expansion on 
democratic citizenship?  The expanding role of Islamic education raises additional questions 
about the role of madrassa alumni in the future of Malian democracy. How might different types 
of schools shape citizens‟ knowledge or patterns of political participation?  The next chapter 
explores the relationship between citizens‟ educational experiences and their political knowledge 
and participation to forecast the effects of these policy changes.   
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 Koranic enrollment was generally under-reported among parents who simultaneously send their 
children to other school types in addition to Koranic school.  Parents were only primed with a second 
question about Islamic education if they provided a no education response. 
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Chapter 4 
Can Education Create Better Citizens: Students? 
4.1 Introduction 
We started our survey in Bamako on a Sunday afternoon.  Djenebou and I walked down a 
red, dirt-road in Niamakoro
146
 counting houses.  At the fifth house, we saw Mamadou
147
, a 
wealthy, Soninke business man, sitting outside drinking tea with his grin.
148
 We approached the 
group, explained our mission, and asked those members who lived in the household if they 
would be willing to participate in our survey.  The group laughed at the sight of two women, an 
American and a university student, speaking Bambara and inquiring about their opinions. 
Everyone agreed to participate so we passed out playing cards. Mamadou pulled the highest 
playing card, and was thereby selected to participate in the survey (F70).  Djenebou read the first 
series of questions about education, but as she broached the topic of politics, Mamadou grew 
impatient with us.  I coded one “I don‟t know” response after another before he stood up from 
his metal chair, sipped a shot of tea, and then explained that he was busy and needed to stop the 
interview.    As we reluctantly packed up, he defended his early departure, “I never went to 
school, so I am not involved in politics.  I don‟t know anything about politics – I focus on the 
market.” Like many Soninke, Mamadou had attended an informal Koranic school as a youth, but 
had never gone to Francophone school.  He then offered, “My children are in school, so maybe 
they can get involved in politics.”  Mamadou saw different possibilities for his two boys and two 
girls who attend an elite, private Francophone school in Bamako. 
                                                          
146
 Niamakoro is a newer, neighborhood in Bamako in the Faladie school district. 
147
 The names of all respondents have been changed to protect their identity. 
148
 “Grin” is a Bambara word that refers to a group of friends who gather weekly to drink tea and hang 
out; the group can be same sex or mixed, but members are generally roughly the same age. 
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Mamadou‟s understanding of the relationship between education and politics mirrors that 
of many political scientists and policy makers: more educated citizens are better able to 
understand and participate in politics.  Will this assumption hold in a nascent, Muslim, African 
democracy with a diverse portfolio of accredited education providers?  Can Islamic schooling 
also increase one‟s capacity as a citizen? 
This chapter analyzes the schooling experience of citizens to assess the impact of 
education on political knowledge and political participation.  I find that all forms and levels of 
education, even informal and Islamic education, are significantly correlated with increased 
political knowledge compared to citizens with no education.  I argue that education increases 
citizens‟ political knowledge by building citizens‟ cognitive skills.  I also find that formal 
education is correlated with a greater likelihood of participating in difficult political activities 
including campaigning, willingness to run for office, and contacting a government official.  I 
argue that education facilitates these activities by empowering citizens with greater internal 
efficacy and through the transmission of French literacy. Contrary to my initial expectations, I do 
not find significant differences among the political knowledge and most forms of participation 
for the alumni of state schools and citizens who attended non-state schools including madrassas 
and Koranic schools at the primary level.
149
 
4.2 What do Citizens Know and Why do they Participate: Building Initial Hypotheses. 
Existing theoretical literature and empirical research suggests that educated Malian 
students will know more about politics than their uneducated peers.  Education could generate 
political knowledge through a number of mechanisms: democratic/liberal curriculum, 
                                                          
149
 This analysis is conducted exclusively for citizens with a maximum of primary and informal levels of 
school since so few respondents attended secondary madrassas (9). 
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empowerment, literacy, and socialization.
150
  Drawing on this literature, I begin with a basic 
hypothesis that the citizens with any level of education will have greater political knowledge 
than citizens who did not attend any school.  
H(1): Citizens who have had any level of schooling will be more likely to provide correct 
responses to the political knowledge questions than those citizens with no education.   
Currently, students attend accredited non-state schools including secular, private schools, 
Christian schools, and madrassas as well as Koranic schools.  It is possible that these schools will 
not develop Malian citizens as well as public schools
151
 because are less invested in 
democratic/civic ideologies, because they discourage students from learning about secular 
politics, and/or because they teach in languages other than French (the language of the 
bureaucracy). For instance, private schools, which are primarily profit-seeking enterprises, could 
be less committed than state-schools to the project of state building.
152
 Dahl‟s argument that 
education created better democratic citizens was predicated upon the assumption that schools 
were committed to liberal, democratic ideals (1967).  It is possible that Islamic schools may be 
less committed to these ideologies. Also due to the history of contention between religious 
authorities and the secular state in West Africa, Islamic schools may be less invested in state-
building and they might even discourage students from learning about or participating in secular 
politics (Manchuelle1997; Brenner 2001; Idrissa 2008).  This juxtaposition further suggests that 
alumni of Islamic schools might be less willing to follow or engage in politics.  For these 
reasons, I expect students who attend state schools should be more informed about politics than 
                                                          
150
 See Chapter 1 for a complete review of this literature that includes diverse thinkers such as Amyarta 
Sen (1999), Weber (1976), Nie et al (1996) and Almond and Verba (1963). 
151
 I use state and public schools interchangeably to refer to schools that are managed directly by the 
Ministry of Education. 
152
 In their criticism of private schools, many public school educators made this assertion (Interviews 
Bamako 2007). 
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those students who attend non-state schools including madrassas, private secular schools, 
Koranic schools, and community schools. 
H(2): Citizens who attended public schools will be more likely to provide correct 
responses to political knowledge questions that peers with the same level of education who 
attended other schools 
Literature on American political participation demonstrates that the most educated 
citizens are also the most active in all forms of politics due to higher internal efficacy, greater 
investment in and support for democratic institutions, higher skill levels, and closer connections 
to central nodes of political power.
153
  However, studies of voting and political mobilization in 
Africa problematize this assumption.  Voters are often mobilized by political entrepreneurs 
through the use of short-term incentives such as bribes and threats (Collier 2009, Banegas 1998).  
In our exit polling during the 2009 Municipal Elections, my research team observed voters being 
rewarded with breakfast sandwiches or money.   When I asked people in my neighborhood who 
they voted for, too often the respondent, sometimes adorned a party t-shirt, would turn to 
someone else in the compound and ask: “Which party is it that I support?”   During election 
week, the streets of Bamako became plastered with layers of party posters, roving teams of party 
supporters on motorcycles, and professional “animators” paid to dance on the back of rented 
trucks.
154
 Citizens complained that parties were not giving out as many gifts to urban zones this 
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 Extensive literature includes Almond and Verba 1963, Lipset 1959, Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 
Scholzman, Verba, and Brady 1995, and Nie et al 1996 
154
 If citizens reported engaging in these activities, they were coded as 1; if they did not know or 
responded that they had not engaged in these behaviors – they were coded as 0.  For voting behavior, I 
excluded those respondents who were ineligible to vote in 2007, but due to Afro-barometer coding 
options that I had adopted unregistered and young voters were grouped together in the same category.  I 
relied on notes from coders, but may have included some no responses for voters who were not eligible 
thus deflating turnout for younger voters.  I coded all no responses as 0 except for instances where the 
respondent noted that they were prevented from voting, which I excluded.  All non-responses were 
 
 
104 
 
year; there were fewer t-shirts or household supplies.  However, young people still managed to 
earn a couple of dollars rounding up people to go to the polls and political parties continued to 
hold high profile soccer matches in most neighborhoods.  ADEMA, which dominated the 
municipal elections, reportedly paid $1000 prize to a winner of one of these tournaments.
155
   
If certain aspects of participation, such as voting and political identification, are rewarded 
or punished by a third party, we need to expand the “D” term in Riker and Ordeshook‟s infamous 
voter‟s calculation (1970).156 These incentives could obfuscate the relationship between 
education and participation. If, as some research suggests, educated voters are less reliant upon 
political parties and therefore less vulnerable to these threats and incentives, then they might be 
less likely to be targeted for mobilization and/or less likely to turn-out to the polls (Kramon 
2010; Dalton 2006).  Blaydes argues that the negative relationship between education and voting 
is due to the poor‟s vulnerability to vote-buying (2006).    
Because of the noise introduced by these short-term incentives, I focus on other aspects 
of participation, such as campaigning, running for office, and contacting a government official 
outside of the electoral context, which require greater skill regardless of incentives offered. 
These activities require skill beyond stating your party of preference or stepping into a rented 
sotrama
157
 that transports voters to the polls.    Nie et al refer to these as “difficult forms of 
participation (1996).” I hypothesize that education will increase difficult participation: 
campaigning for a candidate, running for office, and contacting an official in the electoral off-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dropped from the sample.   I keep all activities as isolated dependent variables since it is unclear which 
aspects of participation are associated. 
155
 Informal interview with participating soccer player (March 2009) 
156
 The D term refers to benefits that voters receive from voting; this is not to assert that all African voters 
are confronted with these incentives, but to state that I feel they are prevalent enough to obstruct the 
relationship between education and voting. 
157
 Sotramas are privately-owned green mini-vans that form the Malian public transit system. 
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cycle.  This does not eliminate the possibility that these activities are also incentivized, but the 
skill threshold would serve as an impediment to those who are less educated.   
H (3): Citizens with greater levels of education will participate in “difficult” forms of 
politics more often.  
Different schools might foster or restrict participation in different ways. For instance, we 
might imagine students who attend private school, will be less dependent on or familiar with the 
state and thus be less inclined to participate in democratic politics (Hirschman 1970).   I have 
already discussed the separate spheres of influence occupied by religious and secular authorities.  
Unlike many Muslim countries where Islamic clerics mobilize voters, we do not observe 
effective political mobilization in formal electoral channels by religious leaders (Sears 2007).
158
    
Therefore, students who attend religious schools might be more committed to solidarity with 
religious and traditional leaders and hesitant to express their preferences directly to the secular 
authorities (Brenner 2001; Gandolfi 2003; Soares 2006).  Despite government requirements that 
madrassas teach French, few madrassas provide comprehensive French instruction.  A study of 
Malian madrassas revealed that the schools spent an average of 5 hours a week teaching French 
and Koranic schools included   no French in their curriculum (Moussa et al 2007).
159
  Therefore 
alumni of Islamic schools are less likely to gain the linguistic skills needed to participate in 
difficult forms of politics than those citizens who attended Francophone schools. 
H (4): State school graduates will participate in all forms of politics at higher levels than 
their peers who attended non-state schools. 
4.3 Analyzing the Relationship between Education, Knowledge, and Participation 
                                                          
158
 In contrast to informal political mobilization such as the 2009 Family Code Protests described in 
Chapter 2. 
159
 Usually lack of French language proficiency creates barriers for madrassa learners to switch over to 
Francophone school.  When students switch from Arabic to French schools, they usually have to repeat 
multiple grades in order to gain French language skills. 
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To assess Malians‟ perspectives on politics, the government, and education, our research 
team walked through cities and villages in Mali. We sat in compounds, and talked to respondents 
as they washed clothes, played cards, nursed babies, chopped wood, pounded millet, cooked, 
collected well water, and tinkered with broken appliances.   After eleven months, we amassed a 
survey of one thousand citizens in ten school districts.
160
   
I used a stratified, area probability sampling within ten school districts for my sample 
(Fowler 2009:29).  I selected school districts using Ministry of Education data on education 
provision to maximize potential variation on my independent variable: type of school.
161
  Ten 
districts were selected from 5 regions: Bamako, Kayes, Sikasso, Mopti, and Timbuktu.  Because 
I hoped to capture a diverse group of providers, and due to logistic and budget constraints, my 
sample also reflects an urban bias as compared to a representative national sample.  As detailed 
in Chapter 1, neighborhoods were selected using an online randomizer. Households and 
individuals were selected using Afrobarometer protocol.
162
 
The survey included questions about two main dependent variables, political knowledge 
and political participation as well as questions about respondents‟ education profiles, my primary 
explanatory variable, and a series of socio-economic controls.
163
  I assessed respondents‟ 
education in two ways: the highest level of education they had attained and the schools that they 
                                                          
160
 School districts were selected for to maximize independent variable, school type, and neighborhoods, 
households, and individuals were selected randomly.  For survey procedures please refer to Chapter 1. 
161
As advocated by King, Keohane, and Verba, I chose districts to maximize potential variation on the 
independent variable (as well as control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables 
(140). 
162
 Due to limited time and resources, we followed Afrobarometer regulations except we did not alternate 
respondents by gender, we only chose among household members who were in the compound on arrival, 
and we did not return to houses, which had members absent. 
163
 Full survey protocol explained in Chapter 1 
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had attended.
164
   This allows me to test the effects of the length of schooling as well as the type 
of provider. 
  We asked five Afro-barometer questions to evaluate the first dependent variable: 
citizens‟ political knowledge.   One question evaluated local level political knowledge by asking 
respondents to name their mayor.  Three questions asked about familiarity with national level 
politics: 1) What is the name of the president of the national assembly?  2) What party has the 
majority of seats in the assembly?  3) What are the term limits for the president? 
During my stay in Mali, citizens and news outlets were engaging in heated debates over issues 
such as the revised Family Code and the secondary school promotion system.  While my 
indicators only scrape the surface of political debates or national issues of interest, they do offer 
insight into citizens‟ abilities to name important and relevant political players and one basic rule 
in their constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
164
 For education level, people who did not attend any school were coded as 0, those who received 
informal education, including Koranic school and literacy training, were coded as 1, those who received 
ant primary education were coded as 2, those with secondary education were coded as 3 and those with 
university education were coded as 4.   Only the highest category of response was coded.  For instance, 
someone who attended Koranic school and public secondary school was coded as both Koranic and 
public for school type and level of education as 3.  To measure school types, I created dummy variables 
based on schools that respondents attended based on the categories of public, private/Christian, Koranic, 
CED/Community school or madrassa 
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Table 5: Dependent Variables 
Political 
Knowledge 
Who is the 
mayor of 
(name 
locality)? 
Who is the 
President of 
the National 
Assembly? 
What party 
has the most 
seats in the 
National 
Assembly? 
How long can someone serve as 
President? 
Political 
Participation 
Did you vote 
in the 2007 
Presidential 
Elections? 
 
 
(Easy) 
Do you feel 
close to a 
political 
party? 
 
 
(Easy) 
Did you 
participate 
in a 
campaign 
for the 2007 
Presidential 
Elections? 
(Hard) 
Would 
you 
Run for 
Political 
Office? 
 
(Hard) 
Have you ever visited 
a government official 
to express an idea or 
to resolve a problem? 
 
 
(Hard) 
 
 
I include multiple Afro-barometer indicators to capture a broad range of formal “political 
participation.”  Following Nie et al., I separate participation into two categories based on the skill 
required: easy and difficult (1996).  These measures of participation are far from inclusive, but 
provide insight into some fundamental political behaviors.  I did not feel that a survey instrument 
could capture candid responses about contentious participation such as protests or boycotts, so 
the dependent variables focus on participation in formal channels.
165
 
I include control variables for factors that might obscure or inflate the relationship 
between education, knowledge, and participation: gender, age, rural/urban, school district, and 
poverty.
 166
  Mali has one of the lowest gender parity ratings in the world (Wing 2009).  Studies 
                                                          
165
 I also thought that these questions might invoke suspicion or fear in respondents.  I tried to keep the 
survey as mundane and practical as possible. 
166
 The index combines the number of household possessions (radio, television, motorized vehicle, and 
cell phone) and the frequency of deprivation from food, water, medicine, and firewood/charcoal.  
Respondents get two points for each item they own and four points if they own a motorized vehicle, so 
that the wealth index ranges from 0-10. Deprivation ranges from never (0) to always (4), so the maximum 
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using Afrobarometer data reveal that African men are more likely than women to engage in all 
aspects of politics (Logan 2010: 17; MacLean 2011:17).  Historically, many fewer women 
attended school than men, so it is important to separate gender effects out from education, since 
excluding gender might inflate the effect of education as women are also less active in the public 
sphere than men.   Afro-barometer data also reveals that older citizens are more likely to vote 
(MacLean 2011; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005).  In Mali, primary school enrollment has increased 
dramatically in the last twenty years; therefore older respondents will have been less likely to 
have attended school.  Fox and Ishayama found a reverse correlation between age and partisan 
identification, where younger Malians were more likely to claim attachment to a party (2006). 
Age might obscure the relationship between participation and education, since older citizens 
generally vote more often or might identify with a party less strongly, but are also likely to be 
less educated.  
167
  I code all respondents by decade of birth to separate out the effects of age.   
Although socio-economic indicators have not proven determinant in previous studies of 
voting behavior, (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005), Maclean found poverty to be correlated with 
higher rates of reporting contact with a politician (2012); higher levels of education and 
household wealth are generally correlated so I include a proxy for poverty in order to try to 
separate these effects.  Political mobilization is different in villages than in urban areas.   Many 
rural zones continue to operate through consensual governments where residents unanimously 
select a candidate with the “guidance” of traditional leaders.168 In her study of Afrobarometer 
countries, Logan finds that rural citizens are more likely to participate in politics than urban 
citizens (2010:17).  Fox and Ishayama find rural residents of Afrobarometer countries have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
score is 16.   Then separated all scores into five quintiles: 10to 6 rich, 5 to1 comfortable, 0- to -4 average,-
5 to-9 poor, and -10 to -16 very poor. 
167
  Coded as: 18-28=1; 29-38=2; 39-48=3; 49-58=4; 59-68=5; 69+=6. 
168 Interview with executive member of the National Independent Election Committee (CENI) 
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stronger partisan identification (2006).  MacLean finds rural residents more likely to contact a 
political leader (2012:21). People in rural zones are also typically less educated since there is less 
school infrastructure in rural areas.  It is important to control for rural/urban residence to 
eliminate this bias.  Finally, the school districts surveyed vary greatly in terms of educational 
possibilities, political candidates, party strength, and voter turnout, so I add a control for districts 
to parse out regional effects from those that are truly a result of education.
169
 
I include two additional controls in my evaluation of education‟s role in facilitating 
political participation: membership in a secular organization and membership in a religious 
organization.
 170
  Scholars of West Africa have found that “agencies of mobilization,” including 
parties and civil society organizations play an important role in mobilizing turnout (Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2005; Koter 2009; Beck 2008).  In her analysis of Afrobarometer data MacLean finds 
that rural residents and poorer respondents are more likely to report “joining together to make 
claims (2011).”  Using 2001 Afrobarometer data, Fox and Ishayama find that membership in a 
Malian civil society organization is correlated with identifying with a party (2006).    
I observed this phenomenon while sitting in on campaign meetings for a municipal 
candidate in Bamako.  The primary strategy for getting voters out to the polls was to target 
patrons or associational presidents who could organize members to come out to vote.  
Prospective campaign members would tout their ability to mobilize specific demographics such 
as neighborhood youth organizations. This “consensual” system was of organizing and voting is 
even more exaggerated at the village level.
171
  If more educated citizens are also more or less 
                                                          
169
 For instance, we know that there are substantial regional differences in terms of voter turnout.  
170
 Each respondent was asked about her degree of involvement in religious and other associations: no 
involvement, member, active member, or leader so that responses for both religious association and 
associational membership are coded on a scale of 0-3. 
171
 Interview with executive members of the National Electoral Commission May 2009; Interview with 
Malian academic March 2009 
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likely to join organizations than average citizens, correlations might capture the effect of these 
organizations rather than education itself.  Therefore I include it as a control to exclude that 
possibility.   
Table 6 provides summary statistics for my sample and from Round 3 of Afrobarometer, 
which was administered in 2005. I caution that these surveys are not completely comparable 
since the Afrobarometer data references the Presidential election in 2002, while respondents in 
my sample referenced the 2007 elections.
172
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics  
Education Level My Sample 2009 Afrobarometer 2005 
None 17% 43% 
Informal 29% 22% 
Primary 34% 24% 
Secondary 16% 9% 
University 3% 2% 
Knowledge   
Can name the Mayor 50% 65% 
Can name President of the 
National Assembly 
36% 41% 
Can name Majority Party 41% 12% 
Can name Term Limits 70% 60% 
Participation   
Voted in 2007/2002 66% 78% 
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 In 2002-2007, the majority party (URD) only had a 1 seat advantage over ADEMA, while ADEMA 
now enjoys a substantial number of seats in the Assembly.  The President of the national assembly in 
2005 (IBK) was more well-known figure than the current president.  Finally, our surveys were completed 
during municipal election time – leading to some confusion between the former and newly elected 
official.   
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Identify with a Party 52% 61% 
Campaigned in 2007/2002 29% NA 
Would Run for Office 34% NA 
Contacted a Government 
Official 
23% 30% 
Women 54% 42% 
Rural 20% 73% 
N 1006 1244 
 
4.4 Education and Political Knowledge 
In order to compare the effect of the each level of education (informal, primary, 
secondary, and university) as compared to a reference category of citizens with no education, on 
the four political knowledge variables, I generate dummy variables for each level of education.  
In my first model, I regress the knowledge variables on the level of education and controls for 
sex, poverty, rural, age, and school district.   Bamako is used as the regional reference category 
for all regressions except the question on “the majority party,” which compares all school 
districts to Timbuktu due to ADEMA
173‟s strong presence in Timbuktu region.174 
The evidence uniformly supports Hypothesis 1 (higher levels of education are correlated 
with more correct responses on the political knowledge questions).  Any level of formal 
education (primary, secondary, and university) has positive and significant (p<.01) effect on the 
predicted probability that the respondent will provide correct responses to each question as 
compared to the reference category of no education.  In addition, informal education has a 
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 ADEMA-PASJ  (Alliance for Democracy in Mali-Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and 
Justice) is the currently the party with most seats in the National Assembly 
174
 See Appendix for full regression charts. 
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significant, positive predicted effect on political knowledge for all questions except knowing the 
name of the president of the national assembly (p<.05).   
In addition, I run a variance inflation factor (VIF) index to check for multicollinearity.  I 
run the model for all dependent variables with all controls, except school districts, and find a 
mean VIF of 1.16 with no variable more highly correlated than 2.
175
   I run the complete model 
for all dependent variables, with school districts and controls, and find the mean VIF to be 2.02.  
In weaker logistic regressions, scores of 2.5 or higher could indicate multicollinearity (Allison 
1999).  The rural school districts, Sevare and Sikasso II, are correlated with “rural;” they have 
scores of 3.56, 3.16, and 4.25 respectively.  To ensure this correlation was not affecting the 
outcome variable, I repeat the regression dropping one variable at a time.  This does not produce 
any change to education level, the explanatory variable, which remains positive and significant 
(p<.000).  Since a logistic regression assumes the dependent variable has a linear relationship 
with the independent variables, I run a link test.   It shows no evidence that the model was mis-
specified.
176
  In addition, I run Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for goodness of fit for logistic 
regression, but the model shows no evidence of lack of fit.
177
 I run the regressions without 
controls to test the explanatory power of education on knowledge alone.  The effect of education 
remains positive and significant.   
I use the Gary King‟s Clarify software to calculate the impact of being exposed to each 
level of education on the probability of a correct response. The chart below graphs the models‟ 
predicted increase in probability of a correct response for each significant level of education as 
                                                          
175
 I use OLS regression in order to calculate the VIF scores. 
176
 The _hat value is significant (p<.000), but _hatq is not significant. See Stata Regression Diagnostics 
Chapter 3: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/logistic/chapter3/statalog3.htm 
177
 With a p value ranging from .42 - .96, Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test indicates that the 
models fit the data well. 
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compared to the reference category of citizens with no education.  Note that I could not graph 
university students‟ responses for president of the National Assembly because I had a case of 
complete separation: every university-educated respondent correctly named Dioucounda Traore.  
Figure 11: Change in Predicted Probability of Correct Answer by Level of Schooling
178
 
 
Holding all other variables at their mean, the models‟ predict a higher probability of a correct 
response with each level of higher education as compared to the reference category of no 
education.   The most pronounced effects are generated by secondary and tertiary education.     
The effects of higher education were strongest on respondent‟s knowledge of the president of the 
assembly and the majority party.  The results are not surprising since most Malians are more 
                                                          
178
 Includes predicted probability with 95% confidence intervals.  Full regression charts are included in 
the appendix.  The predicted probabilities were calculated in Stata using Clarify software. 
 
 
115 
 
familiar with their local governmental officials like their mayor rather than national political 
actors and institutions.
179
  
Informal education, which includes Koranic education and indigenous language literacy 
instruction, is associated with a greater probability that citizens will know the answers to all 
knowledge questions than Malians who attended no school except the name of the President of 
the Assembly.  The Malian government and most donors have dismissed Koranic schools as 
lesser educational institutions, by refusing to give them accredited status along with madrassas.  
Koranic schools are plagued by stereotypes that associate with them with the talibes that beg on 
the streets of cities and towns.  However, this finding suggests that there may be some 
democratic merit in Koranic education as well as government literacy trainings as compared to 
having no education at all.    
The five control variables were significant for various aspects of political knowledge: 
being a woman, living in a rural zone, poverty, and age.  Being a woman has a consistent 
negative and significant (p<.001) predicted effect on the probability of the respondent providing 
the correct answer to any political knowledge questions.  Controlling for all other characteristics, 
the probability that a woman could give a correct response was 15%-26% lower than for a male 
respondent.  This finding demonstrates the progress that remains to be made in terms of gender 
equality in political awareness and empowerment Mali.   
Living in a rural zone, increased the likelihood that citizens could name their mayor.  
This finding is intuitive given that there are fewer political actors at the rural, decentralized level 
and citizens live in close proximity to their representatives. Living at a higher level of poverty 
was associated with a lower likelihood of naming the president of the national assembly, 
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116 
 
Dioucounda Traore, or executive term limits. This may be because poorer respondents are so 
focused on their daily struggles that they have less time and energy to invest in abstract political 
figures or rules.  Older residents were also more likely to be able name Dioucounda Traore.  The 
most striking regional finding is that residents of Timbuktu knew more about ADEMA than 
residents of any other school district.  This is a testament to the organization of ADEMA in 
Timbuktu as each year they manage to mobilize more voters for elections than most other voting 
districts and were able to win the first round of presidential elections for the last four elections, 
even when ATT was a favored incumbent in 2007. 
4.5 Political Knowledge and School Type 
To test my second hypothesis, (State school alumni will know more about politics than 
students who attended non-state schools), I run two separate regressions.  The first compares 
state-school learners to learners in four other school types at the primary level: madrassas, 
private schools, community schools, and Christian schools.  I restrict my analysis to citizens who 
only attended primary school for two reasons.  First, so few respondents attended madrassas at 
the secondary level, that I do not have enough data to generate a comparison.
180
 Secondly, 
government sponsorship of students at private secondary schools conflates any attempt to 
differentiate between the school types at the secondary level. In other words, a student could 
receive a public school education from a private school.  I do not have enough data to 
disaggregate those students who received government scholarships to attend private school and 
those who parents paid the fees themselves.  
For primary-educated respondents, I only find one statistically significant difference 
between Malians who attended a government school and those who attended a non-state school. 
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 Only nine respondents attended secondary school at a madrassa. 
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Private school alumni were less likely to name executive term limits than public school alumni, 
while respondents who had attended community schools performed slightly better than those 
who had attended public school. I find no statistically significant differences between 
respondents who attended Islamic schools and those who attended public schools at the informal 
or primary levels. These finding defy my theoretical expectations, as I cannot reject the null of 
Hypothesis 2 (Public schools will generate more knowledgeable learners than non-state 
schools). 
Table 7: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Political Knowledge Restricted to  
Primary Educated Respondents
181
 
School Type Mayor’s Name President of the 
Assembly 
Majority Party Executive Term 
Limits 
 
Private Secular  -.31 
(.67) 
 
-1.25 
   (.81) 
 
            -.43 
(.63) 
         -1.30* 
           (.56) 
Christian 
Perfect Prediction 
   .27 
(1.98) 
.22 
(1.56) 
          -1.45 
          (1.50) 
Community .55 
(.35) 
.57 
(.34) 
.60 
(.32) 
             .90* 
           (.39) 
Madrassa .33 
(.34) 
             -.40 
(.34) 
-.22 
(.31) 
           -.01 
           (.33) 
Observations 334 336 335             336 
Secondly, I examine a sub-category of citizens with only informal schooling to see if 
those learners who went to Koranic schools are less knowledgeable than the reference category 
of people who attended government literacy centers.  Again, I find no significant differences 
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between alumni of Koranic schools and those who attended government-sponsored literacy 
centers, thus I cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Table 8:  Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Political Knowledge of Alumni 
of Koranic Schools compared to Government Literacy Centers 
School Type Mayor’s Name Majority Party Executive Term 
Limits 
Koranic Schools .18 
(.51) 
-.32 
(.42) 
.27 
(.44) 
Observations 254 251 270 
I caution that my non-findings only apply to the primary and informal levels of 
education.   The fact that there is no significant difference between public schools and madrassas 
is particularly unexpected.  For over four decades public education was linked to the state, while 
madrassas served a separate group of particularly devout learners without any state recognition.   
I would have expected learners in madrassas, most of whom attended school before the change in 
government policy, to be less knowledgeable about formal politics. With the data I have, I cannot 
assess the difference of attending secular or religious schools at the secondary and/or university 
institution – where the effect of education and linguistic skills is expected to be most 
pronounced.  French proficiency remains low for primary school learners (Thunnissen 2009); 
therefore they do not develop their comparative linguistic advantage until they achieve higher 
levels of formal schooling.  Even still, since the majority of Malians have not obtained education 
past these levels, it is very interesting that children at any primary school, secular or religious, do 
not have significant differences in terms of their political knowledge.   As I will discuss in the 
“mechanisms” section, this finding suggests that schools bestow political knowledge through 
cognitive development rather than a specific civic curriculum. 
4.6 Education and Political Participation in Difficult Activities  
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To test the impact of education on difficult political participation (H3), I run models 
similar to that used to evaluate its impact on political knowledge.  I conduct a maximum 
likelihood estimation that regresses “campaigned in 2007,”  “would run for office,” and 
“contacted government official” on the different levels of education and the controls including 
membership in an association (religious and secular).  I also use a logistic regression to assess 
the easier participation variables: voting and political party identification.   The findings support 
Hypothesis 3 (Citizens with higher levels of education will be more likely to participate in 
difficult activities).   All levels of formal education have positive, significant predicted effects on 
campaigning and willingness to run as compared to those with no education.  Only the highest 
levels of education, secondary and tertiary, were significantly, correlated with and greater 
likelihood that a respondent had contacted a government official.  This finding indicates that 
primary school education was not enough to affect this aspect of political behavior and may 
indicate the importance of French language acquisition that happens after primary school.   
I run bivariate regressions with education level and difficult types of participation. 
Education is positive and significant (p<.000) for all difficult activities: campaigned, contacted 
government official, and willingness to run.   In addition, I check for multi-collinearity using 
variance inflation factor (VIF).  Without including the school districts, no variable had a score 
higher than 1.5.  The mean VIF score was 1.14.  However, when I run the full regression, the 
rural school districts, Sikasso 2 and Sevare, were correlated with the control variable “rural;” 
they had VIF scores of 3.94, 3.25, and 4.31 respectively indicating collinearity.  I ran the 
regression dropping each variable, but found that the omission of any of the variables had no 
effect on the explanatory variable: level of education.  I run link test for all of the models and 
find no evidence of misspecification. I find no problems except for the model for government 
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contact, which suggests non-linear relationships between the independent and dependent 
variable.
 182
 In addition, I run Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for goodness of fit for logistic regression, 
but the model shows no evidence of lack of fit.
183
 
Figure12 graphs the models‟ predicted increase in the probability of participation in 
difficult activities for each level of formal education with significant effects as compared to a 
reference category of no education.  I note that the predicted effect of education is lower on 
participation than it was on political knowledge.  I suspect that this is due to the myriad of other 
factors that might affect participation.  Education might serve as a necessary, but insufficient 
condition for participation, whereas once citizens have greater political knowledge – it impacts 
their ability to answer a question immediately. 
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 I find problems with model misspecification for the contact government variable, suggesting that some 
variables relationships may not be linear   I run a Box-Tidwell model to assess the linearity of my 
variables, but none of them come up as significant and nonlinear. 
183
 With a p value ranging from .16- .99, Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test indicates that the 
models fit the data well.   
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Figure 12: Change in Predicted Probability of Participating in Activity by Level of 
Education
184
 
 
In this model, university education appears to have a particularly strong predicted effect 
as compared to other forms of education. For instance, the model predicts a sixteen percent 
higher probability that secondary students will contact a government official than citizens with 
no education and a twenty two percent higher probability that university-educated respondents 
have contacted a government official than their peers with no education.  In the next section, I 
suggest that the pronounced effect of university education is related to French fluency. 
4.7 Participation and Control Variables 
Two control variables had strong, consistent effects on participation: gender and 
associational membership.  Being a woman is negatively associated with the likelihood that a 
citizen will identify with a party, willingness to run for office, contacted a government official, 
or campaigned. At times, our survey team was refused interviews with women who feared 
violent reprisals from their husbands who were not home.  This experience further illustrates the 
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 Includes 95% confidence intervals; the graphs was generated using Clarify software in Stata.  Full 
regression tables are included in the appendix. 
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lack of women‟s voice in the public sphere.  Salimata, a woman who lives in the village of 
Madinel about 15 kilometers from Kayes, made the limitations and barriers to women‟s 
participation very clear.  She explains in Pulaar, “I have never seen a woman run for any office 
here.  It's because they are scared and the men won‟t allow them to run (K6).”  The research 
suggests that there are significant socio-cultural barriers to women‟s political mobilization that 
require further study. 
Consistent with theories of “mobilization associations,” membership in an association is 
positive and significant for all forms of political participation except willingness to run for 
office.  Membership in religious association does not have a significant effect.
185
  As described 
in Chapter 2, membership in associations provides citizens with a traditional venue through 
which to express group grievances and ideas.   
  Age has significant, but contradictory effects on participation. Being a member of the 
highest age category increases the predicted probability of voting by 29% compared to the 
youngest cohort (18-28).
186
 Age was also positively correlated with contacting a government 
official, but negatively associated with campaigning or willingness to run for office.   Older 
citizens‟ hesitancy to campaign or run for office is probably due to the high level of effort and 
energy that is required for these activities.
187
   
4.8 Higher Education, Voting, and Party Identification 
As expected, the highest levels of education do not affect voting or party identification.  
Only citizens with the lowest levels of education, had a greater likelihood of stating they voted in 
                                                          
185
 If I run for contact with a religious figure as a dependent variable, religious associations become 
significant, but secular associations are also significant. 
186
 This is consistent with Kuenzi and Lambright‟s findings that oldest voters are more likely to turn out 
187
 Many older respondents said they are too tired or old to run for office or that they wanted to focus on 
religious activities at this stage in life. 
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2007 or identified with a party as compared to the reference category of people with no 
education.  Voting in 2007 was positively correlated with primary and informal education, while 
party identification was correlated exclusively with primary education.  The inverted u shaped 
findings may suggest that political entrepreneurs target those with enough education to have 
some political consciousness, but who require the partisan assistance for expression.  These 
findings loosely support Russell Dalton‟s work on the evolution of citizenship.  Dalton argues 
that those who have higher levels of education, the secondary and university alumni, are 
sophisticated enough to use “cognitive mobilization” based on independent information rather 
than “partisan mobilization”(2006).  In other work, Dalton argues more educated citizens 
participate directly through “engaged” citizenship instead of voting out of duty-based citizenship 
that ties them to political parties (2008).  While these findings speak roughly to Huntington‟s 
thesis about political alienation of the educated class, I caution against reading too far into the 
relationship between higher education and easier forms of participation, as my findings were not 
significant. 
In addition, more educated Malians‟ refusal to turn out at the polls might also be linked to 
their own voting calculus than political dissent.  During the municipal elections, I asked some 
“middle class” Malians whom I knew if they planned on voting.  Most expressed apathy stating 
that the $2 that was being handed out certainly couldn‟t buy their vote or that they were “too 
busy” to turn out.  For unemployed students or lower-class Malians, the promise of $2 or an egg 
sandwich to turn out to the polls in the context of a political carnival might be enough of an 
incentive to jump in a van and go to vote. 
Informed, skeptical political consumers contrast the more marginalized citizens who take 
what they can from the cash and goods that circulate during election time, but are generally 
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uninformed about politics.  We frequently encountered respondents who were unable to offer any 
evaluations of political institutions or answer any political knowledge questions, but claimed to 
have voted and that they were members of a political party.  Saouda, a Tuareg woman in 
Timbuktu, represents an extreme example of the disconnect between knowledge and 
participation.  She was one of the poorest respondents that we spoke with and could not afford 
school fees to send any of her five children to any school.  She was could not answer any 
political knowledge questions, but claimed to identify with ADEMA (T25).  We do not know 
why Saouda claims to like ADEMA, but another respondent, Karim, from another neighborhood 
in Timbuktu offered a potential explanation.  Karim explained how aid from abroad is often 
appropriated as a political resource.  “The neighborhood received some aid from abroad, so I 
went to the “chef du quartier” to get my allotment, but he refused to give it to me.  This was 
unjust as I‟m very poor with a lot of children to feed.  Not long after, when the election 
campaigns started, I saw him coming around with electoral cards.  He told me to vote for a 
certain party, but I refused.  I never got any aid.  The relationship between power and politics 
happens like that (T39).”  This phenomenon is not isolated in Timbuktu.  Alassane, a seventy-
year old Kayes resident explained, “I don‟t know who I voted for, they just brought me the paper 
(K54).”   These interviews are not meant to demonstrate that elections in Mali are meaningless, 
but only to demonstrate that other incentives to vote or identify with a party do exist. This 
evidence suggests why the connection between high degree of education and easier forms of 
participation are weak.  
4.9 School Type and Political Participation 
I use the same model, restricted to include only primary and informal learners, to 
compare participation of learners from state and non-state schools. The results from the 
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regression do not support H (4) (Non-state schools will generate less participation than public 
schools).  Again, I compare of alumni of non-state schools to a reference category of citizens 
who attended public school.   The only significant, difference that I find between school types is 
that community school alumni are more likely to campaign, say they would run for office, and 
identify with a party than primary educated respondents who went to public school. I ran an 
interaction to see if level of education and rural environment to see if education had greater 
returns for people living in places where comparative literacy rates were lower, but I was unable 
to reject the null.  In fact, I found a significant correlation between education interacted with 
living in a city on participation.   This suggests, at a minimum, different patterns of mobilization 
at the urban and rural environments.  Perhaps students are mobilized at a greater rate in urban 
centers, while villages mobilize all inhabitants regardless of education levels.  These differences 
in mobilization and voter calculation present interesting venues for future research. 
 
Table 9: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Participation Restricted to  
Primary Educated Respondents
188
  
School Type Voting Party ID Campaign Willingness to 
Run 
Contact 
Government 
Official 
Private -.13 
(.63) 
.07 
(.57) 
-.91 
  (.81) 
         -.97 
(.63) 
       .51 
      (.67) 
Community  .49 
 (.37) 
 .65* 
(.32) 
     1.07** 
  (.32) 
 .70* 
(.32) 
       .38 
      (.36) 
Madrassa           .23 
         (.34) 
         .15 
         (.30) 
            .05 
           (.33) 
           .20 
          (.32) 
        .31 
       (.36) 
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 Full Regression listed in Appendix 1.  Christian schools dropped out because there were only three 
respondents who attended them and none of them participated in any political activities we asked about. 
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Table 10: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Participation of Koranic School 
Alumni Compared to Respondents who Attended Government Literacy Centers 
School Type Voting Party ID Campaign Willingness to 
Run 
Contact Govt 
Official 
Koranic 
School 
-.03 
(.46) 
-.57 
(.41) 
.51 
(.47) 
-.95* 
(.42) 
-.84 
(.46) 
 
 There were no significant differences between alumni of state and Islamic schools at the 
informal or primary level except for the lower predicted likelihood that Koranic alumni say they 
will run for office.  The similarity of response rates from alumni of Islamic and secular schools is 
surprising because of the historical separation between secular and religious authority.  We see 
many religious school alumni claim they “get their hands dirty” in secular politics through 
voting, party identification, campaigns and willingness to run for office.  Again, I stress that I 
only make this comparison for students with comparable levels of education and do not have 
data on school type at the secondary level.  The growth and popularity of religious, Arabic 
language schools at the secondary level raises interesting questions about learners who receive 
higher education at Islamic schools. Will madrassa education qualify them to participate in the 
elite world of secular politics now that the state endorses and accredits these schools?  To assess 
this important question, we must have a better idea about what aspect of education facilitates 
political participation. 
4.10 Refining and Isolating Mechanisms  
Before moving forward, I address the endogenity problem that plagues most social 
science research.  I must confront the fact that some other characteristic associated with being 
educated drives greater knowledge and participation.  My best strategy to address endogenity is 
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to develop observable implications of the various causal mechanisms.
189
 A benefit of the focus 
on students is that most children are in an educational track, madrassas or laic school, before 
their political coming of age ruling out reverse causation.  However, it possible that parental 
preferences could play a confounding role determining both school choice and their children‟s 
subsequent political orientation. The American participation literature has found that parents play 
a fundamental role in shaping their children‟s political perspectives (Franklin 1984).  Perhaps 
political attitudes and information are transmitted through familial venues in Mali as well. 
Malian parents who choose to send their children to school could be more political aware and 
most invested in teaching their children about politics. As a result, educated students learn 
political messages at home rather than in the classroom.  Table 11 lists the observable 
implications that we would expect to see if parents were responsible for the correlation between 
education and knowledge and participation.  
Table 11: Do Parents Transmit Political Information and Practices? 
Mechanism Implication Observed? 
Parents 1. Students whose parents send them to Francophone schools 
should know more about politics than students of Islamic schools 
No 
Parents 2. Students whose parents send them to Francophone schools 
should participate more in politics than their peers who went to 
Islamic schools 
No 
Parents 3. The youngest generation of respondents who attended school 
should know more about politics and be more willing to participate 
since there is a greater probability that their parents went to school  
No 
Our survey research revealed that parents enroll their children in different types of 
schools for different reasons.
190
   The majority of survey respondents reported sending a child to 
a madrassa for religious reasons, while many respondents favoring Francophone schools 
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 King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 (30). 
190
 Chapter 5 will discuss school choice in greater depth. 
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described education as an investment in their child‟s future earnings.  I anticipate parents who 
send their children to madrassas to be less knowledgeable and invested in the world of secular 
politics than parents who send their children to secular schools.  As a result we would expect to 
observe greater participation and knowledge from parents who sent their children to state 
schools.  Following this logic, parents who chose to send their children to state schools should be 
more likely and capable of teaching their children about politics.  However, as discussed earlier, 
I find that there is no significant difference between the knowledge and participation of people 
who attended state or religious schools.  Even though I can only make this claim at the primary 
level, I would still expect to see a difference between learners at the two types of schools if 
politically minded parents transmit political knowledge to their children.    
 My third observable implication takes advantage of the changing educational 
environment in Mali.  Due to the increase in educational enrollment over time, there is a greater 
probability that a child who went to school in the last ten years has an educated parent than was 
the case for prior generations of students.  I would imagine that parents who went to school 
would be more likely to know about politics.  If parents transmit knowledge about education, I 
might anticipate that the youngest cohort of educated respondents will know more about politics 
than other cohorts of educated peers since their parents are most likely to be educated.  I test this 
observable implication by creating an interaction term for education and age.   This enables me 
to compare the political knowledge of the youngest cohort of educated respondents compared to 
older educated citizens. I regress political knowledge variables on educational level, the controls, 
and the interaction term. I do not find the interaction term to have a significant effect on correct 
responses to any knowledge question. 
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While observable implications are imperfect measures of causality, the evidence that I 
was able to generate suggests that parents are not, at least entirely, responsible for spreading 
political knowledge or spurring participation.  The root of causation appears to be linked, at least 
in part, to some aspect of the schooling experiences.  The next section attempts to adjudicate 
between competing causal mechanisms explaining the correlation between education and 
political participation and knowledge.  
4. 11 Education: Exploring Causal Mechanisms 
There are many ways that schooling might create greater political knowledge and/or 
increased participation in “difficult activities”: democratic curriculum, heightened socialization, 
increased literacy, political mobilization by teachers, increased internal efficacy and increased 
cognitive development. This section introduces complementary data to interrogate mechanisms 
linking education to political knowledge and participation.  I draw on qualitative justifications 
responses to the surveys as well coders‟ notes on respondents, interviews with 200 university 
students, and data on politicians‟ educational profiles to evaluate and refine the proposed causal 
mechanisms. The student interviews were conducted by my research team in February 2009 on 
all the four of the university campuses.  Interviewers stood in public areas and stopped every 
fifth student who passed them. All interviews were recorded with voice-recorders.  In Table 12, I 
list potential mechanisms and their observable implications.  I quickly discuss three potential 
mechanisms that I didn‟t find evidence for and then move on to make an argument in support of 
the two mechanisms I believe are driving the process: cognitive development, internal efficacy, 
and French language skills.   
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Table 12: Uncovering Education’s Mechanisms 
Mechanism Outcome 
Variable 
Observable Implication Evidence 
Democratic 
Curriculum 
Knowledge  Students who received “democratic 
curriculum” will know more about politics 
than peers who haven‟t gotten the same 
curriculum 
No 
 Participation Students who received “democratic 
curriculum” will participate in politics more 
than peers who haven‟t gotten the same 
curriculum 
No 
Socialization Knowledge Education will have a greater effect on 
girls‟ knowledge than boys‟ knowledge 
No 
 Participation Education will have a greater effect on 
girls‟ participation than boys‟ participation 
No 
Political 
Organization 
in Schools 
Participation  Current university students should be more 
likely to campaign than average 
respondents 
No 
French 
Literacy 
Knowledge Higher levels of education should generate 
progressively higher political knowledge 
scores 
Yes 
 Participation Respondents will stress the importance of 
French as a skill for participation 
Yes 
 Participation  Francophone secondary and/or tertiary 
educated respondents, will be most likely to 
participate in the most difficult forms of 
politics 
Yes 
 Participation Current politicians‟ educational portfolio 
will include elite, Francophone education. 
Yes 
Cognitive 
Development  
Knowledge Higher levels of education should generate 
progressively higher political knowledge 
scores 
Yes 
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Cognitive 
Development 
Knowledge  Education, regardless of school type, 
should increase citizens‟ political 
knowledge 
Yes 
Internal 
Efficacy 
Participation 1. People at higher levels of education 
should claim to discuss politics more often 
Yes 
Internal 
Efficacy 
 
 
Participation 2. Less educated people will emphasize 
their non –participation in terms of inability 
to do so, confusion, the degree of difficulty, 
fear of exploitation more than educated 
people 
Yes 
4.11.1 Curriculum 
The Traore dictatorship struck civic education from the curriculum in 1972 and the 
Ministry of Education did not reintroduce it until 2009.   Only the first decade of post 
independence learners received lessons about how government functioned and the duties and 
rights of citizens. If civic education matters, students who were exposed to this curriculum 
should have better ability to answer questions and a greater likelihood of participating in politics 
than students who did not receive the curriculum. In order to test the effects of civic education, I 
generate a variable “Civic Education” for those learners who were likely to have attended 
schools between 1960 and 1972.
191
 I regress the political knowledge questions on education 
level, the controls, and a new interaction term that tests the effects of “civic education” and 
“education level” together.  This enables me to see if education has a greater effect on the 
participation of learners who received the democratic curriculum.  The interaction term is not 
significant for any aspect of political knowledge and therefore, does not provide evidence for 
support of the democratic curriculum mechanism  
                                                          
191
 I code using the Age variable: all respondents 49-58 and 59-68 were marked as having “Civic 
Education,” while everyone else was coded as “No Civic Education.”  This is an imperfect measure, but 
the closest approximation I can generate. 
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I repeat the regression to assess the effect of the interaction term on participation.  I 
regress the aspects of participation that were correlated with higher education, campaigning, 
contacting a government official, and willingness to run for office, on education level, the 
controls, and the interaction term.  The test does not provide evidence for support of the 
democratic curriculum mechanism.  The interaction term is insignificant for campaigning or 
willingness to run for office.  For contacting a government official, it is significantly negative 
(p<.05) for secondary school learners who were exposed to civic education, opposite of what one 
would expect if democratic curriculum was the mechanism. 
4.11.2 Socialization
192
 
Higher political knowledge and participation could be caused by socialization around 
schooling activities rather than the educational experience itself.  Children could learn about 
politics by talking to peers or being exposed to new experience and information. In this scenario, 
knowledge is not linked to curriculum, but to the experience and interactions that happen in the 
schooling space.  In order to rule out this possibility, I test the mechanism of socialization using 
gender differences.  Malian girls have much more limited social interaction than boys due to 
heavier loads of household chores in the compound and stricter societal regulations.  The gender 
segregation, of women at home and men in the public sphere, continues as children grow up
193
.  
Since boys have more opportunities to socialize outside of the home, the socialization effect of 
school should be greater for girls – who have more limited exposure to new experiences and 
ideas except in the schooling space.   I run a logistic regression with an interaction term for 
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 In this section, I am not referring to political socialization, but rather exposure to external stimuli 
through socialization or exposure to other people beyond the compound walls. 
193
 I am not implying that women‟s mobility in Mali is limited as in other Muslim nations, such as Saudi 
Arabia or the North of Nigeria, but they are generally relegated to the home sphere, where boys explore 
the public sphere. 
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woman and education level. The effect of education on woman‟s political participation or 
political knowledge is not different from the effect on men.
194
  However, this could also mean 
that the average family who allows their daughter to attend school, also affords her greater 
freedom of movement than the average Malian family – thus there is a less of a difference in the 
socialization opportunities between boys and girls that attend school. 
4.11.3 Political Mobilization 
Scholars have described the powerful role of teachers in students in shaping the 
democratization movements in the early 1990s across Africa (Smith 1998).  Frequent teacher and 
student strikes and battles over school conditions are a testimony to the legacy of political 
activism in schools (Diakite 2000).   In other instances the connections between schools and 
politics are even clearer.  The only female presidential contender in 2007, Aminata Diallo, was a 
university professor who ran her campaign largely using her base of students as a support 
network.  She was later named Minister of Education.   Given the politicized school 
environment, I explore the possibility that students in schools are targeted and mobilized by 
teachers and political leaders.  I draw on data from interviews that we conducted with 203 
university students at the various campuses of University of Bamako in February 2009.
195
 Our 
team asked students a series of questions about their expected political participation during the 
upcoming municipal elections.  The questions were slightly different than those posed in the 
household survey: we asked students about participation in municipal elections, while we asked 
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 It is only significant for campaigning at the university level, but not for secondary.  We would expect 
consistent effect for secondary and university if socialization was the determining factor.   
195
 University of Bamako is the only national university and has students from all around the country; we 
surveyed respondents at each of its four campuses. 
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survey respondents about participation in presidential elections.
196
   Only 33% of 203 University 
Students interviewed claimed they would participate in the 2009 Municipal elections as 
compared to national average of 29% who said they had participated in presidential 
campaigns.
197198
  If students were mobilized by teachers and political parties at campuses, there 
should be a much greater difference in reported participation rates between active university 
students and average respondents.
199
   
The above analysis leaves three remaining paths of causation that affect the outcome 
variable: cognitive development, French literacy skills, and internal efficacy. I will discuss how 
education affects citizenship through each mechanism below.  I argue that education stimulates 
cognitive development which can create greater political knowledge as well as enhanced internal 
efficacy.  Education that fosters French language skills offers a further boost in internal efficacy 
by providing citizens with the language of government bureaucracy and enhances political 
knowledge by enabling them to access to diverse and elite forms of political information 
including written government texts.  As shown in Figure 12, cognitive development can create 
political knowledge and internal efficacy, which in turn can increase the probability of political 
participation.  In addition, greater political knowledge further strengthens internal efficacy.  If 
education is sufficient to endow French language skills, it provides citizens with access to a 
greater diversity of news sources as well as the ability to verify the written word – scarce skills in 
                                                          
196
 University students were surveyed approximately one month before the communal elections, which we 
might expect would inflate predicted behavior as compared to survey respondents who gave retrospective 
accounts of participation.  The majority of respondents were male, which I would have expected to inflate 
participation. 
197
The university student interviews do not provide data about mobilization at the secondary level.  The 
possibility that students are mobilized at the secondary level still exists. 
198
 This might also reflect the nature of the municipal elections. 
199
 It is possible that participation patterns are different for national and local elections and that students 
play a larger role in national-level elections. 
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an environment of mass illiteracy.  French further builds internal efficacy as citizens are less 
afraid of exploitation by government bureaucracy.  I discuss these individual mechanisms below. 
Figure  13: Pathways to Political Knowledge and Political Participation 
Education→ A. Cognitive Skills→ Political Knowledge  
      ↓ 
↘ Mild Internal Efficacy→ Political Participation 
↘ 
 French Language Skills→ Access to diverse information sources →Political Knowledge 
   ↓ 
    ↘ Strong Internal Efficacy→ Difficult Participation  
 
4.11.4 Cognitive Development 
Theories of cognitive development stem largely from Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget who 
describes people‟s changing “frameworks” and “grammar” for understanding the world through 
the process of equilibration. In equilibration someone incorporates information and processes the 
new information into existing cognitive structures in addition to making changes to those 
cognitive structures (Piaget1985).  Education exposes children to new information, ways of 
reasoning, and logic, which they can incorporate into the equilibration process.  It is not the 
content of education that matters, but how children engage with the ideas and information.  
Piaget understands cognitive development passing through four stages, which culminates 
in final formal operational stage.  Arlin describes this stage, “ Specifically, the formal stage 
implies the ability to engage in abstract thought, that is, to deal with propositions, to generate 
hypotheses and subject them to empirical investigation, and to employ proportionality and 
combinatorial systems in problem solving (1975: 602).”200 Only approximately 50% of 
Americans ever achieve Piaget‟s fourth stage, so we can imagine that there would be sufficient 
                                                          
200
 Other psychologists have elaborated on a fifth – problem finding phase of development, but each of 
these theories builds off of Piaget‟s stages.   
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variation among African citizens‟ cognitive development as well (Arlin 1975: 605).  We can 
imagine the consciousness required to conceptualize the possibilities for political action as 
residing in this final stage.   
Theories of cognitive development are helpful in teaching us about political socialization.  
Somit and Peterson critique the typical conception of political socialization as overly passive.  
They argue that the literature fails to incorporate their dynamic interaction between a changing 
political structure and the citizen as an agent, which is what they refer to as the “phenomenology 
of political consciousness” (1987:219).  They explain how theories of political socialization 
would benefit from theories of cognitive development:  “And that might have thrown some light 
on the oddest paradox in the political socialization literature: that the 10-year-olds of 1958, who 
did the "benevolent leader" studies for Greenstein, Hess and Easton, were also the 20-year-olds 
of 1968 who overthrew Lyndon Johnson (220).” 
Building from their argument, I understand cognitive development not contributing to a 
linear form of political socialization, but rather equipping citizens with the tools to understand, 
question, and adapt their behaviors to their political environment.  This understanding of political 
socialization is especially important given under-performing regimes in developing democracies, 
where blind allegiance and socialization into political behaviors without questioning authority 
would be counterproductive to institutional development.   
Afrobarometer studies already provide some evidence that education stimulates cognitive 
development by demonstrating that educated respondents are more able to formulate political 
opinions and critique authority figures (Mattes and Mughogho 2009; McCauley and E. Gymiah 
Boadi 2009).  The results from the regressions demonstrate that every level of education is 
correlated with increased political knowledge compared to respondents with no education. The 
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statistical analysis of survey results does not capture the most persuasive examples of the 
intellectual empowerment offered by education.  Most telling, perhaps, are descriptions of 
interviews with women in villages, who had difficulty answering any of our survey questions.  I 
describe my interview with Aminata below to illustrate these dynamics. 
   We met Aminata in the village of Dandaresso, which lies about sixty miles Northwest of 
Sikasso. Aminata was the youngest of Madou‟s four wives.  Madou, a jovial, fast-talking man, 
lives a large compound with his extended family, wives, and twenty children. Two of Aminata‟s 
co-wives sat on the wooden chaise structure with her.  They nursed babies and encouraged her as 
she struggled to answer the most basic survey questions.  Aminata looked away from us and 
mumbled her responses at a whisper.  It was unclear if this was out of fear or deference.  Once 
we reached political questions, Aminata responded with either “I don‟t knows” or attempted to 
give the answer she thought we wanted to her by agreeing with most of the statements we read.  
Her inability to think critically and communicate with outsiders demonstrates her isolation from 
the public sphere.  Aminata has only been out of her village once – to visit Sikasso.  Aminata is 
about 18 or 19 years old, but has never attended any school.  Schooling might have exposed 
Aminata to a world beyond the household; it might have helped her interact with new people and 
have the confidence to express herself.  This counterfactual is impossible to recreate, but we can 
consider responses from another woman in her village with a slightly higher level of 
education.
201
 
 Daoda is also around 18 years-old and attended primary school when she was younger.  
She doesn‟t yet have any children.  Daoda was able to name the mayor of Danderesso as well as 
                                                          
201
 Aminata was typical of many uneducated female respondents in both urban and rural answers who 
gave answers they thought were “compliant” and/or simply said “I don‟t know.”  In many instances, 
coders wrote, “very hesitant and uniformed.”  
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the President of the National Assembly.  When asked about her confidence in various political 
institutions – her response was far from Aminata‟s deference.  She gave a zero confidence rating 
to everyone from the president to the mayor stating, “They are all the same.”  It is possible that 
other factors have led Daouda to live a less sheltered life than Aminata, but one cannot help but 
suspect that her time in school has given her the confidence to learn about and critique 
government.  I met many other women like Aminata, who had not participated in any kind of 
schooling and, who struggled to imagine and describe the world outside of their compound walls. 
 This comparison is not meant to communicate that uneducated citizens are powerless and 
naïve, only that education is one factor that can increase a citizen‟s cognitive development.  I can 
contrast Aminata with Salimatou - a Soninke woman in Kayes who never went to school, but had 
the resolve and determination to contact her government authorities twice with her association to 
address water and road problems.  She didn‟t participate in other forms of politics, but was able 
to openly criticize officials who only visited citizens during the election season. She stressed 
neighborhood solidarity and self-sufficiency.
202
  Salimatou used traditional expressions of group 
grievance by approaching her elected official in the company of her ton. (other examples) 
4.11.5 Internal Efficacy 
Most respondents, regardless of their level of education, expressed a sense of low 
external efficacy.
203
   One after another, respondents gave reasons that they abstained from 
various aspects of political engagement. Lala, who had a primary school education, explained 
why she never contacted the government, “You can tell them (your problems), but they won‟t do 
                                                          
202
 Perhaps it is relevant that Salimatou lives in a city and Aminata lives in a village.  My study has 
focused on urban and peri-urban dwellers, but if I could test a larger sample of rural women I would 
expect the effect of education to be even more pronounced. 
203
 Internal efficacy refers to one‟s ability to understand and participate in politics, while external efficacy 
refers to the responsiveness of existing political institutions (Miller et al 1980). 
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anything, so it‟s just a waste of energy.”   Salimatou, who I referenced earlier, explained similar 
discontent despite her attempts to contact the Kayesian municipal authorities:  “Nothing will ever 
change because they (elites) are comfortable.”   Salah, an Arab respondent from Mopti region 
had similar reasons for not coming out to the polls, “I do not vote because nothing is transparent 
(M60).”   Fatoumata, a fifty something respondent in Sikasso never attended school.  She 
explained her disdain for politics, “I no longer need the president or any other candidate anymore 
- that's enough. There has been no change, I am struggling … I have already had enough 
difficulty already - I don't even trust you who are asking these questions right now (S4).” 
Moussa, who attended Koranic school in Sikasso explained, “They (elected officials) know our 
problems, but nothing is ever developed to help us. They know what is going on (in our lives) - 
they just close their eyes (S1).”  A primary school educated respondent, Mamadou, in Bamako 
explained, “Officials are not accessible, outside of elections they never come visit, we don't see 
any trace of them (BBC10).”   Bintou is in her mid-thirties, she attended public primary school.  
She describes the difficulty of getting government officials to be responsive. “Up until present - I 
haven't been able to benefit from inheritances from when my husband passed away. It's the law 
of the strongest (S17).”   
While most respondents deftly identified core power relations between the elites and the 
masses, Malians struggled to give productive examples of how politics or democratic practices 
might improve. Often politics was presented as something that would trick and deceive them or 
as something that would never change regardless of their efforts.  In most Malians‟ depictions, 
the inner workings of politics and politiki mogo were far removed from their lives or their realm 
of understanding.   
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Many political scientists argue that internal efficacy can motivate political action, even 
despite of low-trust or cynical environments such as what we observe in present day Mali (Craig 
1980; Fraser 1970; Gamson 1968). Pollock argues,  
To be sure, the following analysis shows that individuals who harbor feelings of personal 
political competence (high internal political efficacy) and relatively cynical assessments 
of the responsiveness of the political system (low external political efficacy) are more 
prone toward unconventional, nonconformist participation. However, they also engage in 
high initiative conventional participation closely connected with the ongoing political 
process (1983: 401). 
 
Pollock‟s high-initiative forms of conventional participation, campaigning and contacting a 
government official, are nearly synonymous with those behaviors I have termed difficult: 
campaigning, contacting an official, and running as a candidate.  The evidence I presented here, 
that education increases participation in high difficulty, activities support‟s Pollock‟s general 
claim. 
More educated respondents shared a similar sense of skepticism about politics, but 
demonstrated a greater willingness to critique it and/or engage with the political authorities, at 
least through more substantive activities, due to heightened internal efficacy.  I present excerpts 
from interviews with university students to highlight the differences in the ways that they spoke 
about politics.  Those university students who disliked politics offered very specific, concrete 
justifications for their non-participation in politics including concerns about the lack of 
platforms,  lack of confidence in a party, corruption, deception, and mayors who were not living 
up to campaign promises.  When university students explained non-participation, they justified 
their non-action in terms of protest not due to lack of internal efficacy.  Djackary, a medical 
student explained: “If we vote, then they do what they want (U98).”  Amadou, who attends 
FAST in Bamako said he planned on voting but that he would cast an empty ballot because “they 
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are elected, and then they do nothing.”   Oumar was born and raised in Bamako.  He complained, 
“The elected don‟t do anything, so I won‟t vote… but I am going to campaign - I am going to 
sensitize young people to tell them that they shouldn‟t vote!”   
Striking were those respondents who claimed to get involved in electoral politics to learn 
about the political system so that they could run for office one day (U132, U84, U85).  Issouf, a 
twenty-year old medical student, grew up in Mopti where he attended public school.  He rated 
the Malian state‟s performance in the education sector 10/10 and went as far as to say “the 
educational system is perfect” in Mali.  His optimism may reflect his own success; the medical 
school is the most competitive university in Mali and it is widely acknowledged that the 
strongest students in the country enter the medical track.  In the future, Issouf hopes to be 
employed by the Malian state because he hopes to contribute to “the construction of his state.”   
Like many others, he planned to vote in the municipal elections due to his civic duty.  He said 
that he would participate in a campaign because one day he hopes to become a politician (U154). 
In addition, I observed that more educated citizens claim to discuss politics more 
frequently.   I create a new dichotomous dependent variable, “discuss politics,” based on 
citizens‟ responses to a question of how often they discuss politics.204    Every level of formal 
education, primary, secondary, and university, has a significant positive impact on the likelihood 
that citizens discuss politics as compared to those respondents with no education.  This finding 
implies that educated citizens have a greater degree of interest, ability, and comfort in discussing 
political material. 
4.11.6 The Resilience of the Colonial Legacy: The Political Power of French 
                                                          
204
 Those who responded that they discuss politics at all were coded as 1 and all others 0. I coded the 
variable dichotomously because there was little variation – most respondents claimed “not to discuss 
politics at all.” 
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I find mixed evidence to support the claim that French language acquisition impacts 
political knowledge. I find progressively higher predicted probabilities of correct responses for 
each level of higher education, which is consistent with increased verbal proficiency in French.  
For instance, every respondent who had attended university was able to answer the national 
assembly question correctly.  However, increases in French literacy cannot explain the fact that 
informal and primary educated students know more about politics than citizens with no 
education, since students at that level have either no exposure or a minimal command of the 
French language.
205
  
French literacy could affect political knowledge in the sense that citizens who do not 
speak French are limited from receiving news from sources such as newspapers, the internet, or 
French-language debates or information on the radio. I found some anecdotal evidence that this 
restricts their access to political knowledge.  Citizens like Mobido, a farmer in the Sikasso region 
who scored one out of four on our political knowledge quiz, felt excluded from politics as well as 
television media.  He explains, “I don‟t have confidence in politics.  Politicians do not take the 
time to look at farmer‟s problems.  ATT hasn‟t done anything to help us (farmers).  I never 
watch television because I don‟t speak French (SR11).”  However, local-language community 
radio is widespread in Mali and national news has two broadcasts: French and Bambara, so 
citizens do have access to news through alternative language sources.  This evidence suggests 
that French language acquisition does not play a major role affecting political knowledge as I 
have measured the variable.  However, one could imagine that French language might play a role 
in higher level debates about government policy that become adulterated once they are translated 
in local languages and/or editorialized by radio DJs.  It also raises interesting questions about the 
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 Thunissen 2009 describes minimal French competency rates of 6
th
 grade Malian students. 
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additional importance French language skills play for members of marginalized language group 
communities, who do not benefit from extensive local language programming.
206
 
 French has a clearer, more palpable impact on “difficult” forms of participation.  I argue 
that this is for two reasons.  First, French literacy qualifies citizens to participate in “elite” 
aspects of politics such as running for office or convincing other citizens who to vote for.   
As shown in Chapter 2, the majority of Malian politicians are highly educated as compared to the 
general population.  While the education profiles of national-level politicians are elevated 
compared to “normal citizens” throughout the world, the nature of language and elite politics in 
Africa, make this dynamic particularly powerful.  American or French voters speak the same 
language as their politicians and candidates strain to make their language and gestures accessible 
to the masses.  However, in most countries in Africa, the political sphere uses languages that 
citizens do not speak in their homes.   Advanced education qualifies you to speak the former 
colonial language and that act of speech alone can separate you from other citizens.  Many 
Western politicians exert tremendous effort to prove their working class roots.  They eat hot 
dogs, go bowling, and attend sporting events.
207
  Barack Obama regularly appears in hamburger 
shops and sub joints ordering the special “with everything” on it despite his healthy foods 
initiatives.  Now imagine the impossible – a Malian politician being mocked during his 
campaign for eating arugula.    This type of critique would not happen because in Mali it is 
politically acceptable, even a political prerequisite, to be elite.  This may be in part because 
politicians need to prove to voters than they have “money in the bank” and thus they do not need 
the job to become wealthy.  A frequent rite of passage for potential presidential candidates is a 
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 In interviews with national radio directors in July 2011, my research assistant reported that certain 
language groups – particularly from the North of Mali – receive very little programming centrally 
broadcast from government stations. 
207
 I thank Nicolas van de Walle for raising this point of comparison. 
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self-funded social service project that demonstrates that they are willing to share their own 
personal wealth to help greater society.
208
  By exalting wealth and status, society widens the gap 
between politicians and the masses.  This environment makes elite education and the mastery of 
French that much more relevant. 
Most African citizens do not aspire to be Ministers or members of the National 
Assembly, but interviews with citizens about local elections revealed their perceptions of French 
as prerequisite for running for office.  Most citizens interviewed saw formal education and 
French language fluency as a necessary condition for running for office.  For instance, when we 
asked Kadiatou, an articulate and informed woman from Kayes if she had ever run for office or 
would consider running in the future, she retorted rhetorically:  “I can‟t speak French.  Do you 
think that someone with no (French) education can run for office (K39)?”  Ironically, Kadioutou 
had attended some public schooling under the colonial system, but did not stay in school long 
enough to learn French well.  Salimatou, another Kayesian, said that she would not run for 
office.  She had not gone to school, but suggested that perhaps her children, two of whom are 
receiving government scholarships to attend high school, might be able to run (K40).  While 
interviewing a third, female respondent from Kayes, Aminata, I broke my role of objective 
survey enumerator out of frustration.   She clearly knew community problems that should be 
resolved, but did think she was capable of getting involved in politics. After Aminata had given a 
perceptive lecture about the problems of Malian democracy, and more specifically, the municipal 
authorities of Kayes, then she responded to our question about running for office in the future by 
stating, “No, you need to have studied.”   I spoke out of turn and insisted that she is 
knowledgeable and a very articulate speaker. She insisted again, “Yes, I do (know how to speak 
well), but I didn‟t go to school (KV78).” However, it was not just the women of Kayes who 
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 Interview with member of Malian civil society (June 2009) 
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repeated the importance of having attended school and speaking French. I offer just a few quotes 
from other respondents as examples. 
“I didn‟t study, so I can‟t run (K54).” Drahmane, seventy-something male respondent in 
Kayes. 
 
“I never went to school, so I can‟t run (K2).” Lala, thirty-something woman from the 
village of Madinel. 
 
“I didn‟t go to school so I cannot run (SR11).” Zoumana, a fifty-something Senoufou 
man, who lives in Ziguena and attended literacy training. 
 
“I didn‟t study, so I can‟t run for office (M71).” Kadi, forty-something woman with 
Koranic education. 
 
“I didn‟t study, so I don‟t think so (K60).”  Brahama, twenty-something man from 
Soutoucoule. 
 
“If you can't write your own name, can you be mayor (SR60)?” Issouf, sixty-something 
Senoufou man, Ziguena resident. 
 
“(I can‟t)…I‟m not educated (SV81).” Seydou, Peule man from the village of Fatoma, 
attended primary school in a madrassa. 
 
This strongly contrasts university students, like Tiecoura, who are eager to take 
advantage of political opportunities.  He also wants to work for the government in order to “fix 
his country.”  He says he plans on voting and campaigning in the municipal elections, “I want a 
good mayor in my commune; I want to participate in the development of my commune.”  For 
these young students, electoral politics represented a personal opportunity rather than a foreign 
and oppressive system.  Unlike most Malians, they can visualize themselves at the apex of the 
political system and they felt capable and willing to exercise “complete citizenship.” 
I want to caution that French literacy does not guarantee that citizens will embrace 
politics, but rather that it serves as a necessary condition for their individual involvement.  Many 
educated citizens chose not to participate in politics because of its negative stigma. For instance, 
some university students chose not to participate in campaigns because of the stigma associated 
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with politics.  Abdoullaye, a student from Sevare, explained that he wouldn‟t campaign in the 
municipal elections because “I don‟t want people to think that I‟m a liar (U40).” Brahmane, a 
student at FAST from Segou, explained his reticence to get involved, “By taking part in politics, 
you can make a lot of enemies (U170).” 
French facilitates more difficult forms of participation is that it helps to build internal 
efficacy so that Malians can navigate bureaucracy without fear of exploitation or non-
responsiveness.  Our surveys reveal that most people who reported frequent contact with the 
mayor‟s office, outside of the context of traditional mobilization through an association, had a 
high school or university education.  As the most educated members of their families and 
communities, these citizens often served as spokespeople for a friend or relative and met with 
government officials on their behalf.  Our interviews were filled with examples of educated 
citizens brokering or mediating interactions with government for their networks of family and 
friends.  Mariam is from Bamako; she contacted a government official on behalf of her cousin 
who had a problem with her market stall (BBC81).  Drahmane, a sixty year old Songhrai man in 
Timbuktu, frequently visits the mayor to discuss the poor quality of the roads during rainy season 
because “in Timbuktu people are passive and scared” to approach the authorities on their own 
(T20).  In the colonial and post-independence era, citizens prized French language skills because 
they helped to navigate bureaucracy and to avoid exploitation and deception by government 
officials (Bergman 1996; Gerard 1997).  Remnants of these ideas remain as most respondents 
avoid the police and formal legal system because of the perception that these groups only cater to 
the most powerful. University education qualifies citizens as certifiable French-speakers, but also 
provides access to networks of advocacy in case of potential injustice.   French creates a greater 
sense of internal efficacy in a world that is largely defined by bureaucratic mazes. 
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4. 12 What Does Mass Education Mean for the Future of Democracy? 
The findings suggest that by expanding education to the masses, the Malian government 
is creating more savvy and empowered citizens.  Even with only informal or primary education, 
respondents outperformed their peers with no education.  At a primary or informal level of 
education, this political knowledge and internal efficacy might not be enough to engage in 
difficult political activities, but it could help them to better understand and communicate their 
needs in the electoral context.  The results are encouraging especially given the government‟s 
recent focus on achieving gender parity in education.  As we see, women still lag behind men in 
terms of political knowledge and most forms of participation.  Perhaps the greater rates of female 
enrollment will generate more politically empowered women and potentially enhance the 
prospects of greater female representation in political offices. 
 Education‟s correlation with political knowledge appears rooted in citizens‟ heightened 
cognitive development rather than civic education or history lessons about democracy.  The 
policy choice of expansion and liberalization has been beneficial to democracy in that education 
creates more knowledgeable and capable democratic consumers as cognitive development feeds 
directly into internal efficacy.  This study did not find that non-state schools were less able to 
generate informed or active citizens.  At lower levels of education, attending a religious school 
instead of a state school did not appear to stymie political participation. However, the resilience 
of French raises significant questions about the future of Islamic education in the 
democratization process. Madrassa education has gained notoriety after its endorsement by the 
government and with the rising popularity of Arabic as a cosmopolitan language.   However until 
Arabic is given status as a national language, the acquisition of the French language appears to 
be a pre-requisite for madrassa-educated who want to get involved in politics.  
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The findings suggest that the French language penetrates Malian politics at a deeper level 
in the imaginations of every-day Malians.  Elite, secular political power is deeply associated with 
French, Western education.  Mastery of the French language dictates who can fully participate in 
politics.  Experts have lauded African elections for their early embrace of universal suffrage, but, 
if dig deeper we uncover a massive rift that divides the politically empowered from the 
dispossessed.  Even if indigenous or Arabic language education builds citizens internal efficacy, 
they are constrained by their inability to communicate with formal bureaucratic institutions.  
French language serves as the bridge between the divide by helping people to feel “capable” of 
exercising their voice beyond the ballot box in more difficult venues.  In the minds of many 
Malians French fluency is a necessary condition to run for elected office.    If primary education 
is not enough to achieve command of the French language then government efforts to expand 
basic education might not do enough to bridge the gap between elite secular power and the 
masses. 
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Chapter 5: 
Parents as Social Service Consumers 
5.1 Introduction 
Born in 1932, Tiemoko fought for the French army in French Indochina and later Algeria 
(BA51).  When he returned to Mali, he married and had four girls.  He supported Mali‟s 
independence movement and its first political party, USRDA, in its first electoral victory; he has 
continued to vote for them ever since. Tiemoko had never gone to school, but the educational 
choice for his daughters was simple since there was only one school in his neighborhood of 
Banconi in the 1960s – the Sikoroni public school.   All four of his daughters attended that public 
school.   Now his neighborhood is filled with schooling options: the madrassa Dar es Salaam, 
another public school Nelson Mandela, a community school, and at least three private schools - 
Chez Kamikoko, Mamadou Konaté, and Jean Marie Cissé.  He explains, “Back then, there was 
only one school where we lived.  Now, given the choice, I would send my children to private 
school.”  In Tiemoko‟s lifetime, Mali has not only become a sovereign nation-state, but vastly 
expanded the availability of access to education as well as the schooling options it offers to 
parents.   
The changes in Mali‟s educational landscape raise interesting questions.  How could the 
expansion of public education, as a government social service, affect citizens‟ political behavior?  
Education, after all, is not just a venue to inculcate future citizens, but also a way for political 
leaders to demonstrate its capacity and commitment to its population.  Furthermore, how might 
the diversity of education providers, including private secular schools and madrassas, detract 
from the government‟s ability to forge these types of connections with citizens?  This chapter 
attempts to evaluate the impact social services on parents‟ democratic participation, and in doing 
so, forecast the effects of educational policy changes on democracy in Mali.  Are citizens who 
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benefit from public school education more likely to participate in formal politics than those 
citizens who do not benefit from these same services?   In other words, does a concrete 
connection to the state, through the receipt of social services, induce citizens to vocalize their 
political preferences?  The Malian government also relied heavily on private partners to reach the 
maximum number of learners.  Its privatization strategy in the context of democratization raises 
a second set of questions: how might the receipt of non-state education provision affect citizens‟ 
relationship with the state? 
An emerging literature in American politics suggests that universal social service 
programs can have a positive effect on political participation through policy feedback 
mechanism (Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Mettler 2005; Campbell 2003).  What happens when 
the government is not the only state-accredited social service provider?  Debates within US 
politics have long tried to determine whether private education pulls pupils and parents out of 
civic affairs and/or if it segregates them from a larger social community.
209
  Stakes are even 
higher in nascent democracies – where the state government competes with other entities for 
“public authority.210”  In the developing state context, rebel groups, religious organizations, and 
political parties have all used education provision as a way to siphon support away from the 
incumbent regime. As demonstrated in Abernethy‟s work on Nigeria in the late 1960s, the 
Catholic Church effectively used education provision to recruit converts, while Weinstein shows 
how rebel groups have used education as a successful method to indoctrinate recruits (Abernethy 
1968; Weinstein 2007). Across a broad comparative context, political parties and candidates 
                                                          
209
 For a defense of school choice that draws on European examples, see Wolf, Patrick and Stephen 
Macedo.  2004. Educating Citizens: International Perspectives on Civic Values and School Choice. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press. 
210
 I borrow this word from “The Upside Down View of Governance” to describe institutions (formal and 
informal) that undertake core governance functions (2010: 9). 
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have used education to gain support outside of their political base (Issar and Cammett 2010; 
Thachil 2009; Fox 1994). 
Mali, like many nascent African democracies, still harbors multiple forms of political 
authority including traditional and religious authorities.  As described in Chapter 2, religious 
authority has strong legitimacy in the eyes of the Malian population, but rarely engages in 
formal, electoral politics. Furthermore, religious schooling has had a tumultuous relationship 
with the secular state.  Until democratization, the government authorities tried to co-opt, control, 
or subjugate these schools.  The contentious relationship between Islamic schooling and secular, 
government authority in Mali raises questions about their current collaboration. Do parents who 
send their children to Islamic schools have different patterns of political participation and 
interaction with the state than other citizens?  
I argue that public education contributes to democratization by helping to bring parents 
into electoral politics.  I find that citizens who send (or sent) their children to public school are 
more likely to report voting or campaigning in the 2007 presidential elections and more likely to 
have a voter id card than any other citizens or any other parents. I offer two possible 
mechanisms: first, educated, literate children can act as “linguistic brokers” – pulling their 
parents into politics and secondly, that use of a good public service reinforces a citizenship 
identity that can be further fulfilled by voting through a policy feedback mechanism.   These 
findings suggest state expansion of public education has had a secondary, and perhaps 
unintended effect, on democratic deepening to the extent that it gets more citizens involved in the 
electoral arena.  All francophone education, public or private, enables students to serve as 
linguistic brokers between their families and the political process, but only state education 
reinforces citizenship identities through a policy feedback mechanism. 
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In contrast, I find that parents who send their children to Islamic schools are less likely to 
seek representation through voting or campaigning.  However, this distinction between public 
schooling and madrassa consumer does not carry beyond the realm of electoral politics.  I do no 
find other significant differences in the political participation or likelihood of having government 
documents between consumers of different schooling services.  
5.2 Why Social Service Provision Matters for Democracy 
While the democratic transition has brought many important changes to the life of 
citizens in Mali, citizens are still very wary of the credibility of electoral politics.  As discussed 
in Chapter 2, most citizens view electoral politics with a very skeptical lens: “politiki man ɲi.”  
In Mali, where voter participation rates are far below the continental average – this skepticism 
taints electoral participation.  As one astute Malian citizen, a 36 year old driver named Bina from 
the Mopti region agrees with the many Malians who prize the liberalism of the democratic era 
over actual gains in representation:  
The thing I appreciate most about the democratic transition is the aspect of freedom of 
speech.  Now you can say and do what you want.  However, for most Malians – electoral 
politics represents nothing but lies, nothing but politicians who are hoping to make fast 
money.
211
  
 
  Even if Malians are making accurate assessments and politicians fail to live up to 
electoral promises, if they withdraw from voicing their opinion through electoral channels, the 
political process will continue to remain unaccountable to their needs unless they are able to 
leverage other types of contentious participation.  A citizen‟s willingness to engage and critique 
politicians with a vote is critical first step to making democratic politics relevant.  Although 
participation itself is not sufficient for a democratic transformation of society, the other elements 
– including democratic values and social capital, remain compartmentalized from the state or 
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under-developed without political participation.  I am not suggesting participation for 
participation‟s sake, but rather, as an important step forward in Mali‟s democratic trajectory. 
In the past, governments have used state education to gain legitimacy and allegiance, 
build credibility, and extend their reach into popular imagination.
212
 Primary school provision 
represents one of few, or only, venues for citizens to interact with governing authorities in weak 
democratic states.  A trip to most rural villages in Mali reveals, at a minimum, a school with a 
Malian flag as a symbol of the democratic state even if no other government infrastructure is 
visible. Could the state, through visible social service provision, induce citizens to “give 
multiparty democracy a chance?”  
 If citizens do not engage with public education and instead gain social services through 
outside channels, a worst case scenario might emerge where citizens “exit” to other forms of 
authority such as religious movements, rebel groups, or foreign armies infringing on Malian 
sovereignty. While this scenario might represent an appropriate analogy for Northern Malian 
youth who could be recruited by Al Queda of the Islamic Maghreb, an alternative militia group, 
or transnational trafficking chains, these options are less plausible for the other regions of Mali.  
Alternatively, private provision might foster exit away from any form of political participation.  
Those who can buy their way out of state services or rely on a different form of authority for 
provision might withdraw from greater political participation.  If the state is less relevant for 
these citizens‟ lives, they will be less likely to engage with it.   This threat of their exit weighs 
heavily on the democratic quality, rather than the actual sovereignty, of these states (Englebert 
2009).  If citizens do not participate in democracy, the state cannot benefit from their feedback, 
and as Hirschman anticipates, government institutions will demonstrate “a tendency toward 
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slack,” which in practical terms means that they will be less accountable or responsive to 
citizens‟ needs (1970). 
This chapter starts by exploring the parental educational preferences and school choice of 
the survey respondents to explain enrollment patterns and justifications for these choices.  It then 
demonstrates that public school parents are more likely to claim voting and campaigning than 
other types of citizens.  I then contrast the public school parents finding with the political 
behavior of parents who send their children to madrassas – and are less likely to claim that they 
participate in electoral politics.  I complement the survey data with exit polling data from the 
2009 municipal elections in Bamako, which loosely supports the findings of greater turnout by 
public school consumers and weaker turnout from Islamic schooling consumers. 
5.3 Schooling Options and Schooling Choice in Mali 
Malian parents in urban and peri-urban zones have increasingly diverse schooling options 
available including: public schools, private secular schools, madrassas, Christian schools, 
community schools, and Koranic schools.  These schools are very different in terms of cost, 
religious orientation, language of instruction, curriculum, and perceived quality.  Before 
addressing questions of school enrollment and political participation, it is important to ask a 
preliminary question: when there are multiple providers available, what determines why parents 
send their children to different types of schools?   
 The interviews and surveys revealed that fathers or male guardians generally make 
schooling decisions for the household.  In fact, in many households, wives and mother were 
unable to provide the names of the schools that their children attended, the child‟s grade level, or 
what the child‟s school fees were.213  In some instances, female members were permitted by the 
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 Bleck notes from interviews in Bamako, Sikasso,  and Kayes; Research assistant Guindo notes on 
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absence of a male family member to enroll their children in the school of their choice.
214
 In other 
instances, children were sent to live with relatives who sponsored the child‟s education and then 
the relatives were the ones who made schooling decisions for that child.  The practice of sending 
children to live with friends and family is most common at the secondary and tertiary levels 
where students must travel far distances to attend the closest schooling option.  These students 
board with families who are generally expected to pay most of the students‟ fees, food, and 
provide accommodation.
215
 However, for the most part, Malian fathers selected schools and 
found resources to pay for school fees.
216
 
Literature on school choice often assumes that parents choose schools in order to 
maximize educational quality and the family‟s utility in their selection of that school (Friedman 
1955, Hirschman 1970).  This utility can be thought of as both a consumptive good, improving 
the well being and personal development of their children, and as productive good, investing in a 
child‟s future ability to bring income into the household (Becker 1976, Bast and Walberg 2003).  
In developing nations, such as Mali, it is especially important to stress the productive quality of 
schooling: the child‟s future earnings can benefit the entire household and/or extended family 
(Orazem and King, Bergmann 1996, Sahn and Glick 2000; Gérard 1997).  In Mali, it is not 
uncommon for an educated, employed individual to shoulder the burden of his/her entire 
extended family.    
                                                          
214
 In one example, a Soninke woman in Kayes revealed how her family capitalized on her father‟s 
absence to enroll one of her children in private, secular school.  “In reality, our dad did not want to send 
the children to school (Francophone), but only to madrassa….we profited from his absence to send some 
of the children to French-language school (KV55). 
215
 Informal interviews and observation of Malian households in Bamako 2007 and 2009.  This was also 
the experience of all of my research assistants as they attended university in Bamako. 
216
 I note that many families rely on help from extended family and friends to pay for their children‟s 
school fees.   
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School choice is restricted by the costs of schooling as well as the opportunity costs of 
forgone earnings from that child‟s potential labor.  Parents who are unable to absorb these short 
term costs are unable to enroll their children in school.  In our interviews many of the most 
impoverished respondents were unable to send their children to school.  Aminata lives in city of 
Mopti with her husband and three children.  They recently lost their house and all of their 
possessions in a fire.  None of her three children are enrolled in schools.  She explained, “I am 
too poor even to send my kids to an Islamic school (M7).” Adama, a respondent from Kayes, 
was only able to enroll one of his children in school.  He explained, “These days, poor people 
can‟t send their kids to school like everyone else (K23).”  Drahmane, a respondent in Mopti, 
implies that five of his six children left school early because they needed to help generate income 
for the family:  “All the others left school because of the difficulties that our family faces every 
day (M67).”  Most parents expressed the desire to enroll their children despite these obstacles.  
However, there were certain parents who remained ambivalent about sending their children to 
school and questioned its practical utility – especially in the rural context.217 As one respondent 
in the village of Ziguena, about 75 kilometers northwest of Sikasso on the road to Koutiala, 
explained why his nine children are not in school.  “Because they (my children) are farmers. 
Everyone cannot be at school (SR50b)!”218 Ali, in Timbuktu explained that school was not a 
possibility for three of his four children, because, “we are nomadic (T55).”219 His son stays with 
a relative so he can attend Bahadou public school in Timbuktu, while the rest of the family 
migrates. 
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 Gérard (1997) finds that public schooling is out of synch with the lives and rhythms of many Malians 
in Sikasso region. 
218
 Also Sr67, Sr84 
219
 Similar response from Bozo respondent, “We are Bozo, our children don‟t do (any school), we move 
too much.” (SV 63) 
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 Historically, Francophone schooling represented economic and political opportunities.   
Students that mastered the language of their colonizers could climb a social ladder to the rungs of 
the educated elite.
220
 Mission and public education helped individuals to advance in the colonial 
bureaucracy and escape the boundaries of their village communities.   However, unlike earlier 
eras, educational attainment in the current context does not guarantee a place in the civil 
service.
221
  Many parents felt deceived and disappointed when their child completes secondary 
school or university with no job prospects.  Despite increasing numbers of unemployed 
graduates, many parents still hold out hope for education creating greater economic 
opportunities.
222
  Parents still described French language education, in a public, private, or 
Christian school as necessary for securing a good job.   
Additionally, French-language schools gives students the skills for NGO or government 
jobs, but also helps citizens to navigate government bureaucracy (Bergman 1996).  Even if a 
child eventually drops out, his ability to acquire reading and mathematics skills is a resource for 
the family (Gérard 1997: 59).  In rural areas, parents might enroll one child in Francophone 
school just to help with “decoding and documentation” and “dealings with bureaucracy” 
(Brenner 2001: 186).”  In his study of a rural area near the Bougoni region of Sikasso, Etienne 
Gérard interviewed a respondent with a primary school degree, who explains his role 
collaborating with traditional authority.  
It‟s me who was the first to serve the village – administratively and politically.  Because 
of that - we the educated – are highly solicited.  I even have the impression that the 
villagers – the old wise men – are starting to understand these things….We are here to 
serve the village.  It‟s indispensable.  If you gave responsibility to he who has the pens 
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 Abernethy 1968, Boyle 1995,1999, Uchendu 1979;  
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 Louis Brenner explains that this process ended in the 1980s under structural adjustment reforms (2007: 
209). 
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 Etienne Gérard describes a similar hope for economic returns on French education in his study of a 
Malinke region in Southern Mali (1997: 44). 
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(who knows how to write), it‟s him who is responsibility.  He needs to help all (1997: 
187).
223
 
The respondent goes on to explain his partnership with those in traditional authority. His 
education does not displace the power or authority of the older elites, but enables him to work in 
collaboration with them. 
 
When I entered households to conduct surveys, it was very common for the respondent to 
seek out the child in the household with the highest level of education to “assist” with the 
interview.  Our surveys were conducted in local languages, but having the “educated” child there 
as a mediator seemed to put the respondents at ease.  The fixation with French attainment fuels 
parents‟ resistance to “pédagogie convergente224” curricula despite producing better academic 
results (Bender et al 2007, Interviews Summer 2007).  Parents with children at schools with 
pédagogie convergente would often complain about non-French instruction.  I spoke with many 
respondents who would say, “What good is sending my child to school, if she isn‟t learning in 
French?  She can speak Bambara at home.”  
Almost universally, respondents preferred private to public schools citing better quality, 
fewer strikes, and higher passage rates on exams (Bleck and Guindo 2010). In most instances, 
the choice between a private and public schools is based on a family‟s economic resources and or 
the availability of private schools.    Initially, private school teachers were thought of as less 
qualified then public school teachers, but with the rise of contractual teachers, those who are less 
educated and not employed by the civil service, in public schools and the increasingly numbers 
of public teachers who moonlight in private school classes, these lines have blurred (Bleck and 
Guindo 2010).   However, household income limited a family‟s ability to enroll children in 
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 Bleck Translation of Original French Text 
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 Pedagogie convergente slowly phases primary students in from local languages to French instead of 
immediate immersion in French language primary school classes.  After being taught as a subject, French 
is used as the language of instruction after 6
th
 grade. 
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private schools where fees generally range from $2-$8 dollars a month.
225
  If a household has 
enough resources to pay for private education then parents said they want to enroll some of their 
children in these schools.   There is a near universal perspective the private schools provide 
better job prospects than public schools.   A Bamakois respondent, Issouf, lamented the poor 
quality of public education and the shifting loyalty of the Malian population to private providers: 
“It‟s the season to send your children to private school (after BA58).”  Lassana, a respondent 
from Kayes, also gave a private school endorsement, “If you want quality education, you have to 
pay money for private school (K39).” 
The exception to this rule comes from teachers and school directors who work at public 
schools and see private school promoters as nothing more than entrepreneurs hoping to turn a 
profit.  Salif, a director of a public school in the village of Fatoma in the Sevare region explains: 
“Me, I would never send my child to a private school… they are (only) interested in money 
(SV65).”   
 From a strictly economic or productive perspective, a choice between a French language 
education and an Arabic education seems more puzzling. A resource-based argument might 
explain why some parents enroll their children in inexpensive Koranic schools instead of no 
school at all.  Students who attend Koranic schools generate their own school fees by “begging” 
for alms once a week.  Generally each student is required to bring in approximately 100 CFA 
($.20) to the karamogo.
226
  This amount is less than what is charged at public school 
(approximately $10-20).  Salif, a fifty year old respondent lives in Mopti where his three children 
attend Koranic school.  He explains his schooling choice as motivated by his limited resources. 
“I was in an accident 14 years ago; I don't have anything; that is why my kids are at a Koranic 
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1,000 -4,000 CFA for most average private schools.  There is a separate class of elite private schools 
that cost thousands of US dollars a year. 
226
 Term translates as religious teacher in Bambara. 
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school (M24).”  In some cases, parents send their children to live with the Koranic school 
teachers.  The teachers become responsible for providing housing and food to subsidize what the 
children can earn in alms.   
 However, arguing that parents enroll children in Islamic schools as purely a second best 
option or for economic reasons ignores the socio-cultural realties and tradition of the Malian 
educational landscape.  Koranic schools have existed in some regions of Mali since the 12
th
 
century (Sanankoua 1985).  In addition, the other form of Islamic schooling – madrassas – is not 
a cheaper educational option.  Madrassas cost as much as most private schools and more than 
public school options, but the medium of instruction is Arabic – which is not a recognized 
language of the state bureaucracy.  In the past, madrassas were criticized for limiting graduates‟ 
job opportunities since they did not provide the linguistic instruction vital for participation in 
government channels.  Many believed that graduates of madrassas could only obtain jobs as 
teachers in madrassas.
227
   Despite these challenges madrassas represented their own form of 
social power.  Sanankoua and explain the social and political power knowledge of Islam can 
wield:   
But they (madrassas) also represent a strategy for creating, occupying, and controlling a 
defined social and political space.  If madrassas have not succeeded in providing 
productive economic employment for the majority of their students (this is why they are 
often critiqued), they have certainly created a negotiable social statute, and up to a certain 
point, a social mobility, which is not available to students of Koranic schools (1991: 
8).”228 
 
  Despite their productive limitations, some parents choose religious education because 
they see it as morally imperative to their child‟s development as a Muslim. Some fearing that, as 
Louis Brenner described, “...Secular state schools might turn their children into „unbelievers,” 
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(2007:199).  Aboubacar a forty-something respondent, Tuareg respondent in Timbuktu explained 
why he sends all of his three children to Koranic school: “Many say they are Muslims, but they 
haven't gone to Koranic school or a madrassa or done any kind of (religious) studies.  How can 
you declare yourself Muslim? Maybe because they pray they think that that suffices? (T2).” 229  
In his study of school choice in Mali and Burkina Faso, Etienne Gérard found religious leaders 
who forbid their children to attend secular, public school and others who sent their children to 
public school, while supplementing their education with Koranic studies at home (1999).  Gérard 
describes these different choices as two distinct strategies for dealing with the reality of the 
growing importance of French language education and trying to preserve one‟s own religious 
authority. 
5.4 Justifications for Enrollment Decisions 
 To get to the heart of why parents send their children to different types of schools we 
asked them directly. Survey team members asked all respondents with children, if and where 
their children attended school.  Then, each respondent was asked to provide a reason for 
enrolling their student in each relevant type of school. The pie charts in Figure 2 show the 
reasons parents gave for enrolling their children in each school type. 
230
  We observed that 
parents chose different school types for different reasons.   Sixty-three percent of respondents 
sending their children to public school said they did so for reasons of proximity and an additional 
14% said they did so for reasons of affordability.  Only 13% chose the public school for reasons 
of quality.   
                                                          
229
 Gérard found that parents who had attended Islamic school enroll their children at lower rates than 
those who had attended public school (71.7%compared to 82.8%), but this may also be a result of other 
control variables such as urban/rural residence or income (1999: 159). 
230
 Parents responded for each school type where they had a child; multiple justifications for school 
enrollment were coded cumulatively.    
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Issoufou, who lives in Senou, a peri-urban suburb about 10 km from Bamako, has two 
school-aged children. He used to work in the field as a day laborer at a neighboring farm, but 
now that he is in his fifties and is unable to withstand the intensive labor that farm work requires, 
so he is no longer working. He said he enrolled only some of his children in public school 
because, “private school is too expensive (F43).” He said he would happily enroll the other 
children if he had the money.    
Similarly, most parents enrolled their children in community school because their choice-
sets were limited.  Predominantly in rural zones, seventy percent of parents enrolled their 
children in community schools because they were the closest available education providers.   
This is intuitive since the vast majority of community schools were built in places that had very 
little educational infrastructure. 
 In contrast, the majority of parents who send their children to private, Francophone 
schools or madrassas stated that they “chose” to do so.  Fifty-two percent of respondents sent 
their children to private, secular school because they felt they would receive a quality education 
there. Abou, who lives in Samé, a suburb of Bamako enrolled his child in a private school 
because “public school is sick.  Plus, I know the director.   It was less expensive (than the other 
private schools) and the teachers are capable (BBC76).”  Fifty-four percent of students attending 
madrassas and fifty-five percent of Koranic students were enrolled for religious reasons.  When 
asked why he chose to enroll his children in a madrassas, Samba, a resident in a village in 
Fatoma in the Mopti region, explained, “Allah is the unique creator (Sv85).”   
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Seventy-one percent of parents with children at Christian school reported enrolling their 
children for the reasons of quality and the majority of them said they were Muslim.
231
 Twenty-
nine percent who sent their children to Christian school cited religious reasons.  Daoda is one of 
the many Muslims who choose to enroll their children in Catholic school.  He explains his 
choice, “There are serious studies there.  The administration has good relations with the parents.  
For instance, if my child isn't at school, as a parent - I am alerted immediately (BA60). 
Decisions to enroll a child in an Islamic or Francophone school are not always a direct 
outcome of parental preferences, but are can also be dictated by logistical or financial constraints 
or other outside factors.  In some instances, a friend or relative encourages a family, with an 
Islamic schooling pedigree, to enroll a child in a Francophone school.  As an example, I describe 
the Diallo family in the village of Soutoucoulé just on the outskirts of Kayes N‟Dyi.  We sat 
outside their small two room cement house and Karim, the father, energetically answered our 
survey questions, while his wife Mariam watched –often nodding in approval.  The Diallos are a 
Peule family, so they didn‟t think twice when his Karim‟s father suggested they enroll their son, 
Ibrahim, in the local Koranic school where he had gone as a child.  Ibrahim was busy reading his 
hadiths, rather conspicuously, during his dad‟s interview.   The family was very pleased with 
their sons‟ education, but decided to enroll their daughter in public school.  When I asked why – 
Karim explained that he had a friend who works in the mayor‟s office who thought that it would 
be a good idea and they had enough resources that they could pay (K60).  
In the same village of Soutoucoulé, Kadiatou explained that she sends her children to Dar 
es Salaam, the big public school in downtown Kayes N‟Dyi approximately 3 kilometers away.  
However, during rainy season the massive craters in Soutoucoulé fill with water, separating 
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compounds scattered along the highest peaks of embankments like small islands.  The village 
becomes nearly impossible to navigate except with a small boat.  During the period, Kadiatou 
sends her children to the local Koranic school located in Soutoucoulé because it is too difficult to 
make the journey to Dar es Salaam (K13). 
In Sikasso, I met a marabout, Salah, and his wife Haoua.  They used to enroll all of their 
children in a madrassa, but due to economic constraints on the family, they were forced to 
transfer their youngest son into a less expensive public school.  Salah was pleasantly surprised by 
his son, Mamadou‟s, performance.  This year, Mamadou was first of the hundred students in his 
class.  Salah is very satisfied with the public school performance and rated it “very good”, while 
only rating the madrassa his other two children attend “OK.”  (S78). Salah was not alone, other 
respondents stated that they preferred Islamic schooling, but did not have the resources to place 
their children in madrassas.  Chaka from Mopti has his four girls enrolled in public school, 
despite the fact that he thinks “boys should go to Francophone school and girls should go to 
madrassas (M61).” 
It is also important to note that religiosity is not perfectly correlated with Islamic 
schooling.   Some of the most active members of Islamic Associations had their own children in 
public schools.  Abdoulaye is Peule and lives in Mopti where he is an active member of the High 
Council of Islam – one the primary organizations that organized the family code protests.  
During his interview, he complained about the National Assembly saying that the Family Code 
was against Islam. He attended some primary school at a madrassa, however, all of his children 
attend public school – the symbol of the secular state (M5). Abdoulaye claimed to enroll his four 
children in public school because it was the closest school to his house.  He rated his children‟s 
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educational experience there as “good.”  This evaluation might reflect the fact that three of his 
children had already continued on to secondary and university. 
The pie charts below in Figure 14, demonstrate how parents made schooling decisions for 
different types of schools. 
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Figure 14: Respondents’ Reasons for Choosing Each School Type (N=983)232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
232
 Based on respondent responses for each school type where they had a child enrolled; Parents could 
provide more than 1 justification for enrollment, so total number of justifications exceeds number of 
parents with children in each school type: Public N=520, Private, Secular =299, Madrassa =75, Koranic 
=39, Community = 36, Christian = 14; Other category includes multiple types of justifications . 
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Many parents who enroll their children in Islamic schools simultaneously enroll their 
children in secular, Francophone schools.  The Venn Diagram in Figure 15 demonstrates the 
number of parents that enroll their children in the most popular schools, public, private, and 
madrassas, as well as the number of parents that enroll their children in multiple school types.    
In fact, only approximately a third of respondents send their children exclusively to madrassas.   
Figure 15: Overlapping Enrollment between School Type (N=600) 
 
In Etienne Gérard‟s study of the Malian education sector in southern Mali, he similarly 
found that only 20% of guardians sent their children exclusively to public school and 13% of 
parents sent their children exclusively to an Islamic school; the remaining 67% use some kind of 
mixed strategy (1997:58).  This strategy of diversification is consistent with findings in Pakistan, 
where a study found that only 25% of families who send their children to madrassas do so 
exclusively (Andrabi et al 2005).  The majority of parents enrolling children in madrassas also 
enroll their other children in public and/or private schools.   
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A respondent in the village of Fatoma, about 30 kilometers outside of Sikasso, has 
children enrolled in both public school and a madrassa.  He attended Koranic school and when 
asked what school type he prefers he said madrassas or Koranic school but, “if the person has a 
lot of children, then I think he should divide them up and send certain children to madrassas or 
Koranic school and others to French schools.”  
Parents gave multiple reasons for diversification including a preference for religious 
education for girls and supplemental education for children who are not yet old enough to attend 
public school.  For some parents, especially those who are reluctant to send their girls to school 
at all, madrassas represent a more culturally appropriate and conservative educational venue.
233
   
Most madrassas in Mali are not gender-segregated, but they do require female pupils to cover 
their heads, which few Malian girls do outside of that context.
234
  The public school age 
requirement prevents younger children from registration, however parents know that if they do 
not pass the DEF by age 17, they will be unable to go to formal “lycée” with a government 
scholarship and have to attend a vocational school or pay for private school.  
5.5 Hypothesis Building 
For numerous reasons, we can anticipate that parents who send their children to public 
school will be more likely to engage with the government than other types of Malian citizens. 
Policy feedback literature suggests multiple mechanisms that might lead parents who use public 
services would be more likely to interact with the government providing resources and 
incentives for participation as well by affecting interpretive aspects of citizenship (Pierson 1993).  
Below I discuss the potential for these mechanisms to affect political behavior in Mali and 
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 Interview World Education Employee (July 2007) 
234
 In Mali, it is uncommon to see young girls with covered heads.  In most cases, head-covering is not 
required until a woman marries. 
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include two additional mechanisms, which are particularly relevant to the developing world 
context: state capacity, legibility, and linguistic brokerage. 
5.5.1 Incentives and Resources 
First, drawing with the logic of Albert Hirschman, I expect parents with a child in public 
school to be more likely to exercise their political voice because it is in their political interest 
(1970).   Expanded public provision provides incentives to parents to voice their political 
opinions in the administration of state schooling or other public services.  As direct social service 
consumers of the state, these citizens have more invested in the performance of the state and will 
therefore be more active in politics as opposed to other citizens with less at stake during 
elections.   
In the first study to apply policy feedback mechanism to the developing world, Lauren 
MacLean looks that the negative consequences of state social service retrenchment as a product 
of structural adjustment (2012).  She analyses cross-national Afrobarometer data and finds that 
citizens with experience using state health or schooling services are more likely to report 
registering to vote and voting as compared to citizens with no exposure to these services.  
Drawing on original survey and interview data in Cote d‟Ivoire and Ghana, she argues that the 
voting is incentivized among public service users to voice concern over the declining quality of 
public services (20).  
The expansion of public education, as well as the growth of state-sanctioned community 
schools, foster citizens‟ participation in PTAs and school management committees.235  By 
bringing citizens together in the context of these associations, such as the PTA, enrolling your 
child in school might heighten what Schlozman et al refer to as civic skills (1994).  Parent 
teacher associations or school management committees serve important functions for budget 
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 Madrassas and private schools have no comparable outlets for parental participation and management. 
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management and allocation in public schools.  These organizations provide parents with an 
opportunity to come together collectively and “exercise their voice” and interact with a 
government service in an institutionalized channel.
236
  More broadly, sending your child to school 
could broaden your social network and force you to associate with others from more diverse groups and 
backgrounds.  Enrolling a child in school could increase a citizens‟ propensity to join groups and activate 
their social capital. 
5.5.2  Interpretive Mechanisms 
Social service provision can build a citizenship identity through the interpretive feedback 
mechanism. Literature on social service provision in the US suggests that certain social services, 
like social security, are seen in a positive light, and can stimulate participation while others, like 
welfare, have a negative stigma can create isolation (Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Soss 2002; 
Gordon 1994).  Surveys have found that citizens who receive “positive” services are more likely 
to participate in politics, while those receiving “negative” services are more likely to withdraw 
from the political realm (Campbell 2003). In the American context, Andrea Louise Campbell has 
demonstrated how government provision of social security has shaped an active constituency of 
“uber-citizens” out of the nation‟s once marginalized seniors; the receipt of social security boosts 
Americans cognitive ability to understand their political interests (2003).  Suzanne Mettler shows 
the GI Bill had a similar affect on creating more politically active citizens who feel capable and 
empowered (2005).
237
  In all feedback studies, the perceived status of the social service, affects 
the political identity and subsequent political behavior of the recipients (Mettler and Stonecash 
2008; Soss 2002). They explain: 
 
                                                          
236The government pays teachers‟ salaries directly, but the APE is responsible for all purchases/repairs.   
Interviews July 2007 
237
 Mettler finds the strongest effect among low income groups. 
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As a result, the „„advantaged‟‟ may be more likely to gain the message that they are valued 
citizens, to adopt an orientation to government that the political game is open, fair, and winnable, 
and thus to participate in conventional forms of participation at high levels. Conversely, 
„„dependents‟‟ may be more likely to receive a message that they are helpless and needy, to adopt 
a disinterested and passive orientation to government, and thus to participate at low levels 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1993, 1997). (275). 
 
The Malian state has made pronounced visible campaigns to increase access to education 
through former President Alpha Konare‟s “one school or adult education center in every village 
campaign during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The Malian state has gone to great lengths to 
sensitize populations about the importance of education and therefore most Malian citizens, 
especially those receiving public school services, are likely to view education in a positive light.  
By enrolling their children in Malian schools, they are activating their citizenship status; political 
participation could build upon this base of positive citizenship actions.  Citizens may pursue 
other activities, such as voting, that validate their status as “good citizens.” 
In a recent study, Keefer and Khemani find that greater exposure to radio signals was 
correlated with higher enrollment averages in rural schools in Benin (2011).  They argue that 
access to radio led households to make greater investments in their children‟s education.  These 
findings suggest that popular media, in a comparable democratic environment, persuaded parents 
of the importance of education. 
5.5.3 External Efficacy and State Capacity 
In the atmosphere of pervasive skepticism about politics, government services could 
provide citizens with tangible evidence of a functioning state making their vote seem more 
relevant. While demonstrating state capacity is not commiserate to a belief that a state will be 
responsive and accountable to citizens‟ demands, it is a first step towards demonstrating the 
possibility of external efficacy.   Unlike many other African democracies, the government in 
Mali did not go as far as making school free, but instead concentrated on developing 
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infrastructure (Stasavage and Harding 2011).
238
  Although public school is not free, parents with 
children in public school can observe the state at work.  Concrete proof of a state‟s “work” 
allows citizens to be sensitized to the functioning of government bureaucracy increasing their 
perception of the state‟s external efficacy.   
During my survey work, I found some evidence that state capacity/external efficacy (or 
lack thereof) enters a citizen‟s calculus on about whether or not to vote.  In Kayes, where voting 
rates are habitually low, I would ask respondents, taxi drivers, and other people I met while 
living there, why so few people were showing up to vote.  I can paraphrase their response “Look 
at the quality of our roads.  Look at how dirty our city is.  Our politicians do not do anything.”  
Rather than using the ballot box to punish incumbents, many Kayesians chose to exit or forgo 
politics altogether.   
5.5.4 Legibility 
In the most basic sense, before a parent enrolls a child in public school, she is forced to 
interact with the state by producing a birth certificate for her child.  As many children are born at 
home and lack documentation, this often requires a trek down to the municipal government 
office and request for a legal document.  This simple act engages the parent with local 
government, which might otherwise exist merely as an abstract symbol of state power. The need 
to connect with citizens is particularly pressing in weak states, where citizens have little contact 
with or evidence of a central government (Bierschenk and de Sardan 1997).
239
 James Scott 
argues that public schooling increases the legibility of citizens for the state – enabling the state of 
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 By law Malian school fees are free, but in practice all parents pay a nominal fee (around $1) per 
month. 
239
 In an extreme version of this scenario in rural parts of the Central African Republic, they show how 
little evidence citizens have of the state and the constant struggle of the state to demonstrate its existence 
and authority. 
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to observe and control its population.
240
 However, we can also imagine this type of interaction as 
making the state more “legible” to parents.  Parents, at a minimum, learn where state buildings 
are located and gain a sense of what the process is.  This knowledge might result greater contact 
with state bureaucracy and/or greater willingness to participate in state politics. If children have 
greater contact with government (through public schooling), their families will be less 
intimidated and reluctant to interact with the state actors out of fear of exploitation.  The 
connection is more than symbolic since public schools transform into polling stations during 
elections. 
5.5.5 Linguistic Brokerage 
Public school parents, or any other parents who children receive francophone instruction,  
might benefit from greater access to government through the education of their children as 
linguistic/social brokers.  An emerging literature on immigrant populations in the US suggests 
that political socialization can move from children to parents – in addition to the traditional 
conceptions of political ideas traveling from parents to children (Bloemrad and Trost 2007).
 241
 
Malian parents like immigrant parents, especially those who are less educated or who do not 
speak the language of the state, could benefit from their children‟s linguistic skills in order to 
interact with government bureaucracy.  As we observed in the previous chapter, Malians who do 
not speak French feel stigmatized as second class citizens.  By endowing a child with the skills to 
participate – education could impact the political capability of the entire family. Therefore, we 
can imagine educated children bringing their parents into the political process. 
For the many reasons listed above, I propose the following hypothesis: 
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 Scott 1998 
241
 De Ment et al (2005), Parke and Buriel (2006). 
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H1: Parents who enroll(ed) their children in public school will be more likely to engage 
with the Malian government than other citizens and (or) other parents. 
5.6 Islamic Schooling 
Are consumers of religious education just as likely to participate in bureaucratic and 
electoral channels as their peers?  There are reasons to believe that these parents would be more 
likely to turn to contentious or informal participation – mediated by their mosques and religious 
leaders, than traditional, institutional political channels.  Islamic schooling is unique due to its 
religious focus and because the primary language of instruction, Arabic, is not recognized as an 
official government language.  If we think of public school or private Francophone schools 
endowing students and their families with a linguistic broker capable of dealing with 
government, parents who send their children exclusively to madrassas or Koranic schools will 
fail to access these resources.  This, in and of itself, might make a parent at an Islamic school less 
likely to engage with state bureaucracy than parents whose children attend Francophone schools. 
Since formal, political participation is associated with secular, Western power, it is 
possible that parents that align themselves with religious authorities, including Islamic education, 
will forgo formal, secular channels of political expression.  As demonstrating by the Family 
Code protests in 2009, 50,000 mosque members protested after elected officials failed to 
represent their interest.  This contentious action succeeded and ATT was forced to send the 
debated parts of the code back to the National Assembly for Review.  As of Spring 2011, a new 
version of the family code had not yet emerged.  
The history of hostility, cooption, and oppression of religious education and religious 
leadership by the colonial and postcolonial government regimes suggests that Islamic schooling 
consumers would be particularly reluctant to engage with the state (Brenner 2001; Amselle 
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1985).  Islamic schooling, in either modern, madrassas or Koranic schools, represents a realm of 
knowledge and power distinct from the secular, Francophone state.  We can anticipate that 
parents whose children receive education from these venues might be less likely to contact the 
formal secular political realm and more likely to engage with traditional or religious leaders. In 
the past, members of these communities, usually illiterate in French, have been fearful and 
suspicious of the state (Villalón forthcoming).   
As a citizen‟s loyalty to a government system erodes and he or she chooses to “exit” out 
of public provision, s/he may be dissuaded from exercising his “voice” in the formal realm of 
governmental politics.  As discussed in Chapter 2, Islamic actors have profited from the opening 
of the public sphere facilitated by democracy, but have failed to capitalize in the formal political 
sphere.  As a result, politics are viewed as the inverse of religion and many devout Malians claim 
to abstain from politics.  Islamic organizations have been more effective in applying pressure on 
the executive and other top policy makers outside of formal political channels.  Religious leaders 
have been extremely successful mobilizing people to protest, however we have not seen Islamic 
political movements or candidates draw and mobilize these constituencies.  We might expect 
Islamic schooling communities to encourage their members to avoid “dirty politics.” Therefore, I 
generate the following hypothesis: 
H2:  Parents who enroll their children in madrassas will be less likely to engage with the Malian 
government than other Malian citizens. 
5.7 Empirical Tests 
As in the previous chapter, I draw on an original survey of 1000 individuals from 10 
school districts.  The survey was conducted in three school districts in Bamako, two in Kayes, 
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two in Sikasso, two in Mopti/Sevare region, and one in Timbuktu.
242
  I selected school districts 
using Ministry of Education enrollment statistics disaggregated by school type to maximize 
potential variation on the primary independent variable- where children are enrolled in school.  
Neighborhoods, households, and individuals were selected at random using an online randomizer 
and Afro-barometer protocol.
243
  Interviews were conducted at various times of the day and 
evenings and on weekends in order to try to capture residents who were home at different times.    
All respondents were asked if they had children who were at least 7 years of age.
244
  If 
they had children, they were asked if their children had ever been enrolled in school, and if so, 
what school type (s).  Each respondent was asked their reason(s) for enrolling their child(ren)  in 
each relevant school, evaluations of schools, and their general attitudes toward the Malian 
education system.  In my sample, 694 respondents reported having at least one child seven years 
of age or older.
245
   Of parents with children who attend/attended school
246
:  442 respondents had 
children who attend/attended public school, 179 had children who attend/attended private, 
secular school, 91 had children who attend/attended madrassa, 58 had children at community I 
                                                          
242
 I originally intended to conduct surveys in two districts in Timbuktu, but due to insecurity in the region 
we were only able to conduct surveys in Timbuktu city. 
243
 Once school districts were selected, I drew quadrants on the map of the accessible areas of the school 
district and selected quadrants at random.  Survey teams started in the middle of the quadrants and 
interviewed respondents at every fifth house.  Once inside a compound, all residents over 18 were asked 
to pull a playing card and the respondent with the highest number was selected for the interview.  We did 
not alternate between gender and thus have a slightly higher sample of women in our sample. 
244
 Most Malian children are enrolled in school by this age; this is also the age needed to enter Malian 
public school. 
245
  The question tries to generate information about children in school as well as those who had already 
gone through school, but in some instances respondents only gave information for children still living in 
their households.   In some instances respondents would reference extended family as their own: parents 
with grown children spoke regarding the experience of grandchildren or aunts and uncles would answer 
the questions for any school aged child living in the household even if s/he was a nephew rather than a 
son. 
246
 This number captures parents who had children who went through the educational system and those 
with children currently enrolled.  Some of these parents are counted twice as they have children enrolled 
in multiple schools. 
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purposefully targeted zones with different types of schools, but as a result my sample has a 
strong urban/peri-urban bias: only 20% of respondents live in rural zones and therefore the 
percentage of respondents enrolling their children in community schools and of parents not 
enrolling a child in any school is below the national average.   My sample also captures older 
respondents with children who attended school in the earlier decades in order to capture not just 
those parents who are benefitting from a state service, but also those parents who previously 
benefitted from state services. 
5.8 Public Schooling Consumers 
Using my survey data, I divide all citizens into two dummy groups: those with children 
who attend/attended public school and those who do not.
247
  The second category includes those 
parents who send their children to “other schools” such as community schools, madrassas, and 
private, Francophone schools, as well as those citizens who do not have school-aged children and 
those who do not have their children enrolled in school at all.
248
 To test hypothesis H1, I needed 
to determine if public school parents are more likely to engage with the government than other 
types of citizens.  I measure engagement through a series of dichotomous dependent variables 
that measure government documentation including whether or not the respondent has a birth 
certificate, national id, and voting card as well as political engagement: whether the respondent 
voted or campaigned in the 2007 presidential election, whether or not they identify with a party, 
whether or not they would run for office, and whether or not they have contacted a government 
official. 
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 I use dummies because a large number of parents have children who attend multiple school types and 
in comparing school type dummies certain parents (with children in multiple schools would fall out).   
248
The first category includes parents who have children enrolled exclusively at public school as well as 
those parents who have children enrolled in public school and other school types. 
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I regress each of the dichotomous variables on the public school dummy and controls 
including age, educational level, gender, urban/rural, school district, associational membership 
and poverty index.
249
  I observe positive and significant relationship between public school 
parents and three of the dependent variables: having voting identification card, reporting voting, 
and reporting campaigning in the 2007 presidential election, but not for contacting a government 
official, willingness to run for office, partisan identification, or any of the other documentation 
variables.
250
  This suggests that public school enrollment affects a narrow range of electoral 
politics, but not citizens‟ general linkages to the state.251  As the previous chapter suggests, 
participation in two of the more difficult acts – willingness to run for office and contacting 
government officials – might be dependent on skill sets (like language) that merely sending your 
child to school could not provide.
252
  
I regress the three variables, voted in 2007, campaigning, and having a voter id, on 
whether a respondent enrolled a child in public without any of the controls.  I find that having the 
enrolling a child in public school‟s impact on voting in 2007 and having a voter identification 
card remains significantly and positive (p<.00), but that campaigning loses its significance has a 
negative coefficient in the bivariate regression.  I test for multicollinearity using a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) test, and again do not find signs of multicollinearity.  I run the regression 
dropping each control and I find that campaigning is only significant once controls for gender 
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 These are the same controls included in the previous chapter in addition to the respondents own 
educational level. 
250
 For other documents, birth certificate and national id, poverty is the only variable that appears to affect 
the likelihood that a citizen has these documents.   Since party allegiance is largely temporal in Mali, I am 
not concerned that parents with children in public schools could have a higher likelihood of reporting that 
they campaigned and that party ID is non-significant.   
251
 Pierre Englebert suggests that African government‟s weak sovereignty is pervasive and that all 
citizens, regardless of how invested they are in the state, have to engage with minimal bureaucracy to 
survive. 
252
 Identifying with a party is also not effected. This could mean that citizens‟ mobilization happens 
outside of party allegiance/party mobilization.  
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and age are included.  I know that both variables are negatively related to having reported 
campaigning in 2007.  I run interaction terms with each of the two variables and enrolling your 
child in public school, but neither interaction term is significant.   
Additionally, I run a link test to test for non-linear relationships, but do not find evidence 
of model misspecification for any of the models.  I also run a Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit 
test and do not find any signs indicating lack of fit for any of the models. 
Holding all other variables at their mean, if a citizen has a child enrolled in public school, 
there is an 18% increase in the predicted probability that she will have a voter id card.  The 
predicted effect is stronger than most of the control variables:  for instance, increasing a 
respondent‟s age by 10 years or increasing their degree of associational membership only 
increases the predicted probability of having a voter id by 5%.
253
  Increasing the respondent‟s 
education level is associated with a 3% increased predicted probability in having a voter 
identification card.  Finally being a woman only has a 10% decreased predicted probability.  
Having at least one child who was or is enrolled in public school can be interpreted as 
increasing the predicted probability of having reported voting in the 2007 presidential election by 
11% when holding all other variables at their mean.  The predicted effect of consuming 
government schooling services is larger than all of the other control variables except education. 
254
  Being a public school consumer increases the predicted probability of having participated in 
a campaign during the 2007 presidential election by 7%.  Level of education, gender, age, and 
                                                          
253
 I use Clarify (King) to calculate predicted probabilities. 
254
 For instance, increasing age of a respondent by ten years only increases the probability of having voted 
by 6%.  Increasing a respondent‟s level of education from one level to the next, for instance none to 
informal or informal to primary, translates into a 2% increase in the probability of voting; while going 
from no education to university education increases the probability of having voted by 13%.  Note that 
education is a continuous variable in this estimation since I already tested the effects of specific levels of 
education in the previous chapter. 
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associational membership are also significant.  This finding is somewhat surprising as I have 
theorized campaigning as a “more difficult” form of participation, which requires a certain 
degree of internal efficacy.  However, we might also conceptualize “the mobilized” participating 
in campaigns alongside those citizens who are “mobilizing” others. 
 
Table 13:Public School Consumers’ Political Participation as Compared to Other 
Citizens
255
 
 
Where Child Enrolled 
  Vote in 2007 Pres Election? 
 
Campaign in 2007 ? 
 
Voter Id Card? 
 
Public 
.53** 
(.17)` 
              .35* 
             (.18) 
 
  .82*** 
   (.18) 
 
Controls      
Education  
.11*                                                                    
(.06) 
                    .19*** 
                   (.06) 
     .13* 
    (.06) 
 
Woman  
-.20 
(.17) 
                   -.77*** 
                   (.17) 
    -.47** 
     (.17) 
 
Urban  
.17 
(.38) 
                     .54 
                   (.40) 
     -.26 
     (.37) 
 
Poverty  
 .02 
(.07) 
                   -.01 
                    (.07) 
     -.18* 
    ( .07) 
 
Age  
 .26*** 
(.06) 
                    -.12* 
                     (.06) 
      -.20** 
      (.06) 
 
Associational Membership  
.26** 
(.08) 
                    .35*** 
                   (.07) 
      .23** 
      (.08) 
 
Faladie  
-1.07** 
(-.36) 
               Reference Category      -2.16*** 
       (.38) 
 
Banconi  
-.43 
(.37) 
                   -.62 
                   (.35) 
     -1.48*** 
        (.39) 
 
Bamako Coura  
-.82* 
(.34) 
                   .14 
                  (.32) 
      -1.23** 
        (.41) 
 
Sikasso 1  
-1.37*** 
(.36) 
                -1.02** 
                  (.35) 
      -1.63*** 
        (.38) 
 
Sikasso 2  
-.18 
(.51) 
                   .05 
                 (.48) 
       -.52 
       (.54) 
 
Timbuktu  Reference Category 
                 -.14 
                  (.33) 
Reference Category  
Kayes Rive Droite  
-1.31*** 
(.37) 
                   .06 
                  (.35) 
       -1.17** 
          (.40) 
 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
- 1.20.*** 
(.34) 
                  -.18 
                  (.32) 
       -1.99*** 
         (.37) 
 
Mopti  
-.80* 
(.37) 
                   .10 
                  (.34) 
       -1.40*** 
        (.40) 
 
Sevare  
-.07 
(.57) 
                   .77 
                  (.54) 
        -.33 
       (.59) 
 
Constant   
.1    .10 
      (.54) 
                -1.37** 
                  (.54) 
     -1.11 
      (.56) 
 
McFadden‟s+/Pseudo R-squared   .09                   .08         .13  
Log Likelihood  -503.72             -504.10   -514.82  
Observations 859                914      910  
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 p<.05=*, p<.01=**, p<.001=*** 
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It is important to isolate the effect of sending a child to a public school compared to 
simply being a parent since the majority of parents send their students to public school and since 
age has a significant effect on all forms of participation.  In order to ensure that this distinction is 
a result of public schools, and not just having children in school, I repeat the regressions on a 
subpopulation of parents.  I drop all respondents who do not have school-aged children from the 
regression, so that the reference category only reflects those citizens who are currently parents.
256
  
I find the identical results on the relationship between public school parents and voting as with 
the previous regression, except that the effect of having children in public school is slightly 
stronger – estimated at increasing the probability of having voted by 12%.   I repeat the 
regression with whether or not the respondent has a voting card as a dependent variable, again 
with a restricted subpopulation of respondents with school-aged children and I find identical and 
again slightly magnified results. 
However, when I run the regression exclusively with parents with school aged children 
on whether or not a respondent campaigned as a dependent variable, the relationship between 
public school consumption and campaigning loses its significance.  Perhaps, schooling had a 
stronger effect on campaigning for older citizens, who had children at public school, and thus 
could benefit from their political brokerage, as compared to peers in their cohort.  Those parents 
with older children, who have already attended school, are more likely to benefit from their 
linguistic skills than parents with children in primary school – who have not yet achieved the 
level of literacy in order to be a competent linguistic broker.   
5. 9 Mechanisms 
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 This means that younger respondents as well as older respondents who no longer have school age 
children are excluded from the regression. 
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 As I suggested earlier, there are many ways that sending a child to public school might 
make parents more likely to vote. Since enrolling your child in school in urban and peri-urban 
districts is usually a choice between large numbers of competing schools, there is a concern that 
parents‟ preferences could drive both school choice and political participation.  The parents‟ 
political attitudes, acting as a confounding variable, could determine both enrollment and 
political behavior.  However, few parents interviewed claimed to enroll children in public school 
because it was their first preference.  The majority of parents enrolled their children in public 
schools due to reasons of practicality, 63% due to proximity and 14% due to affordability.
257
 
This finding partially offsets the possibility that students are enrolled there as part of a parent‟s 
larger political project.  These justifications are coupled with the fact that most Malians 
expressed a desire to enroll their child in private school if they had the means available.  The 
majority of choices appear to be driven by external constraints rather than a desire for state 
education, so there is less evidence that parents‟ preferences drive both school choice and 
ideology.
258
 
 If the experience of sending your child to public school is driving voting, then there are 
multiple reasons that this could be the case.  Below, I try to explore some of the potential ways 
that consuming a state service could make a citizen more likely to vote. These various pathways 
are not mutually exclusive, but I offer evidence for each mechanism that might determine 
participation behavior in some cases. 
 
 
 
                                                          
257
 These findings are consistent with MacLean 2007 and Boyle 1999 who find that finds that poorer 
citizens are “forced” into public services by financial constraints, well wealthier citizens use private 
services 
258
 I do not find evidence of a significant relationship between income and voting, which would rule out 
the possibility of poverty as a confounding variable for school enrollment and higher voting rate. 
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Table 14: Evidence of Potential Mechanisms?  
Mechanisms Observable 
Implication 1 
Observable 
Implication 2 
Observable 
Implication 3 
Possible? 
Legibility: Public 
schooling gives state 
increased 
visibility/legibility, 
prompting citizens to 
engage with it 
Should see positive 
correlation between 
public school 
consumers and all 
forms of 
documentation(No) 
Receipt of public 
schooling should 
have greater effect on 
parents with less 
education (No) 
 No 
Incentives and 
Resources: Parents 
with children at public 
school are more 
invested in 
government 
performance/ Parents 
with children in public 
school have greater 
social capital, 
connections to other 
citizens 
We should not 
observe heightened 
voting or 
campaigning from 
private school 
parents as compared 
to other citizens 
(Yes) 
Parents with children 
in public school have 
greater social capital, 
connections to other 
citizens (Yes) 
PTA members 
are more likely to 
vote and 
campaign (No) 
Maybe 
State capacity: Parents 
with children see state 
as more capable and 
are more willing to 
vote  
 
Those parents with 
better experience in 
school should be 
more likely to vote 
(No) 
Qualitative Data 
should suggest that 
parents think the state 
is putting a “good 
effort” into education 
provision (Yes) 
Public schooling 
consumers are 
more likely to 
say that 
government 
responds to 
citizen needs 
questions? 
(Yes) 
Maybe 
Interpretive: Parents 
with children in public 
school want to 
continue to act as 
“good citizens” 
See qualitative 
evidence that parents 
have positive 
associations of 
enrolling their 
children in school 
(Yes) 
Large Public 
Relations campaigns 
to promote the idea of 
schooling 
(Yes) 
 Yes 
Linguistic Broker: 
Children who attended 
public school bring 
Observe evidence of 
educated children as 
linguistic brokers, 
Focus group of 
university students 
said that educated 
Parents with 
children in non-
state francophone 
Yes 
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their parents into the 
political process 
helping parents to 
interact with 
“outsiders” (Yes)  
children bring 
candidates to rural 
areas for a 
campaign/provide 
parents with political 
info (Yes) 
schools should 
have higher rates 
of participation 
than other 
citizens 
(Yes) 
 
Legibility 
I found evidence for a series of mechanisms and I am only able to exclude the legibility 
argument.  If public schools made the government more legible to the population, we should 
have seen differences between public school consumers and others citizens on all forms of 
government documentation, but this is not the case.  I also ran an interaction to see if public 
school consumption had a greater effect on parents with less education, and who were therefore 
less likely to interact with the state themselves, but I did not find any significant results. 
Incentives and Resources 
I find evidence for the argument that public school parents are more invested in education 
due to the fact that they are stakeholders in government performance (incentives) and through the 
social capital resources provided by schooling communities (resources).  Public school 
enrollment might also bring parents into contact with other parents and thus increase their 
likelihood of being a member of an association as a proxy for increased social capital.  In order 
to test this mechanism, I create a dichotomous dependent variable for associational membership, 
which I have previously used as a control.
259
   I regress being a member in an organization on the 
dummy for “public school consumers” and the controls.  I find being a public school consumer is 
                                                          
259
 I dichotomize this value because I am less interested in the role that parents play in the organization (or 
their level of activity) than their involvement compared to a control category of no-involvement; I 
anticipate that responses of whether someone participated or not are more valid than their estimation of 
level of participation. Member=1 (I consolidate all three categories of associational members) and non-
member =0 
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positive and significantly (p<.01) correlated with being a member of an association. Holding all 
variables at their means, enrolling a child in public school creates a 12% increase in the predicted 
probability that a citizen is a member of an association.  This finding suggests that membership 
in a larger public school community could increase likelihood of joining an association, which in 
turn translates into social capital and willingness to turn out to the polls on election-day as 
associational membership is significant for all forms of political participation. To make sure that 
this socialization effect is not just a result of having a child at any school, I repeat the regression 
with dummies for parents with children in the two other most popular school types: madrassas 
and private schools.  However, I do not find a significant relationship between these schools and 
associational membership in either regression.  This correlation appears to be distinct to public 
school parents.  I included associational membership in my initial regression, so I know that 
public school consumption matters on its own.  However, this finding suggests that they may be 
voting more often as a result of some kind of social capital or maybe a certain type of group 
membership. I run a regression to see if PTA membership is correlated with greater political 
participation.  However, I do not find that membership is significant. Very few respondents 
reported being active members of parent teacher associations.  This implies that social 
capital/resource mechanism might work through more informal contact and association with 
other parents rather than a formal organization.  
State Capacity and Interpretive Effects 
I find evidence for both state capacity and the interpretive effects of public schooling 
consumption.  The policy feedback literature stresses that public policy efforts must be visible 
and legible in order to generate an effect on citizens (Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993).  
Harding and Stasavage argue that democratic governments in Africa employ visible, measurable 
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policies through free public schooling in order to earn electoral support (2011).  The provision of 
public schooling, even if school fees exist, offers governments a venue to demonstrate their 
capacity using the physical presence of schools.  Moving beyond infrastructure, it is possible that 
a citizen could evaluate the state based on the quality of their own experience with social service 
provision; this evaluation may also influence their decision to vote.  Joe Soss describes the 
impact of welfare programs on recipient‟s political learning and subsequent participation in the 
American context. 
To summarize, clients draw political lessons from their program experiences because 
welfare agencies are usually the most accessible and consequential government 
institution in their life. Welfare agencies are easily recognized as a part of government 
and have clear links to its other branches. For many clients, they serve as the most direct 
source of information about how government works (369).  
 
I run an additional test to see whether parents‟ positive evaluation of their children‟s 
experience is correlated with higher reported turnout to the polls.  I restrict the analysis to parents 
with children whom attend/attended public school. During the survey, parents were asked to 
evaluate their children‟s experience in each relevant school type on a scale of 0 (no quality) to 5 
(very good).
260
  I include a public school rating variable with the expectation that people who 
give public schools the highest rating will be even more likely to vote.  However, a high rating of 
a child‟s educational experience is not positively correlated with a higher predicted likelihood of 
voting.  In fact, rating has negative predicted effect on voting significant at the .1 level.  
Therefore, I do not find support for perceived school quality as a proxy for state capability - 
inducing parents to vote.   
There is the possibility that parents view the act of school construction, rather than the 
quality of content, as fulfilling the state‟s role and proving that it is a capable actor or that some 
                                                          
260
 I averaged the evaluations for parents with students in multiple public schools  
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parents are not capable of evaluating educational content.
261
  The median rating of public 
schooling was “good” despite that fact that many parents were critical of the public school 
system and talked about a pervasive educational crisis.  This suggests that parents are less aware 
of the actual content of what is being taught at school and therefore more likely to use visible 
infrastructure criteria, than the content of curriculum or quality of teacher performance. 
Figure 16: Public School Evaluations by Parents (N=442) 
 
Lauren MacLean adds a third dimension to the policy feedback framework that is useful 
in this analysis.  She argues that feedback is affected by the gap between popular expectations 
and actual implementation (2012: 21).  Contrary to her study of the more developed economies 
of Cote d‟Ivoire and Ghana, Malian parents had lower expectations for the state‟s role in 
education provision.  Parents spoke of the state efforts at education as „doing its best.‟  
Occasionally, when I followed up with questions about a perceived decline educational quality, 
public school parents defended the state by saying: „well, you can‟t possibly do both (quality and 
access); the state has really put tremendous focus on access.‟  In the Malian case, policy 
                                                          
261 In instances when parents did evaluate individual schools, they often based their evaluation on their 
child‟s rank in the classroom and/or whether the child had passed standardized exams. 
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feedback may be triggered by positive assessment of the government‟s efforts as proof of its 
capacity. 
In order to test the state capacity argument further, I used another Afrobarometer question 
that surveys respondents‟ evaluations of government performance: “Does the Malian state 
respond to citizens needs?”  If receipt of public education leads to a evaluation of state capacity, 
then respondents who have children who attend/attended public school should rate the state at a 
higher capacity than other citizens.  To evaluate this hypothesis, I create a binary dependent 
variable: good evaluation and bad evaluation.
262
  I regress the evaluation on the control variables: 
living in a rural area, being a woman, age, poverty, education level, and whether or not someone 
had a child enrolled in public school.  I find that having a child who attend/attended public 
school is positive and significantly (p<.05) correlated with a “good evaluation” of the state 
responses to citizens‟ needs.  In fact, it increases the predicted probability that respondents would 
give a good evaluation by 8%.  However, when I include regional controls, public school 
consumers‟ remain positive, but the significance drops down to .1.  These findings offer tentative 
support for the state capacity argument. 
I also observe interpretive effects of social service receipt on citizenship.  The 
government, under Konare, as well as donors embarked on nation-wide educational sensitization 
campaigns.  Most Malians know that schooling is a good thing that the government supports.  In 
addition to proving state capacity, enrolling your child in public school might reinforce the 
recipient‟s identity as a good citizen. Just as American citizens who receive a “positive” social 
service from the state, Malians who have access to education – as a positive government 
distribution program, might have reinforced identity as good citizens.  This identity could bring 
                                                          
262
 Ratings of 0, 1, and 2 were consolidated as a negative rating; ratings of three (OK) and up were rated 
as positive evaluations. 
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them to vote at the polls.  As I discussed in Chapter 2,  our exit polling during the 2009 
municipal elections revealed that  voting citizens‟ primary justification for coming out to the 
polls was because of “a patriotic duty.” 
Finally, I find some evidence that linguistic broker mechanism increases participation.  If 
participation was inducted by a child‟s acquisition of linguistic skills, then we should see that 
private school parents, who also benefit from having children in French school, are also more 
likely to participate than other citizens.  I test a dummy of “private school parents” and I do not 
find a significant effect on voting or campaigning. However, if I drop public school parents from 
the reference category and compare private school parents to all other citizens, having a child 
enrolled in private school becomes positively and significantly correlated with having voted 
(p<.01) in 2007 and having a voter identification card (p<.05).    This suggests that private 
school parents may also be pulled into the electoral system by their children. 
Additionally, I found qualitative evidence that citizens are pulled into political campaigns 
and the voting booths by their educated children.  I ran a small focus group in Bamako in the 
spring of 2011 with a group of university students from regions outside the capital to determine 
how their grandmothers, uncles, parents, and neighbors back in the village access political 
information and or get involved in politics.  Their response was nearly unanimous: their educated 
children tell them how to vote.  More concretely, students and former-students in Bamako 
participate in campaigns as brokers for political parties.  They act as guides - introducing 
candidates and party representatives to traditional leadership in the village.  These findings 
suggest that, at least in rural areas, educated children play a role in bringing their parents into the 
political arena.  However, this mechanism would benefit not only public school parents, but any 
parent whose child receives a French language education. 
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All of the mechanisms support the idea that the expansion of public primary education 
has created democratic returns in a secondary way: by fostering the participation of parents in the 
political arena.   In the face of widespread skepticism, public school parents are making a choice 
to vote.  The implications for liberalization are mixed.   If the linguistic brokerage element is 
playing the strongest causal role – then liberalization to include other Francophone schools is 
also benefitting Malian democracy. However, if the increased participation is a result of greater 
civic identity associated with the receipt of a good social service, greater interest/investment in 
government performance, and/or greater belief as the state as a capable actor, then a premium 
should be placed on public provision and/or expanding the visibility of the state‟s role in private 
provision. 
5.10 Islamic Schooling Consumers 
Our surveys revealed that only forty-two parents had their children enrolled in Koranic 
schools.  Due to the nature of the survey design, I think that enrollment in these schools was 
underreported in instances where parents enrolled their child in Koranic schools to supplement 
other forms of education.  The survey asked if the child was enrolled in school and went on to 
code the school types.  Parents were only prompted with a second question: but does your child 
go to any informal or Islamic schooling if they replied that the child was not enrolled elsewhere?  
Koranic schools are less expensive than other school types since the children generate the fees 
themselves by begging. Many of the parents who send their children to Koranic schools are from 
rural areas that do not have access to other types of educational infrastructure and/or the means 
to pursue other types of education. 
Parents who enroll their children in madrassas come from a wider socioeconomic 
spectrum. In the sample, ninety-two parents reported sending their children a madrassa; although 
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only a third of these parents exclusively enroll their children in Islamic schools.   However, the 
two types of Islamic schooling are very distinct and have a history of contention as madrassas 
were explicitly built to offer a modern alternative to local, hierarchical Koranic education.  It 
does not make theoretical sense to combine the two types of schooling into one category since 
they cater to different groups and due to socioeconomic differences of their consumers.  
Therefore, I decide to test each hypothesis with two different categories of parents: those who 
send their children to Koranic schools and those that send their children to madrassas.  
In order to test the hypothesis 2, I create two dummies for Islamic schooling: one for 
those with a child who attends/attended a madrassa and a second dummy for parents whose 
children attend/attended a Koranic school and other citizens.
263
 I regress the dichotomous 
outcome variables for government documentation (whether or not they have a birth certificate, 
identification card, or voting card) and political participation (party identification, campaigning, 
voting, willingness to run for office, and contacting a government official) on each Islamic 
schooling dummy and the controls.  This allows me to compare parents with children in 
madrassas (or Koranic schools) to a reference category of all those citizens who do not have a 
child enrolled in these school types. 
I find that having a child enrolled in madrassa had no significant effect on the likelihood 
that a parent has any government document.  Having a child in a Koranic school was 
significantly correlated with a lower predicted probability of having a birth certificate, but this 
was the only significant difference.  This finding suggests, consistent with Englebert‟s argument, 
that even communities that prefer to operate outside the realm of the secular state are not 
                                                          
263
 The category of citizens who have a child in an Islamic school includes those parents who have other 
children in other school types. The category of other citizens includes parent with children in non-Islamic 
schools as well as non-parents. Again, due to the prevalence of parents enrolling their children in multiple 
school types, I wanted to create exclusive categories through the creation of this kind of dummy. 
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completely isolated from it.  In order to function in Malian society, one still needs to pursue 
government documentation – no matter what your religious or schooling preferences are.  We 
often associate madrassa consumers with traders and reformist Islamist movements, but these 
findings curtail suspicions of separatism, but rather suggest a willingness to engage with the state 
as necessary. 
As demonstrated in Table 15 below, having a child attend a madrassa is correlated with a 
lower predicted likelihood that a citizen reports voting as compared to other respondents.  
Additionally, enrolling a child in a madrassa negatively correlated with campaigning and 
significant at the .1 level.
 264
  However, there is no significant difference between Islamic 
schooling consumers and other citizens for any of the other participation variables.  I do not find 
any significant results comparing parents with children at Koranic schools to all other citizens.  
This may be in part because of large number of parents with students enrolled in Koranic schools 
simultaneously  as they attend public, private schools or madrassas who did not report having a 
child in Koranic school. 
If a parent has a child enrolled in a madrassa there is a 13% lower predicted probability 
that she reported voting in the 2007 presidential elections.  There is no significant relationship 
between sending your child to a madrassa and any of the other participation or documentation 
variables except campaigning as mentioned above (p<.1).    These findings suggest that receipt 
of services from Islamic providers is only negatively correlated with participation in the narrow 
range of electoral politics.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
264
 If I combine madrassa and Koranic parents, the campaign variable is negative and significant. 
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Table 15: Madrassa Consumers’ Participation Compared to Other Citizens265 
 
 
Where Child Enrolled 
 Voted in 2007 Pres Elections     
 
Campaigned in 2007 Pres Elections 
 
Madrassa 
-.55** 
(.26) 
     - .59 
      (.33) 
 
Controls     
Education  
.08 
(..05) 
        .17** 
      (.06) 
 
Woman  
-.05 
(.17) 
      -.67*** 
       (.17) 
 
Urban  
.29 
(.38) 
         .73 
       (.41) 
 
Poverty  
 .02 
(.07) 
       -.01 
        (.07) 
 
Age  
 .33*** 
(.06) 
       -.07 
       (.06) 
 
Associational Membership  
.26** 
(.08) 
         .36*** 
       (.07) 
 
Faladie  
-1.22** 
(..36) 
        .04 
       (.38) 
 
Banconi  
-.55 
(.37) 
         .22 
       (.33) 
 
Bamako Coura  
-.89* 
(.38) 
       -.48 
       (.36) 
 
Sikasso 1  
-1.38*** 
(.35) 
       -.84* 
       (.36) 
 
Sikasso 2  
-.11 
(.51) 
        .41 
      (.50) 
 
Timbuktu  Reference Category 
Reference Category  
Kayes Rive Droite  
-1.31*** 
(.37) 
       .22 
      (.36) 
 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
- 1.23.*** 
(.34) 
      -.05 
      (.33) 
 
Mopti  
-.90* 
(.36) 
      .19 
     (.33) 
 
Sevare  
-.07 
(.57) 
     1.04 
     (.56) 
 
Constant  
   .13 
   (.54) 
    -1.60** 
     (.55) 
 
McFadden‟s+/Pseudo R-squared       .09       .08  
Log Likelihood 
N 
 
-513.56 
 871 
-507.87 
  921 
 
 
I run an additional regression excluding any parents who sent their children to public 
school from the reference category.  Since the previous regression showed that there is a positive 
correlation between public school parents and voting, I want to ensure that their presence in the 
reference category is artificially inflating the negative relationship between madrassa consumers 
and voting.   I find that when comparing madrassa parents to citizens with no children, citizens 
with children in private school, community, or Koranic schools, and citizens without children 
                                                          
265
 p<.05=*, p<.01=**, p<.001=*** 
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enrolled in school, being a madrassa consumers is still significantly and negatively correlated 
with a lower likelihood of voting (p<.005).
266
  In addition, as with the previous regressions, I ran 
the link test, VIF tests for multicollinearity, and Hosmer-Lemeshow test for goodness of fit and 
none of the tests indicate problems with either multicollinearity or model specification. 
These findings suggest that receipt of services from Islamic providers specifically affects 
participation in the narrow range of electoral politics.    I run additional regressions to see if 
school choice affects willingness to contact government officials.  I find that receipt of Islamic 
social services is not correlated with a decreased likelihood of contacting a government official.  
I ran a second regression to see how sending you child to a religious school might heighten the 
likelihood of contacting a religious leader, but I did not find any significant relationship.  
Additionally sending your child to a madrassa does not have significant relationship with 
probability of being in a religious organization.  These results suggest that there is not a divisive 
counter-culture emerging, but rather that the receipt of social service has a particular correlation 
with electoral participation. 
5.11 Mechanisms 
The regressions suggest that parents with children enrolled in Islamic schools are less 
likely to report voting or campaigning. Since the majority of parents report enrolling their 
children in madrassas for religious reasons, ideology could be a determining force of both 
enrollment and political behavior.  We do not know if patterns of participation are an actual 
result of the receipt of schooling or an underlying characteristic which determines parents‟ 
school preference and their non-participation.  In the chart below, I try to create a list of 
observable implications for each causal path: A. Islamic schools generate allegiance to non-
                                                          
266
 Note that when I drop “public school parents,” I also drop those madrassa consumers who have  a 
child simultaneously enrolled in public school. 
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secular authority → less political participation or B. Parents who chose Islamic schools are also 
predisposed to participate less in politics.  I find evidence for both causal pathways. 
Table 16: Observable Implications for Potential Causal Mechanisms 
Observable Implications of 
Mechanisms 
A: Receipt of Schooling 
Affects Participation 
B. Self selection Bias (Parents who 
choose Islamic schools also less likely 
to participate) 
Does public schooling affect 
participation? 
Parents who have other 
children at public school 
will be more likely to vote.  
(Yes) 
No difference between parents with 
diverse educational profiles and those 
who use Islamic schools exclusively. 
(No) 
Gender difference in turnout? Parents with children at 
school should be equally 
affected by educational 
provision.  (No) 
Since male members of the household 
make educational choices, fathers with 
children at Islamic schools should be 
less likely to participate than mothers 
with children at Islamic schools. (Yes) 
Different participation patterns 
from those enrolling for 
“ideological vs. non-ideological 
reasons” 
The reason for enrollment 
should not affect turnout 
within the subpopulation. 
(Yes) 
Those parents, who enroll for 
ideological reasons, should be less 
likely to vote than parents enrolling 
children for other reasons (No). 
 
In looking at the distinct sub-population of parents who send their children to Islamic 
schools, I wanted to explore if there are differences among citizens who also send their children 
to public school and those who send their children exclusively to madrassas.  If parents who also 
have children at public school are more likely to vote, it suggests that the schooling experience 
itself matters.  The qualitative data presented in Chapter 3 suggests that many parents enroll their 
children in public schools for non-ideological or non-strategic reasons such as cost, friend‟s 
recommendation, or proximity.  I restrict my analysis to a population of madrassa consumers, 
and regress voting in 2007 on my controls and variable of interest, on whether the respondent 
also had a child enrolled in public school.  Having a child enrolled in public school has a positive 
and significant (.p<.05) predicted effect on voting.   Within the subpopulation of madrassa 
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consumers, holding all other variables at their mean, enrolling a child in a public school, 
increases the predicted probability that a parent will vote by 40%. 
These findings suggest that the integration of “religious” parents into the public school system 
might have beneficial effects on their political participation and that political behavior may be 
malleable.  If schooling does affect allegiance, the findings suggest that the receipt of state social 
services can induce citizens to vote- even among populations that also receive religious 
schooling. 
Next, I explore the differences between male and female respondents within the sub-
population of respondents with children at Islamic schools.  Since men make schooling choices 
for the household, if ideological predispositions determine both schooling choices and political 
behavior, we would expect to see a lower likelihood of voting from men than women. I regress 
the gender and the other control variables on reported voting in 2007.  In this subpopulation, 
being a woman (p<.01) is positive and significant correlation with voting. The coefficient can be 
interpreted to mean that holding all other variables at their constants, being a woman increases 
the predicted probability of having voted by 53%.
267
  This finding is particularly interesting 
because being female is generally negatively correlated with all forms of participation.
268
 These 
findings confirm the opposite path of causation.  However, these results should be interpreted 
with caution as women‟s responses may be subject to higher levels of conformity bias. 
Finally, I compare parents who send their children to madrassas for ideological reasons as 
compared to those parents who stated sending their children to madrassas for practical reasons.  
If those parents who send their children to madrassas for ideological reasons have lower 
predicted likelihood of voting than parents who enroll for practical reasons, it suggests that prior 
                                                          
267
 In the general population, being a woman is negative, but not significantly correlated to voting 
behavior. 
268
 Associational membership, usually correlated with voting, is not significant for this subpopulation. 
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ideology, rather than experience as a madrassa consumer, is probably playing the strongest role 
in determining voting behavior.  I do not find evidence to support this implication. There is a 
positive, but insignificant correlation between ideology and voting.  I run a simple correlation 
test to see if the relationship is negative for a subpopulation of men – those we know to be 
responsible for schooling decisions, however,  I find a weak (less than .2) correlation between 
ideology and voting.   
The observable implications of these causal pathways are inconclusive as I have evidence 
for different mechanisms.  However, the fact that sending your child is negatively correlated to 
voting is an important descriptive contribution on its own.  Though many have studied specific 
Islamic communities in West Africa, this is the first study to demonstrate different patterns of 
participation by different social service consumers. 
5.12 Additional Data: Bamako Municipal Election Exit Polling 2009 
Since all participation behavior data from survey is self reported, we have no way of 
knowing if correlations with participation represent actual behavior or just how respondents want 
to present themselves.  If public school parents know that “good citizens vote” then they might 
want to over-represent that behavior.  Similarly, if there is a stigma against voting for members 
of certain religious communities, then they might want to downplay their own electoral 
participation.   
To complement reported participation data, I collected exit poll data on the school 
enrollment patterns of voters during the 2009 Municipal Elections in three school districts in 
Bamako.  All school districts were located in zones near where we conducted our surveys to 
capture potential variation on schooling experiences. I organized three teams of threes to stand 
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outside a large polling station (usually a public school) in each of the districts.
269
 Each team was 
composed of three members, primarily university students and recent graduates, who were tasked 
with interviewing every third person who exited from the polls.  The teams all conducted their 
polling from the time when polls opened at 8 am until they had collected 150 total responses.  
Therefore there is a potential for bias towards a subpopulation of early voters as compared to 
voters who come later in the day. 
If the survey data are correct, we should see a large number of public school parents at 
the polls as compared to a much smaller percentage of parents who enroll their children in 
madrassas. Figure 17 shows where most voters enroll their children in the three different polling 
stations (Banconi, Bamako Coura, and Faladie). However, it is also important to remember that 
Bamako, as the urban capital, may not be representative of national trends.  For instance, while 
age is generally correlated with people stating that they have voted, note the large number of 
respondents from the exit polls claim that they do not have children or school aged children.  It 
may be that mobilization in Bamako targets youth at a higher rate than in other regions.  
However, I have no reason to suspect that the mechanisms would be different in Bamako than 
elsewhere in the country.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
269
 Polling stations selected were among the largest and most popular to capture the greatest amount of 
voter flow. 
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Figure 17: Where Voters in 2009 Municipal Elections Enroll their Children 
 
Of the people with children, we see the largest turnout from those people with children in public 
and private school.  Interestingly, quite a few voters – almost 5% in two of the polling stations - 
claimed to have children not enrolled in any school type.  This is substantially higher than what 
we found in our surveys and could suggest either that a). poor voters have higher than average 
turnout or b). survey respondents underreported the number of children who were not in school.  
Participation by the most economically marginalized actors raises concerns about vote-buying, 
cooptation, or other short-term threats and incentives.   
Previously, I ran a regression that compared parents of children in private schools to 
other citizens and did not find a significant relationship with any form of political participation.  
The exit poll data suggests at a minimum that in Bamako, private school parents are still 
engaging with the electoral political process and suggests evidence of the linguistic broker 
mechanism. 
Again, it is important to note that these data are only from Bamako and were taken during 
the municipal elections, while the survey references the presidential elections of 2007.  
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Municipal elections, often described as “elections of proximity,” might offer greater incentives 
for madrassa consumers to be involved in that a family member or neighbor might be running 
and election and encourage him or her to come out to the poll.  In presidential elections, where 
contenders are foreign and generally secular, Western-educated elites, madrassa consumers 
would have a lower likelihood of an allegiance that would overcome societal stigma about 
voting. 
5. 13 Implications 
These findings suggest that government social services, such as public education, provide 
the state with a tool to connect with their citizenry and encourage participation in electoral 
institutions.  The last chapter demonstrated how the educational expansion of the democratic era 
has benefitted citizens by increasing their political knowledge, and to some degree, fostering 
political participation.  These findings suggest that expanding state education provision has 
created an additional benefit – it has helped connect parents to the state and the democratic 
system by demonstrating state capacity and increasing citizenship identity.  Furthermore, by 
increasing the number of children who make it into secondary or university schooling, policy 
changes endow families with linguistic brokers.  Despite concerns mass concerns about school 
quality, most parents with a child in a public school rated that education as “good” and seemed 
content with the state‟s efforts to provide public education.  Unlike many countries in West 
Africa, the Malian government has not made steps to eliminate school fees.
270
  This suggests that 
the mere provision of the good itself, rather than quality or a complete subsidy, is might enough 
to build credibility for the state in the Malian context.   
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This finding also cautiously warns against complete liberalization of the educational 
sector. It appears that a tangible connection between a citizen and a public service benefits the 
democratic system, thus we need to consider this additional factor when deciding how much of 
the educational system should be privatized.  However, Francophone private schools can also 
contribute to the integration of citizens in that they can endow students with French language 
skills necessary for linguistic brokers who can help integrate their parents into politics.  These 
skills would be most valuable for parents who are illiterate and therefore, most likely benefit 
children who are attending public school, but perhaps also more affluent Malians who are Arabic 
language educated and/or never learned French themselves.  The exit polls in Bamako revealed 
that private school parents do not appear to be dissuaded from voting. 
The second finding, that madrassa consumers vote less, highlights important distinctions 
between sub-populations of service consumers in Mali and challenges for their integration into 
national politics.  I have identified a negative correlation between Islamic schooling consumers 
and participation in elections – through voting or campaigning.  My initial attempts to adjudicate 
endogenity concerns are inconclusive.  However, while some parents might chose to abstain 
from politics prior to their enrollment decisions I have found some evidence that the schooling 
experience itself deters parents from voting.  The finding that receipt of public schooling remains 
positive and significant for voting for the subpopulation of Islamic schooling consumers also 
suggests a potential pathway for this group‟s integration through a gradual process as more of 
these families are willing to enroll their children in secular, public schools. 
While, questions of endogenity remain, it is important to demonstrate that this sub-group 
has distinct political behavior patterns and that those parents who are also integrated into the 
larger public school community are more willing to get involved in elections.  Further research 
 
 
202 
 
needs to be done to determine the exact path of causation and the effects of schools themselves.  
However, the finding that Islamic schooling consumers, as a distinct subpopulation, are less 
inclined to participate in electoral politics is important.  If these populations can mobilize 
effectively through contentious politics, then perhaps Malian politics can continue in its current 
trajectory with two distinct spheres of authority.  However, if these populations begin to feel 
marginalized in formal politics and chose to withdraw completely from political endeavors, then 
Mali‟s democratic society with not benefit from the voice or participation of a significant 
subpopulation with the risk of fragmenting and estranging this population. 
Perhaps people sending their children to Islamic schools might be willing to participate in 
elections if the electoral landscape included some of “their candidates,” who reflect their values 
and backgrounds.  The Malian state‟s accreditation of madrassas creates the possibility of the 
emergence of “Islamic” candidates with state diplomas.  Since most parents who send their 
children to Islamic spheres appear integrated, rather than isolated, from other citizens, I think 
that possibility of their incorporation into an electoral system with more conservative candidates 
is high.  Those existing candidates who have attempted to run on an “Islamic” platform, such 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita‟s presidential run in 2002, were not credible because they come from an 
elite Francophone background.  The resilience of French as the language of formal politics raises 
significant questions about the future of Islamic education in the democratization process. 
Madrassa education has gained notoriety after its endorsement by the government and with the 
rising popularity of Arabic as a cosmopolitan language.   However until Arabic is given status as 
a national language, the acquisition of the French language appears to be a pre-requisite for 
madrassa-educated who want to get involved in politics. 
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Chapter 6:  
Education and Citizenship in Africa 
6.1 Introduction 
I selected education as the “practical lens” through which I would explore contemporary 
African democratic politics, while working on a USAID-funded girls‟ scholarship program.   
During three years collaborating with twenty NGOs to distribute thousands of primary school 
scholarships to girls in Central and Southern Africa, I was exposed to a range of political systems 
in flux.  A decade after third wave transitions, countries and institutions were evolving at 
different rates: despite regular elections Bongo still ruled Gabon as his personal fiefdom, while 
other countries like Madagascar, Mozambique, and Namibia were experiencing their first 
alternations in power.  However, at the village level - in the context of poverty and local 
government bureaucracy, the distinction between electoral democracies and closed regimes 
collapsed into a murky blur.  Conversations about social service provision, tax rates, and 
unaccountable government institutions made me reflect on what democracy or governance 
actually means in the quotidian level.  In most of these hybrid regimes, there was a sense that 
institutions were shifting and citizens were negotiating their own opportunities for political 
involvement.  Village chiefs, former educators, taxi drivers, and homemakers prompted me to 
think long and hard about what “democracy” means to everyday African citizens.   
Across all of these countries, I was dumbfounded by the ability of a small public school 
scholarship, comprising of school fees, supplies, a uniform, and/or a kerosene lamp, to change 
the trajectory of a girl‟s life.   I was doubly struck by how deeply parents cared about these 
educational opportunities as a key to both social mobility and “complete” citizenship. To many 
of these parents, or grandparents, the African state seemed far out of reach, an alien institution 
reserved for the privileged, educated elite.  Their hopes and dreams for their daughters and 
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granddaughters culminated in their abilities to navigate and profit from state institutions.  The 
girls, many proudly speaking a colonial language that was unintelligible to their families, 
radiated a hope that through education anything was possible.  
I started graduate school with these images fresh in my mind and decided to explore the 
micro-dynamics of democracy, education, and citizenship in a country that experienced the most 
extreme educational changes post-transition - Mali.  Through donor-funded programs, like the 
one I had worked on, and the liberalization of the education sector, the government was able to 
expand gross primary enrollment from less than 30% prior to the democratic transition to almost 
80% less than 20 years later.   Theoretically, I expected that education mattered for democracy, 
citizenship, and state-building, but my fieldwork revealed that its impact is far more lasting and 
profound than I anticipated.   I found that educational expansion aids democratic transformation 
and state-building in three important ways: by improving students‟ cognitive ability to process 
political information, by endowing students with the language of state bureaucracy, thus 
increasing their perceived internal  efficacy, and in building connections with parents through 
social service provision. 
6.2 The Democratic Benefits of Educational Expansion 
Mali is not the only county to make significant gains in primary school enrollment in the 
last twenty years.  Primary school net enrollment has increased in Sub Saharan Africa from 56% 
in 1999 to 70% in 2007.
271
  The expansion was driven by multiple factors including citizen 
demand as well as donors‟ universal access agenda through programs such as the Education for 
All Campaign and the Millennium Development Goals. Historically, Francophone countries lag 
behind their Anglophone counterparts and represent some of the largest gains in enrollment in 
the recent era.  Figure 18 below shows increases in enrollment between 1990-1998.  While 
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Mali‟s increases are the largest, we observe similar increases in the other two democratic 
frontrunners – Senegal and Benin. 
Figure 18: Educational Expansion in Neighboring Francophone “Democracies” 1990-
1998
272
 
 
 
My findings have demonstrated that education helps citizens to learn about politics by 
increasing their cognitive capacity and internal efficacy.  Citizens with greater levels of 
education, even informal education, were able to answer questions about politics more accurately 
than those with no education at all.  I did not find significant differences across school types at 
the primary or informal levels of education.  This is a sharp departure from the way that we 
typically imagine schools contributing to state-building – as communal institutions teaching and 
reinforcing the importance of democratic or nationalist institutions.  Instead, African schools 
have created better democratic citizens by heightening individuals‟ ability to process and 
evaluate political information. This is not to say that Malian schools could not benefit from civic 
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education curriculum, but the progress that has been made to date is a result of increases in 
individual capacities as citizens. 
Qualitative data from the surveys revealed a remarkable skepticism about politics and 
citizens‟ sense of alienation from the process.  Education offers citizens an opportunity to 
increase their ability to understand politics, and despite an environment of low external efficacy, 
empowers them to feel like democratic agents. Educated citizens‟ increased cognitive skills and 
internal efficacy could reduces their dependence on political parties holds in the African context, 
education may prove a powerful tool to off-set short-term incentives and issue-framing offered 
by political entrepreneurs.  Cognitive skills and internal efficacy lay the foundation for informed 
political participation as democratic agents.  
I did not find there to be a significant difference in the political knowledge of those 
students who attended Islamic schools, public schools, or Francophone private school.   At the 
primary school level, I found that a madrassa prepares a democratic citizen as well as a public 
school.  I even found that citizens with a Koranic education or literacy training were on average 
better informed about politics than their peers with no education.  From a policy perspective, my 
findings suggest that the expansion of education through privatization has increased prospects of 
democratic deepening in Mali, as it has increased the number of children who are attending 
school and the number of learners that are continuing to secondary and university education. 
These changes happened without explicit democratic curriculum; the positive relationship 
between education, knowledge, and participation is not linked to the specifics of what occurred 
in Malian classrooms.  Therefore, these lessons from Mali should transfer to other countries that 
experienced a comparable expansion after a democratic transition.
273
 I would hypothesize that 
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any and all educational expansion in Africa increased population‟s political knowledge and 
internal efficacy among students in the same ways. 
Education, especially at the secondary and tertiary level, helps citizens participate in 
more “difficult” forms of participation including campaigning, willingness to run for office, and 
contacting a government official by endowing them with French language skills. Qualitative data 
revealed that citizens‟ continue to revere the French language fluency as a critical characteristic 
of citizens who are fully empowered.  Secondary and tertiary education had no effect on voting 
or party identification, but those citizens with informal or primary education were more likely 
than their uneducated peers to report doing both.  Since I was not able to reject the null for the 
highest forms of education (that educated respondents were more likely to report voting the 
citizens with no education), it is possible that education might have a ceiling effect on easier 
forms of participation like voting and campaigning after primary school.  Highly educated 
Malians might be too cynical about those running for office or too busy to become involved in 
the electoral process.  This suggests that with post-democratic educational expansion at the 
primary level, we might see an increase in electoral participation by citizens who have enough 
education to increase their internal efficacy and willingness to engage with politics at the ballot 
box.   If educated citizens are more active participants in politics, and African democracies spend 
more on primary education than non-democracies due to mass demands (Stasavage 2005), we 
can imagine a generative cycle in which a greater number of citizens are educated and thus more 
supportive of the democracy as the governing system.   
The most recent wave of educational expansion has focused primarily on young girls.  
This study, as well as much of the secondary literature on Africa, has shown that women are less 
knowledgeable and less likely to participate in politics (Logan 2010; Kuenzi and Lambright 
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2005).  Since the increases in access and enrollment have targeted women, we might interpret the 
story of greater educational access as being a story about laying the foundations for girls‟ 
political empowerment.  This study has shown how education instructs and empowers citizens, 
including women, to become engaged in politics.  If a larger subset of girls is able to be 
educated, this bodes well for their ability to participate and to be represented in democracy.  
Mali‟s first female Prime Minister took office in the spring 2011 – setting an example for future 
generations of educated Malian girls.    However, there is still a very long way to go for most 
African girls as many cultural and economic barriers to school completion remain.   As of 2005, 
only 46 per cent of girls who were enrolled in school in sub-Saharan Africa were able to 
complete primary school (Oxfam 2005).  Given the importance of secondary and tertiary 
education for empowerment as a complete citizen, it is imperative that programs continue to 
focus on girls‟ retention and completion in order to for them to achieve the skills and self-
confidence of “complete citizens.” 
6.3 Social Services as a Medium to Connect Citizens to the State 
 Students of public policy have shown us that policy can impact the ways that citizens 
view and engage with government.  In the edited volume Public Policy for Democracy, the 
editors argue for the importance of looking past questions of efficiency or how citizens shape 
policy, but instead the effects of the reverse process of how policies shape citizens. In his 
contribution Marc Landy writes: 
Policies also constitute a teaching: they instruct the public about the aims of government 
and the rights and responsibilities of citizens.  These scholars have enriched public 
discourse by reintroducing and legitimizing words like character, civic virtue, public 
spiritedness, and deliberation.  This essay seeks to illuminate further nature of the 
relationship between policy and polity by focusing specifically upon the effects of policy 
on citizenship (1993: 19). 
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There is an emerging literature on the affect of conditional cash transfers on retrospective voting 
and citizenship.  Ana De La O Torres‟ experimental work on conditional cash transfers suggests 
that they can improve turnout as well as incumbent vote share in Mexico.
274
 Cesar Zucco‟s 
analysis of cash transfers in 2006 Brazilian elections also demonstrate that voters benefitting 
from programs reward incumbents (2011).  Radical changes in welfare policy in Africa could 
potentially impact African citizens‟ relationship with their government.   
In the same vein of research, this study has shown the education expansion can affect 
democratization in an unexpected way: through a policy feedback mechanism.  I have identified 
a few different mechanisms that link public schooling consumers with electoral politics by  
fostering connections to stakeholders that rely on its services through increased sense of civic 
identity earned as recipients of a “good social service,” through greater perceived state 
capability, greater incentives and resources, or because of their children‟s newly gained skills as 
linguistic brokers. Each mechanism has dramatically different policy implications and therefore 
further research should identify when and how each of these mechanisms is at play.   
If being a public stakeholder, citizenship identity, and increased perception of state 
capacity are critical for inducing citizens to vote, then we should stress the importance of state 
involvement in the educational sector.  The liberalization and privatization trends that the 
continent is currently experiencing could be damaging in that they steal opportunities for the 
state to prove its capacity and forge connections with citizens through welfare provision.  These 
mechanisms also suggest that the state might increase citizens‟ participation through other 
visible, universal types of social services – like health services or road improvement as Lauren 
MacLean has noted in her Afrobarometer study (2012).   
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However, if linguistic brokerage, endowing family members with skills to communicate 
with government, drives the process then we would to see benefits to all families with children in 
Francophone schools whether public or private.  A premium should be put on French language 
instruction in all schools as a way to reach illiterate families, which are hesitant to get involved 
in politics. Government service provision and citizenship behavior offers an interesting and 
fruitful venue for scholars of African democracies. I hope to conduct future research, which tests 
the strength of these different mechanisms through different government welfare policies and for 
different types of political engagement. 
6.4 Obstacles that Remain 
My findings about the importance of language suggest that if basic education does not 
endow citizens with language skills it will not be enough to help citizens realize their full 
citizenship in Mali.  Although Mali‟s literacy rates are among the lowest in Africa, the basic 
dichotomy between indigenous languages, representing popular culture and everyday 
interactions, and colonial languages that are required for citizens‟ interaction with government 
persists in many countries in Africa. Unlike most other countries in the world, citizens in Africa 
states speak a different language at home than they do when they deal with government 
bureaucracy. Post colonial theorists have long warned of the danger of the colonial language as a 
lingering force of personal subjugation as well as the endangerment of indigenous languages and 
culture.
275
  I would like to suggest that beyond this abstract and symbolic alienation, colonial 
language has practical implications on democratization in countries where literacy rates remain 
so low.  Most states do not have formal education requirements for political participation - unlike 
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the American South in the 1800s that imposed literacy tests on African Americans. 
276
 Instead, 
the political constraints of language were largely “imposed” through a societal understanding of 
linguistic power. The power of French as a necessary condition for full political participation is 
both a product of the Malian population‟s collective imagination and understanding of politics 
and a direct effect of French language colonial institutions.   
I have sipped a shot of tea during many a grin conversation when two of the most 
educated group members discuss Malian politics or current world events.  When a less educated 
third party tries to offer an opinion, the first two members offer a sharp, commonly repeated 
Bamana retort: “You cannot even enter this conversation because you didn‟t go to school.277 
Those with an education, or similarly those who have traveled, often reassert their cosmopolitan 
perspective over those with local and specialized knowledge. Similarly in a conversation 
between neighbors or friends, one person might offer that something happened in the news and 
second person adds another detail that they heard.  The first person denigrates the second‟s 
opinion because he “heard” it, while his own sources of information came from a more official 
written source. In some sense, knowledge from reading is more valuable or more authoritative.  
This hierarchy of information is most likely a result of the harsh reality facing most illiterate 
Malians: they are unable to interact with formal government institutions without an interpreter or 
information broker.   
For those citizens who manage to obtain fluency in a colonial language – education 
endows them with more complete citizenship.   However, the idea of the political sphere as being 
dominated by a Western, educated elite permeates many other countries where literacy rates 
remain low for the masses.  In talking about the difficulties that illiteracy poses to development, 
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Brock-Utne writes, “It seems paradoxical that most them (donors) are not more concerned with 
the fact that some 90% of the people in Africa have no knowledge of the official language of 
their country, even though it is assumed to be the language of communication between citizens 
and government (2002: 17).” She cites Paulin Djité on citizens in Francophone African 
countries, which historically have had the lowest literacy rates: 
It is hard to believe that there can be, or that one can possible argue, for a true and lasting 
development under such policy when so many people do not know their constitutional 
and legal rights, cannot understand the development goals of their governments and 
therefore cannot exercise their basic democratic rights, simply because they are writing in 
foreign languages (Brock-Utne 2002: 16 citing Djité 1990: 98). 
 
These arguments seem even more compelling as they relate to democracy.  How can we expect 
citizens to fully engage with a political system that is largely out of their linguistic reach?  
As the chart below demonstrates, less than seventy percent of adults are literate in the 
state language in many African countries.  Only in a few places, does literacy hover near 90%.  
Figure 19: Percent Adult Literacy Rates in Selected African Countries (2005-2008)
278
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In her studies, Brock-Utne argues that fewer than 5% of all African children schooled in 
European languages reach proficiency (Gandolfo 2009 citing Brock-Utne 2003,68); not only 
does this have an impact on the quality of their substantive education, but on their potential as 
participants in democracy.  
This linguistic dilemma is applicable to other countries where the government policies 
and programs operate in language other than that of mass popular, discourse.  Paulin Djité ‟s 
work on South East Asia suggests similar dynamics in another complex multi-lingual 
environment (2011).While local language radio operates in many of these contexts, the inability 
of citizens to personally interact with democratic institutions without a third party substantially 
impacts the potential for autonomous citizenship and representative democracy.  When 
information is difficult for citizens to access, they become dependent on linguistic brokers with 
“official” language skills who can represent their interests.   
 Experimental work has shown that information campaigns can overcome clientalist 
efforts at political mobilization regardless of education levels (Pande 2011).  However, in the 
real world, even if, as I find, citizens are able to learn discrete facts about politics without 
knowing how to speak French fluently, they are limited by available information sources and 
subject to the whims and reliability of information brokers: local radio DJs, chiefs, or educated 
people in their villages. A meta-trading language, like Bamana or Songhrai, might give citizen 
access to greater information than someone who speaks Bozo or Tamasheq, but in order to 
achieve “complete” autonomous citizenship one has to deal in the currency of the former French 
language.   More importantly, there remain institutional obstacles posed by French language: the 
police, the judiciary, the public records office, hospitals.  These institutions operate exclusively 
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in French, so in order to file a complaint, get a land title, register your child at school, or get a 
prescription filled – you need the assistance of someone else who speaks French.   
Given that language appears to be a critical element of complete citizenship, we should 
put a premium on official language instruction for students in all schools, including madrassas, 
and consider the ways that French literacy classes for adults might help them to gain political 
autonomy.  However, since education is unlikely to reach the poorest of the poor, those in remote 
rural areas, and poor women, a complementary, and more radical, strategy would be to reshape 
the nature of democratic politics in Africa to embody and reflect more widely spoken indigenous 
languages (Gandolfo 2009).  While this might be a less possible option in places where linguistic 
fractionalization is high, it is possible in places like Mali or Kenya or regionally in Nigeria where 
meta-trading languages, like Bambara, Swahili, and Hausa are widely spoken.  This does not 
necessarily require a “linguistic renationalization” of democratic spaces, but greater efforts in the 
translation and dissemination of resources in local languages or Arabic.  For instance, only two 
courts in Mali, one in Segou and one in Bamako offer offices of operational assistance – that 
translates and explains judicial information to everyday citizens.  The state could undertake 
efforts to make these kinds of resources more accessible to citizens – especially rural 
populations.  While these initiatives would take scarce resources away from the Malian state, it is 
critical to raise questions about the ability of the median Malian citizen to be able relate to and 
understand her democratic institutions.   
6.5 Islamic Education and Democracy 
There has been debate in political science about the compatibility of democracy and 
Islam, but little attention has been given to the emerging Muslim democracies of West Africa: 
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Senegal, Mali, and more recently, Niger, and Guinea.
279
  Villalón‟s (2010) pioneering work on 
Islam in West Africa has moved past the reductionist questions of whether Islam and Democracy 
are compatible to focus on the ways that Islam and democratization affect each other. In 
upcoming work, Villalón and Idrissa will examine the major education policy changes 
subsequent to democracy, in which many countries – including Mali responded to mass demand 
for state support for Islamic education (forthcoming.) Partnership with Islamic providers was a 
groundbreaking change considering that collaboration between the government and Islamic 
schools had been plagued by suspicions and hostility from colonial time throughout 
independence.
280
  Under colonialism in Mali, madrassas were banned from offering French – 
which isolated many of their graduates from the political system.  The current system, which 
acknowledges madrassas as accredited institutions of state education, mandates that they teach 
French, and offers Arabic language testing options, attempts to incorporate them in the 
citizenship project.  For the first time, constituencies that support Islamic education, have tracks 
gain access to higher education and in government. 
There has been much debate about the role of madrassas in state-building or the 
proliferation of terrorism, but little has been said about their democratic potential.  This study 
suggests that incorporating Islamic schooling has two potential effects on democratic deepening.  
First, Malian madrassas appear as capable of shaping informed citizens, who are as willing to 
vote and participate, as their francophone counterparts.  In this sense, Islamic schooling has the 
ability to encourage more informed and more active democratic citizens from communities that 
prefer religious education.  Koranic schools are typically cast-off as archaic centers of rote 
memorization, which preserve hierarchy and or places where children begging for alms are 
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pulled out of productive classroom time. However, my results suggest that Koranic schools have 
the democratic potential of other schools to instill critical thinking and cognitive ability.  Policy 
makers might reexamine how they could engage with Koranic teachers to offer short courses on 
citizenship and democracy to make students more aware of their rights and obligations in the 
current political system. 
What we cannot guarantee is that madrassas or Koranic schools will produce democrats 
with liberal values. Since I did not observe school curriculum I do not want to make claims about 
educational content beyond what is included in the Ministry of Education guidelines.  I can say 
that, anecdotally, when I dropped in on a madrassa in Niamakoro to observe classrooms and 
interview teachers, I walked into a history lesson in Arabic on the democratic transition in Mali.  
A study of madrassas in Mali found that the majority were teaching content on “peace and 
tolerance (Moussa et al 2007).”  However, as we saw in Chapter two values that are associated 
with democracy can vary substantially.  My research can speak to how education might elicit and 
encourage citizen engagement in politics, but cannot specify what the content of their demands 
will be.  It is likely that if Islamic schooling graduates, particularly those alumni of madrassas get 
more involved in the political realm, there will be greater political representation of a broader set 
of values systems including some of the more conservative ideas within reformist schools of 
Islam.  This could lead to greater debate and contestation within electoral politics and in the 
National Assembly.
281
 
Secondly, chapter 5 demonstrated that parents who choose Islamic education are less 
likely to participate in elections.  This is the first study to disaggregate citizens and their behavior 
by school choice and offers initial evidence that there are differences in the ways Islamic 
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schooling consumers and secular consumers participate in electoral politics.   While I do not 
make a causal argument, this descriptive evidence confirms popular attitudes within Mali that the 
most pious Malians, who choose Islamic schooling, simultaneously abstain from politics.  This 
might reflect the paucity of ideological diversity among the field of candidates as much as their 
indifference toward the system.  It suggests important future research that focuses political 
attitudes and behavior of Islamic schooling in Mali and other Sahelian countries.  
The current collaboration between the state and Islamic schooling in the democratic 
context sends signals to Islamic consumers that their preferences are recognized and legitimated 
by the state.  State support for Islamic education and the newly instituted Arabic university 
entrance exam could change the future political terrain of Mali.  Until now, Western educated 
elites have held a monopoly over national level politics. This is because higher education was 
synonymous with Francophone education.  It remains to be seen if high “qualified candidates” 
with Islamic schooling backgrounds emerge.  These candidates could potentially offer a broader 
set of values-based political stances, and we might see something analogous to conservative 
political movements in the US.  My research suggests that this will depend both on their French 
language acquisition and/or government language policy toward Arabic. 
Other states, such as Gambia, Senegal, and Niger have adopted similar policies to 
integrate madrassas in national efforts to expand enrollment.
282
  In all these cases, government 
willingness to partner with Islamic providers favored by subsets of the population who may have 
been reticent to participation in secular politics is one step forward to incorporating these 
communities into electoral processes and democratic representation.  By expanding the range of 
citizens who are exercising their “political voice,” this policy change has the potential to increase 
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the representativeness of African democracies, but also change the elite, secular values we 
currently associate with West African politics.   
6.6 Educational Policy and Democracy: Future Work   
Donors and governments should consider the effects of education provision and 
education policy on the state of democracy in Africa.  Many of the positive changes that I have 
outlined are unintended benefits of efforts to reach development goals, rather than calculated 
government strategy to improve the quality of democracy.  The increase in girls‟ and rural 
enrollment and partnership with Islamic schools, though driven in part by citizen demand, was 
also largely engineered to reach development targets. Ironically, these democratic gains have 
happened accidentally. Unlike the post independence era, democratic expansion has not been 
accompanied by national efforts to inculcate citizens and shape their democratic behavior.  Given 
the young age and the limited resources of African democracies, inattention to building more 
representative or participatory democracy is unsurprising. After all, many politicians and 
theorists of fledgling democracies might prefer less citizen participation as not to overwhelm 
nascent institutions (Almond and Verba 1963).   
However, citizen “voice” is critical for legitimizing democratic institutions and for 
making them more accountable.  In that sense, we should celebrate these accidental “democratic 
gains,” but also look to expand on them.  The case study of Mali has revealed citizens who feel 
largely isolated from the democratic institutions that represent them.  I suspect that this cynicism 
plagues many other African democracies – especially among the less educated and the less 
powerful. In the future, donors and governments should be mindful of how education policy 
might be used to forge connections with citizens and further their capacity to build the 
democracy that best represents their interests and ideas.  In environments of low external 
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efficacy, internal efficacy is necessary characteristic for empowered engagement.  I hope to 
continue the investigation of the relationship between different levels and types of education, 
cognitive development, and internal efficacy in other African countries to test the following 
hypotheses: 
H(1): Any type of education can foster cognitive development 
H(2): This cognitive development increases citizens’ political knowledge 
H(3): Increased education translates into increased internal efficacy  
H(4): In low literacy environments, proficiency in former colonial languages plays a 
critical role in building the highest levels of internal efficacy. 
Moving forward, I would like to develop better measures of “cognitive development” and 
“internal efficacy” in order to test their relationship to political knowledge and political 
participation in a more sophisticated way.  Additionally, I would like to run my additional 
hypotheses in countries with strong civic education programs – such as Tanzania or South Africa 
– to see the role that civic education plays on knowledge and participation and how it interacts 
with internal efficacy.  My country of study did not have a strong civic education provision, but 
my findings do not preclude that citizens in other countries exposed to these curriculums might 
have an even better understanding of politics and sense of internal efficacy. 
6.7 Survey Research in Africa: Moving Forward 
This study builds on the survey tradition of citizens in Africa stemming from the ground-
breaking first wave of Afrobarometer surveys.  I am indebted to this tradition for the 
methodology it has afforded me.  Surveys enable us to quantify the opinions and behavior of 
“everyday citizens,” which is crucial for understanding the inner workings of democracy.  
However, researchers often are at the mercy of Western concepts and interpretations; response 
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categories can obscure different motivations for observed behavior.  My survey used a 
methodological innovation: I coupled survey research with open ended justifications for 
responses in order to try to understand the ways that respondents understood the questions and 
the ways that they talked about their own political action.
283
  I believe this one of the first studies 
of African citizens‟ attitudes and behaviors toward democracy that offers qualitative data to 
disaggregate similar looking behavior and to better anticipate bias. In the pre-testing phase, I 
removed questions when I felt that they were not resonating with respondents or when I didn‟t 
think they were internally valid.  In later stages as I recorded responses into Excel, I saw patterns 
of qualitative responses that contradicted the closed- responses from the same survey, I decided 
not to use these particular dependent variables because of potential conformity bias or lack of 
internal validity. 
284
      
Given my experience administering this project, I challenge survey research in the 
developing world, and African in particular, to better explore and address the following issues: 
distinctions between “empowered” and non-empowered participation, theoretical and contextual 
understandings of concepts in translation, non-response categories, and establishing expectations 
for bias in responses.   There are many different reasons a respondent might vote or campaign; 
they could support a relative, reward or punish a candidate‟s performance, receive a bribe, out of 
curiosity, out of patriotism, and/or out of fear.  However, when this participation is coded it all 
looks the same.  While I cannot place a value judgment on what type of voting behavior is better 
and/or exclude the possibility of multiple motivations at play, but it is important to establish if 
                                                          
283
 This strategy differs from using open ended responses for some questions and closed for others.  It 
includes observing respondents‟ justification for a given closed response – enabling the coder to see the 
logic behind the number or grade awarded. 
284
 For instance, I had envisioned using confidence in government institutions/actor as a dependent 
variable, but I observed too many respondents who gave government high ratings while simultaneously 
criticizing how unresponsive and selfish they were.  
 
 
221 
 
the actor fully understood the action they were participating in. Behavioral research in Africa 
needs to disaggregate between the political competences of respondents who report participating 
in “easy” activities.  As an example, a survey could assess an actor‟s degree of political 
competence – do they know who they voted for, do they know what party they were in, do they 
know anything about the party or candidate?  This evaluation could then be used to as an 
interaction term with participation variable (voting, party identification): informed* participation 
or uninformed*participation variable.  Social inequality and interpersonal dependence is 
widespread in African countries; given rampant group mobilization - especially in rural zones or 
among hierarchically stratified groups – informed participation should be disaggregated.  This 
kind of disaggregation is essential for identifying instances of agency in democratic 
participation. 
Surveys have to be translated from English to French to local languages. In addition, 
surveys need to incorporate the local conceptualizations of the topics of interest.  For instance, to 
ask about trust in political authority – you must understand “trust,” “political authority,” and any 
specific actors you reference. African survey research often has a weak theorization or discussion 
of these translations.  However, my results suggest that local understandings can create noise or 
distort the validity of closed-ended responses.  I offer two respondents from the village of 
Fatoma in Sevare region to illustrate this point. Salif, a 35 year old respondent with a Koranic 
education, rated his trust of the institution of the Presidency as “very high” (SV85).  However, 
Salif clearly understood the question to reference his current president ATT – rather than the 
abstract institution.  However, while providing the “very high” rating, Salif offered, “He (ATT) 
is my relative, but he doesn‟t care about me.” The stark contradiction between the high rating the 
president‟s disregard for Salif needs further interrogation to be properly understood.  Is he just 
 
 
222 
 
making up responses, is he trying to be compliant and then giving himself away, or can he 
somehow reconcile trust in the president and the president‟ neglect of his situation? Safiatou, 
from the same village, also rated trust in the president and every other institution as “very high.”  
She offers an explanation of this contradiction, “People have trust in them (institutions) because 
they are the superior authorities (SV83).”  Responses like these led me to the belief that Malians 
conception of trust could be rooted in communitarian conceptions of hierarchy rather than 
performance evaluations.  Later I began to observe patterns, where respondents would always 
afford the president this immunity, but be more willing to critic municipal officials.  This finding 
could explain inflated trust ratings for the President in almost all Afrobarometer surveys as being 
based on deference rather than a performance evaluation (Logan 2008). 
I was overwhelmed with the number of “I don‟t know” responses, which could make up 
to 15% of total responses for certain questions.  Watching different citizens run through “I don‟t 
knows” made me reflect on their reasons for doing so.  While some citizens clearly were not 
interested or did not care about the question, others, especially uneducated rural women, had 
difficulty understanding the hypothetical questions and concepts that we were describing.  
Survey research in Africa must have a better understanding of respondents‟ cognition abilities 
and/or ways to make the questions more accessible to respondents.  For instance, Bambara uses 
hundreds of traditional proverbs that resonate with all of its speakers and NGOs in Mali 
frequently employ picture boards to illustrate concepts.  A survey in Mali might be better served 
to integrate proverbs, illustrations, or to test other ways to make concepts and questions clearer 
to respondents.  Citizens‟ understanding and interpretation of the questions is critical for 
generating good data.  Survey teams and local research experts should collaborate to improve the 
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quality of this communication.  High categories of non-response should be analyzed to 
understand the reasons the respondents do not want to share or cannot share the information. 
Finally, years of survey research in the United States have generated priors about 
respondent compliance bias and other expected behaviors of respondents.  Citizen surveys in 
Africa need to formulate a better understanding of who conceals and exaggerates behavior and 
why.  In the US, educated citizens often exaggerate their levels of participation, but in Mali – I 
observed the most destitute respondents and female respondents were most likely to exaggerate 
their participation because they were most interested in “pleasing us” as interviewers.  Survey 
practitioners should collaborate to create a better expectation for response bias in Africa.  Better 
knowledge of how respondents interact with surveys will heighten our ability to use surveys 
productively and to better represent citizens‟ ideas, opinions, and behaviors.  
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Appendix 1: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Models 
Table 1:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Mayor’s Name  
Education 
Level 
Restricted to 
Citizens with 
Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with 
only Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.67* 
(.26) 
  
Primary 
1.16*** 
(.26) 
  
Secondary 
1.51*** 
(.32) 
  
University  
2.16*** 
(.51) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
-.31 
(.67) 
 
Christian  Perfect Prediction  
Community  
.55 
(.35) 
 
Madrassa  
.33 
(.34) 
 
Koranic    
.18 
(.51) 
Controls     
Woman  
-.94*** 
(.17) 
-1.15*** 
(.30) 
-.90** 
(.32) 
Rural  
1.03** 
(.38) 
-.01 
(.65) 
1.37* 
(.64) 
Poverty  
 .05 
(.08) 
.20 
(.13) 
-.25 
(.15) 
Age  
 .08 
(.06) 
                 .07 
                (.11) 
.00 
(.11) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
1.53*** 
(.36) 
    1.91** 
 (.63) 
.43 
(1.07) 
Bamako Coura  
1.91*** 
(.36) 
      2.51*** 
                 (.63) 
.16 
(1.31) 
Sikasso 1  
3.88*** 
(.41) 
     3.47*** 
 (.66) 
Perfectly Predicted 
Sikasso 2  
2.50*** 
(.51) 
      3.17*** 
(.87) 
2.72* 
(1.11) 
Timbuktu  
3.00*** 
(.38) 
      2.87*** 
(.66) 
3.17*** 
(.83) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
1.36** 
(.39) 
1.28* 
(.64) 
1.67 
(.89) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
 .61 
(.38) 
-.24 
(.69) 
1.17 
(.90) 
Mopti  
1.14** 
(.39) 
1.25* 
(.60) 
.88 
(.90) 
Sevare  
1.74** 
(.54) 
3.35** 
(.99) 
1.23 
(1.05) 
Constant  
    -2.54*** 
     (.27) 
              -1.91 
               (.66) 
-1.40 
(1.00) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .26 .27 .28 
Log Likelihood  -490.78 -167.45 -126.18 
Observations       952 334 254 
 
  
 
 
225 
 
Table 2:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
President of the Assembly  
Education 
Level 
Restricted to 
Citizens with 
Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with 
only Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.29 
(.28) 
  
Primary 
.77** 
(.26) 
  
Secondary 
2.42*** 
(.33) 
  
University  
Dropped since 
All Answered 
Correctly 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular/Christian  
-1.25 
(.81) 
 
 
Christian  
.27 
(1.98) 
 
Community  
.57 
(.34) 
 
Madrassa  
-.40 
(.34) 
 
Koranic    
.56 
(.48) 
Controls     
Woman  
-1.20*** 
(.18) 
-1.22*** 
(.29) 
-1.41*** 
(.41) 
Rural  
-.41 
(.46) 
-.43 
(.73) 
-.29 
(.81) 
Poverty  
 -.36*** 
(.09) 
-.41** 
(.14) 
                          -.54** 
                         .20 
Age  
 .22*** 
(.06) 
-.10 
(.11) 
                        .39** 
                       (.12) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
.65 
(.35) 
.56 
(.58) 
                       -.11 
                        (.81) 
Bamako Coura  
.63 
(.36) 
1.54** 
(.56) 
-.12 
(.94) 
Sikasso 1  
-.19* 
(.33) 
-.30 
(.57) 
-.58 
(.83) 
Sikasso 2  
-.15 
(.53) 
-.50 
(.84) 
-.27 
(1.03) 
Timbuktu  
-.04 
(.36) 
-.24 
(.59) 
-.18 
(.65) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
-.87* 
(.42) 
.09 
(.59) 
-1.67 
(.98) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
- .66 
(.36) 
-.93 
(.60) 
-.24 
(.75) 
Mopti  
  .11 
(.34) 
-.18 
(.55) 
.53 
(.67) 
Sevare  
-.59 
(.61) 
.30 
(.93) 
-2.76* 
(1.42) 
Constant  
    -.54 
     (.44) 
1.00 
(.59) 
-.55 
(.87) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .24 .17                          .22 
Log Likelihood  -449.15 -175.84 -112.21 
Observations       919 336 270 
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Table 3:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Majority Party  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.70* 
(.27) 
  
Primary 
1.29*** 
(.26) 
  
Secondary 
2.55*** 
(.32) 
  
University  
3.37*** 
(.62) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
-.43 
(.63) 
 
Christian  
.22 
(1.56) 
 
Community  
.60 
(.32) 
 
Madrassa  
-.22 
(.31) 
 
Koranic    
-.32 
(.42) 
Controls     
Woman  
-1.12*** 
(.17) 
-1.03*** 
(.28) 
-.99** 
(.35) 
Rural  
.07 
(.37) 
-.39 
(.65) 
-.20 
(.58) 
Poverty  
 -.04 
(.08) 
-.04 
(.12) 
-.21 
(.16) 
Age  
 .06 
(.06) 
.04 
(.10) 
.08 
(.11) 
Faladie  
-2.45*** 
(.36) 
-1.73** 
(.60) 
-3.02 
(.70) 
Banconi  
-2.31*** 
(.37) 
-1.93** 
(.64) 
Perfectly predicted failure 
Bamako Coura  
-1.88*** 
(.38) 
-1.49* 
(.61) 
-2.84 *** 
(.92) 
Sikasso 1  
-2.56*** 
(.37) 
-2.48*** 
(.63) 
-2.89*** 
(.74) 
Sikasso 2  
-2.33*** 
(.50) 
-3.45*** 
(.90) 
-2.10** 
(.79) 
Timbuktu  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Kayes Rive Droite  
-1.66*** 
(.27) 
-1.48* 
(.63) 
-1.53** 
(.57) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
- 2.33*** 
(.35) 
-2.14*** 
(.58) 
-2.36*** 
(.62) 
Mopti  
  -2.31 
(.37) 
-2.22*** 
(.61) 
-2.12*** 
(.59) 
Sevare  
-3.04*** 
(.56) 
-2.78** 
(.94) 
-3.77*** 
(.91) 
Constant  
    1.02* 
     (.44) 
2.05** 
(.62) 
2.54** 
(.76) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .21 .12 .22 
Log Likelihood  -507.93 -198.82 -130.81 
Observations       947 335 251 
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Table 4:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Term Limit  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.64** 
(.22) 
  
Primary 
1.08*** 
(.22) 
  
Secondary 
2.08*** 
(.34) 
  
University  
2.31** 
(.77) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular/Christian  
-1.30* 
(.56) 
 
Christian  
-1.45 
(1.50) 
 
Community  
.90* 
(.39) 
 
Madrassa  
               -.01 
                (.33) 
 
Koranic    
.27 
(.44) 
Controls     
Woman  
-83** 
(.18) 
-.82* 
(.32) 
-.84** 
(.31) 
Rural  
-.33 
(.38) 
.40 
(.65) 
-.47 
(.61) 
Poverty  
 -.16* 
(.07) 
-.24 
(.13) 
-.22 
(.14) 
Age  
 .07 
(.06) 
-.10 
(.11) 
.04 
(.10) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
-.04 
(.33) 
-.43 
(.57) 
-.37 
(.67) 
Bamako Coura  
.65 
(.38) 
.75 
(.61) 
.13 
(.80) 
Sikasso 1  
.83* 
(.35) 
.58 
(.56) 
2.23 
(1.14) 
Sikasso 2  
.33 
(.48) 
-.62 
(.77) 
3.23* 
(1.26) 
Timbuktu  
.41 
(.33) 
.15   
(.58) 
                           .53 
(.57) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
-.19 
(.34) 
-.06 
(.57) 
                           .14 
                          (.63) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
.24 
(.32) 
.39 
(.52) 
-.18 
(.62) 
Mopti  
  .91 
(.36) 
.93 
(.61) 
                          .63 
                          (.63) 
Sevare  
-.50 
(.51) 
.21 
(.93) 
-.16 
(.83) 
Constant  
    -.37 
     (.40) 
1.95** 
(.60) 
1.06 
(.74) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .13 .07 .15 
Log Likelihood  -498.32 -177.59 -146.49 
Observations       952 336 270 
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Table 5:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Voted  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.49* 
(.24) 
  
Primary 
.57** 
(.23) 
  
Secondary 
.42  
(.29) 
  
University  
 .67 
(.48) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
-.13 
(.63) 
 
Christian  Perfectly predicted failure  
Community  
.49 
 (.37) 
 
Madrassa  
                  .23 
                  (.34) 
 
Koranic    
-.03 
(.46) 
Controls     
Woman  
-.11 
(.17) 
.06 
(.30) 
.03 
(.33) 
Rural  
-.36 
 (.38) 
-.29 
(.68) 
-.09 
(.61) 
Poverty  
 .02 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.13) 
.06 
(.15) 
Age  
 .31*** 
(.06) 
.30** 
(.12) 
.20 
(.11) 
Member of Association  
.26** 
(.08) 
.29 
(.15) 
.14 
(.18) 
Member of Religious Association  
.09 
(.10) 
.15 
(.19) 
.20 
(.20) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
.71* 
(.34) 
.14 
(.63) 
.86 
(.75) 
Bamako Coura  
.41 
(.34) 
.37 
(.64) 
.56 
(.85) 
Sikasso 1  
-.14 
(.32) 
                  - .28 
(.61) 
-.41 
(.71) 
Sikasso 2  
1.24* 
(.50) 
.47 
(.88) 
2.05* 
(.98) 
Timbuktu  
1.28** 
(.37) 
1.20   
(.73) 
                      1.93* 
(.70) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
-.12 
(.34) 
-.69 
(.62) 
                       .02 
                       (.65) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
-.04 
(.31) 
-.33 
(.56) 
.14 
(.64) 
Mopti  
  .34 
(.34) 
-.08 
(.60) 
                          .62 
                          (.66) 
Sevare  
1.13* 
(.55) 
1.17 
(1.04) 
.77 
(.90) 
Constant  
    -1.05 
     (.41) 
-.47 
(.65) 
-.63 
(.79) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .09 .10 .11 
Log Likelihood  -507.67 -166.60 -135.39 
Observations       869 296 254 
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Table 6:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
PartyID  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.27 
(.22) 
  
Primary 
.49* 
(.21) 
  
Secondary 
.30 
(.27) 
  
University  
 .31 
(.45) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
.07 
(.57) 
 
Christian  Perfectly predicted failure  
Community  
.65* 
(.32) 
 
Madrassa  
                  .15 
                (.30) 
 
Koranic    
-.57 
(.41) 
Controls     
Woman  
-.48** 
(.16) 
-.51 
(.27) 
-.66 
(.31) 
Rural  
.33 
(.35) 
.33 
(.61) 
.33 
(.59) 
Poverty  
 .05 
(.07) 
-.08 
(.12) 
-.12 
(.14) 
Age  
 .06 
(.05) 
.06 
(.10) 
.11 
(.10) 
Member of Association  
.22** 
(.07) 
.29* 
(.13) 
.39* 
(.16) 
Member of Religious Association  
-.10 
(.07) 
-.16 
(.15) 
.03 
(.17) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
.28 
(.30) 
-.07 
(.15) 
.34 
(.73) 
Bamako Coura  
.79 
(.32) 
.92 
(.57) 
-.31 
(.95) 
Sikasso 1  
-.01 
(.30) 
                  - .11 
(.52) 
-.18 
(.76) 
Sikasso 2  
.18 
(.43) 
-.34 
(.74) 
.78 
(.85) 
Timbuktu  
.65* 
(.31) 
-.06   
(.54) 
                       2.05** 
(.64) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
-.26 
(.33) 
-.16 
(.55) 
                           .90 
                          (.67) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
-.31 
(.30) 
-.72 
(.50) 
.73 
(.67) 
Mopti  
  .23 
(.31) 
-.06 
(.52) 
                          .57 
                          (.66) 
Sevare  
.63 
(.50) 
.13 
(.87) 
1.72 
(.90) 
Constant  
    -.44 
     (.38) 
.23 
(.55) 
-.36 
(.76) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .06 .08 .15 
Log Likelihood  -591.61 -201.01 -152.21 
Observations       909 317 258 
 
Table 7:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
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Campaign  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.26 
(.27) 
  
Primary 
.61* 
(.26) 
  
Secondary 
.79* 
(.31) 
  
University  
 1.24* 
(.48) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
-.91 
(.81) 
 
Christian  Perfectly predicted failure  
Community  
1.07** 
(.32) 
 
Madrassa  
                  .05 
                (.33) 
 
Koranic    
.51 
(.47) 
Controls     
Woman  
-.65*** 
(.17) 
-.69* 
(.30) 
-.71* 
(.34) 
Rural  
-.59 
(.40) 
-.47 
(.70) 
1.31 
(.75) 
Poverty  
 .01 
(.08) 
-.03 
(.13) 
-.13 
(.15) 
Age  
 -.08 
(.06) 
-.22 
(.12) 
.11 
(.10) 
Member of Association  
.35*** 
(.07) 
.44** 
(.13) 
.40* 
(.16) 
Member of Religious Association  
.05 
(.10) 
-.09 
(.15) 
-.10 
(.20) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
.19 
(.32) 
-26 
(.59) 
.25 
(.91) 
Bamako Coura  
-.55 
(.35) 
-.20 
(.59) 
.65 
(1.04) 
Sikasso 1  
-.96** 
(.35) 
                -.85 
(.62) 
.11 
(.93) 
Sikasso 2  
.23 
(.48) 
-.64 
(.82) 
2.18* 
(1.04) 
Timbuktu  
-.06 
(.33) 
-.53   
(.60) 
                       .66 
(.74) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
.06 
(.35) 
.24 
(.58) 
                        .80 
                       (.82) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
-.16 
(.33) 
-.20 
(.54) 
.69 
(.81) 
Mopti  
 .13 
(.33) 
-.15 
(.56) 
                        .15 
                        (.85) 
Sevare  
.85 
(.53) 
-.01 
(.94) 
2.55* 
(1.09) 
Constant  
    -.97 
     (.42) 
-.12 
(.60) 
-1.51 
(.90) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .08 .10 .07 
Log Likelihood  -506.47 -178.13 -137.02 
Observations       916 318 260 
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Table 8:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Would Run  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
-.03 
(.26) 
  
Primary 
.56* 
(.24) 
  
Secondary 
.68* 
(.29) 
  
University  
 1.22** 
(.46) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
-.97 
(.63) 
 
Christian  Perfectly predicted failure  
Community  
.70* 
(.32) 
 
Madrassa  
                  .20 
                (.32) 
 
Koranic    
-.95* 
(.42) 
Controls     
Woman  
-.35* 
(.16) 
-.32 
(.28) 
.46 
(.36) 
Rural  
.56 
(.37) 
.91 
(.65) 
.81 
(.76) 
Poverty  
- .04 
(.07) 
-.23 
(.12) 
-.03 
(.16) 
Age  
 -.24*** 
(.06) 
-.26* 
(.11) 
-.20 
(.12) 
Member of Association  
.13 
(.07) 
.16 
(.12) 
.08 
(.17) 
Member of Religious Association  
.03 
(.09) 
-.33* 
(.16) 
.20 
(.20) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
.19 
(.31) 
.54 
(.57) 
1.53 
(.85) 
Bamako Coura  
-.01 
(.32) 
.21 
(.55) 
.99 
(1.00) 
Sikasso 1  
-.06 
(.31) 
                  .14 
(.54) 
1.40 
(.76) 
Sikasso 2  
-.38 
(.46) 
-1.29 
(.80) 
.47 
(1.05) 
Timbuktu  
-.08 
(.33) 
-.15   
(.57) 
                       1.07 
(.78) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
-.30 
(.35) 
-.45 
(.57) 
                      - .36 
                      (.94) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
-.27 
(.31) 
-.27 
(.52) 
.21 
(.88) 
Mopti  
 -.38 
 (.34) 
-.19 
(.55) 
                      -.55 
                     (1.00) 
Sevare  
-.67 
(.52) 
-.91 
(.90) 
.13 
(1.13) 
Constant  
    -19 
     (.40) 
.64 
(.58) 
-.87 
(.90) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .07 .07 .11 
Log Likelihood  -536.95 -195.64 -127.41 
Observations       887 314 253 
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Table 9:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Contact Government  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.04 
(.30) 
  
Primary 
.47 
(.28) 
  
Secondary 
.81* 
(.34) 
  
University  
 1.01* 
(.49) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
.51 
(.67) 
 
Christian  Perfectly predicted failure  
Community  
.38 
(.36) 
 
Madrassa  
                  .31 
                (.36) 
 
Koranic    
-.84 
(.46) 
Controls     
Woman  
-.65*** 
(.19) 
-.58 
(.32) 
-1.20** 
(.46) 
Rural  
.77 
(.40) 
1.00 
(.68) 
-.05 
(.74) 
Poverty  
 .02 
(.09) 
.06 
(.14) 
-.06 
(.20) 
Age  
 .17** 
(.06) 
-.01 
(.12) 
.34* 
(.13) 
Member of Association  
.32*** 
(.08) 
.33* 
(.14) 
.45* 
(.18) 
Member of Religious Association  
.12 
(.10) 
.11 
(.16) 
.32 
(.21) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
.14 
(.34) 
-.19 
(.66) 
.14 
(.92) 
Bamako Coura  
.01 
(.35) 
.70 
(.60) 
Perfectly predicted Failure 
Sikasso 1  
-.79* 
(.37) 
               - .68 
(.68) 
-.30 
(.93) 
Sikasso 2  
-1.03* 
(.51) 
-1.15 
(.88) 
-.44 
(1.04) 
Timbuktu  
-.55 
(.40) 
-1.37   
(.88) 
                       .42 
                        (.76) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
-.24 
(.39) 
.19 
(.62) 
                           .37 
                          (.86) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
.04 
(.34) 
-1.15 
(.88) 
.12 
(.87) 
Mopti  
  -.58 
(.40) 
-.74 
(.67) 
                          .28 
                          (.82) 
Sevare  
-2.15* 
(.66) 
-1.36 
(.99) 
Perfectly Predicts Failure 
Constant  
    -1.87 
     (.47) 
1.40* 
(.66) 
-1.80 
(.99) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .10 .10 .16 
Log Likelihood  -433.04 -154.77 -95.95 
Observations       908 316 217 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
Table 10:  Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Discuss Politics  Education Level 
Restricted to Citizens 
with Primary School 
Education 
Restricted to Citizens with only 
Informal Education 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved     
Informal 
.42 
(.23) 
  
Primary 
.88*** 
(.23) 
  
Secondary 
1.28*** 
(.28) 
  
University  
2.24** 
(.60) 
  
Types of School Attended     
Private Secular  
.27 
(.56) 
 
Christian  
.14 
(1.57) 
 
Community  
.73* 
(.32) 
 
Madrassa  
                  -.25 
                  (.31) 
 
Koranic    
-.26 
(.39) 
Controls     
Woman  
-.73** 
(.16) 
-1.03*** 
(.28) 
-.46 
(.32) 
Rural  
.26 
(.36) 
0.09 
(.62) 
.66 
(.60) 
Poverty  
 -.11 
(.07) 
.00 
(.12) 
-.24 
(.14) 
Age  
 -.13 
(.05) 
-.23* 
(.10) 
-.11 
(.10) 
Member of Association  
.34 
(.08) 
.38** 
(.13 
.39* 
(.15) 
Member of Religious Association  
-.06 
(.09) 
-.07 
(.15) 
-.28 
(.19) 
Faladie  Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category 
Banconi  
.78* 
(.33) 
.89 
(.59) 
-.92 
(.74) 
Bamako Coura  
.79* 
(.33) 
1.26* 
(.57) 
-1.16 
(.94) 
Sikasso 1  
.76* 
(.32) 
1.56** 
(.56) 
-.74 
.75) 
Sikasso 2  
.05 
(.49) 
.27 
(.75) 
-1.36 
(.86) 
Timbuktu  
.62 
(.33) 
.16   
(.57) 
                           .09 
(.60) 
Kayes Rive Droite  
.35 
(.34) 
1.02 
(.57) 
                           -.22 
                          (.66) 
Kayes Rive Gauche  
.41 
(.31) 
.90 
(.52) 
-1.09 
(.69) 
Mopti  
  .24 
(.33) 
.58 
(.54) 
                          -.35 
                          (.65) 
Sevare  
-.49 
(.51) 
.96 
(.87) 
-2.25* 
(.93) 
Constant  
    -.48 
     (.39) 
.12 
(.58) 
1.27 
(.77) 
McFadden’s+/Pseudo R-squared         .12 .10 .11 
Log Likelihood  -553.53 -198.70 -153.67 
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